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ABSTRACT
A SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN
STEEL INDUSTRY, 1865-1929: FACTORY CLOSURES IN THE
CYCLE OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

ty
Daniel J . Santoro
University of New H am pshire, December, 1988

The case of th e developm ent of the A m erican steel industry
from 1865-1929 is used in a socio-historical analysis of factory
closures in order to critically ad d ress the th eo ry of deindustrialization,
influential in m u ch cu rren t sociological work, developed by w riters
su c h as B luestone an d H arrison (1982). The historiography of th e
steel in d u stry is analyzed in order to exam ine the role o f factory
closures in the form ation and disform ation of th e n atio n ’s basic
capacity to produce by com paring th e course of steel in d u stry
developm ent from R econstruction th ro u g h th e first th irty years of th e
tw entieth cen tu ry to th a t following th e Second World W ar, especially
the developm ent of th e in d u stry su b seq u en t to 1970—th e so-called
"deindustrialization wave." This approach is intended to overcome
problem s associated w ith the lim ited historical scope ch aracteristic of
c u rre n t literatu re on deindustrialization.
By focusing on th e tran sitio n from iron to steel production in the
dom estic context, th e H om estead Strike of 1892, the form ation of the
U nited S tates Steel Corporation in 1901, a n d the rise of steel p ro d u c
ing centers like Youngstown, Ohio, a n d Gary, Indiana, a s well as by

xiii

analyzing n atio n al economic policy, e.g., protectionism , and com m un
ity case studies, several conclusions are reached. Factory closures are
found to have played a n im portant role in both developm ent an d
dism antling of th e dom estic steel in d u stry so th a t th e contem porary
n a tu re of factory closures is found not to reflect a n aberration of a n
otherw ise health y accum ulation process specific to th e cu rren t era.
Since factory closures play essentially th e sam e role in industrializa
tion and deindustrialization, it is suggested th a t s u c h events are b etter
u ndersto o d w ithin th e process of the reproduction of capitalist society
as firm s act to re-create th e social conditions—i.e., class and m ark et
relations—u n d e r w hich capital accum ulation is possible. Specifically,
factory closures historically enter: (1) th e cycle of lab o r control a s
events w hich re-create th e conditions u n d e r w hich labor-pow er is
bought and sold, (2) the cycle of capitalist com petition as capitalists
com pete for control over production a n d m arkets, a n d (3) th e
organization of geographic space in a w ay w hich facilitates capital
accum ulation.

xiv

Sociology is th e art of saying old th in g s in new w ays
and th e science of affirming contradictions.
--Gonzalez Prada

CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION:
SOCIO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION
AND THE STEEL CASE

The issu e and concept of deindustrialization h a s become
im portant in social science. W ithin sociology itself, deindustrialization
is discussed in a variety of subdlsciplinary contexts Including sociology
of development, industrial sociology, sociology of work, political
sociology, and economic sociology. In cu rren t sociological discourse,
the concept of deindustrialization is applied to explain c u rren t trends
in th e economy and in th e workplace since World War II an d
especially since the 1970s. My work is intended to contribute to the
debate over deindustrialization and offer a critical exam ination and
reconsideration of the theory by viewing it against the historical
narrative of the domestic steel industry. In general, I a s se rt th a t when
viewed against a wider historical landscape, the concern of
sociologists w ith deindustrialization a s it is presently conceived m u st
be re-evaluated--we cannot speak of deindustrialization p er se as an
historically unique process since its attrib u tes and the events in which
it is m anifested are characteristic of th e process of industrialization as
well.
The approach I take in th is stu d y is in line w ith growing interest
in the discipline for attention to more historically oriented w ork in
sociology: processes of political-economic development a t th e
system ic level and the relationship betw een these an d processes
1
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played o u t a t the local and organizational levels; and th e social problem
of deindustrialization with special regard to the dynam ics and effects
of factory closures. Through sociological analysis of a n historical case,
th a t of th e rise and decline of the domestic steel Industry, the cu rrent
crisis as it relates to th e issue of deindustrialization can be more
adequately understood by explicating th e relationship between the
event of th e factory closure and the process of capitalist development.
In th is study, I develop a sociological analysis of the history of
steel production in the United S tates w hich places th e process of
deindustrialization in socio-historical context. This will be
accom plished through the application of social-scientific concepts
concerning political-economic development to th e analysis of the
historiography of steel. In taking a socio-historical approach, I will
examine the career of the steel in d u stry in the U.S. covering its
inception an d growth in the post-Civil W ar period to its apparent
decline an d transform ation in the post-World W ar II period. This will
entail an analysis of post-World War II developments in th e U.S. by
setting them against th e m ajor eras in th e development of the steel
industry in America from the end of the Civil W ar (1865) to about
1929.
The focus of th is introduction is to establish a definitional
startin g point for th e ensuing study. Therefore, th e rem ainder of th is
chapter is devoted to three tasks: to define the w ork in term s of its
historical orientation, to define deindustrialization a s a sociological
issue, and to sketch the analysis and identify the issu es covered in
subseq u en t chapters.

3
Historical Sociology an d th e Steel Industry Case
The history of th e U.S. economy and th a t of the steel Industry
subseq u en t to 1945, particularly since I960, h a s been of special
Importance to sociologists working in the area of deindustrialization.
Schw elkart (1984, p. 33) states th a t concern w ith this issue h a s
followed th e "collapse of the post-WWII economic expansion." The
concept of deindustrialization h a s gained acceptance in sociology in
the wake of Bluestone an d H arrison’s (1982) work, The D eindustrial
ization of America, an d w as developed largely in a n effort to explain
th e social im portance of th e post-w ar collapse.
In order to u n d erstand deindustrialization properly, both as a
social issue an d as a social scientific theory, the problem m u st be
approached historically. Toward th is end, I draw upon relevant
conceptual frameworks an d inform ation from su c h areas as sociology,
political economy, and history in th e analysis of a concrete case--the
American steel in d u stry —in order to form generalizations from the
specific process of in d u strial development to w ider systemic
processes.
The United S tates steel in d u stry provides a n historical case
against w hich the theories of political-economic development, i.e.,
those concerned with Its social, spatial, and tem poral aspects, can be
tested against historical evidence. This, then, is a work in historical
sociology. T hat Is, it is influenced by the social scientific tradition th a t
seeks to "transcend the seeming boundaries betw een theory,
abstractly form ulated, an d history, concretely recorded" (Harvey 1982,
p. xiv). In undertaking a socio-historical analysis, I am concerned with
two general realm s of com parison. The first of th ese is the com
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parison of theory to historical information, i.e., the ex ten t to w hich the
explanatory power of concepts holds up to scrutiny in term s of actu al
developments. T heda Skocpol (1984a, p. 362) describes historical
sociology a s a forum wherein "history and theoretical ideas [can be
brought] to bear on one another." Here, Industrialization an d deindus
trialization, for example in steel, can best be viewed a s historically
situated processes m anifested in concrete actions and living events,
like th e opening an d closing of factories. These actions an d events
produce p attern s w hich need to be explained in term s of their
consequences and roles in the broader processes associated with the
reproduction of the social relations of capital accum ulation.
The second realm of com parison Is th a t between eras. The b asis
of a socio-historical analysis is to u se w hat is known of th e p ast to
make se n se of the present. As a society, we have become concerned
with the m eaning of cu rren t social trends, an d social scientists have
attached th e term deindustrialization to one su ch trend. My work is
an attem p t to u n d erstan d the p resen t in term s of the p a s t in order,
among o th er things, to determ ine w hether or n o t we have nam ed It
correctly. But, my concern here is not m erely one of sem antics.
Rather, since we conceptualize an d create terminology w ith reference
to concrete social processes, a crucial task of all social science is the
constant re-evaluation of the "fit" between theory and historical
experience (cf. Trudgill 1983, pp. 133-134, an d Com forth 1963, pp.
60-62).

In using th e history of th e American steel industry, it m u st

be borne in mind th a t we choose o u r cases "so that... th e far is seen a s
near an d rath e r synonym ous w ith th e concerns of our own era" (Khleif
1986, p. 219); and th a t the Issues of our own era, e.g., th e
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deindustrialization of America, are necessarily lenses through w hich
we view the past. The problem of deindustrialization, a s it is currently
conceptualized in sociology an d contem porarily experienced in social
life, is th e vantage point from which the history of steel
industrialization is viewed. In other words, an idea ab o u t a particular
asp ect of current social life is assessed in relation to historical
development of m aterial conditions of w hich it is a p a rt (cf. Com forth
1963, p. i). In th is way, p rese n t social conditions can be more clearly
understood.
It h as been argued th a t social scientific disciplines emerged
w ith th e need "to come to grips with th e roots and unprecedented
effects of capitalist commercialization" (Skocpol 1984a, p. 1), b o th in
defense and criticism of capitalist based developm ents (cf. W allerstein
1984, pp. 173-74; Anderson 1985, p. 31; an d H udson 1985, p. 35).
As a society we continue to face the sam e problem s in different form,
and social science continues in efforts to u n d erstan d the
contem porary course of capitalist development and its effects. The
atten tio n sociologists give to th e problem of deindustrialization is p art
of th is overall concern.
Definition of th e Problem and Its T reatm ent w ithin Sociology
The starting point of th is study is to Identify th e way
deindustrialization Is conceptualized in contem porary social science.
In developing a prelim inary definition an d point of reference for this
study, particular em phasis is placed on th e contribution made by
B luestone and H arrison (1982) since th eir work h a s exerted the
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g reatest influence on contem porary sociological treatm en ts of the
Issue.
Concern w ith the dynam ics and effects of p lan t closures on
com m unities h as intensified w ithin sociology (as it h as in other
contexts such as government, law, and the labor movement).
Schw eikart (1984, p. 33) sta tes th at, "Until recently...plant closings
were accepted along with tornadoes, floods, and other d isasters as
som ething to be endured." They were seen as "accidents" or "acts of
God" connected w ith the vagaries of w hat is otherwise rational
economic life. B u t th e Increased frequency of p lan t closures, espec
ially since the 1970s, has prom pted the analysis and discussion of a
definite trend w hich social scientists have come to call
"deindustrialization." It is th e com m unity case study, focusing on
effects a t the local level, w hich h a s made the strongest contribution to
taking th e discussion of factory closures out of the realm of accidental
occurrence. With particular reference to the steel industry, Staughton
Lynd's (1982) The Fight against Shutdow ns: Youngstown's Steel Mill
Closings and B uss an d R edbum 's (1983) Shutdow n a t Youngstown:
Public Policy for M ass Unemployment stand as the m ost influential
studies. Such w orks have done m uch to move u s away from the view of
p lant closings as accidental occurrences connected w ith th e tem po
rary vagaries of a n otherwise self-regulating and rational economy by
dem onstrating th a t p lan t closings are the outcom es of decisions made
by h u m a n actors w ithin organizational stru ctu res of corporations and
played o u t on the local level w ithin communities. Along a sim ilar line,
Adams (1982, p. 6) discusses p la n t closures an d movement of capital
and jo b s relating them to a range of decisions m ade within capitalist
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firm s w here the realities imposed by political and economic stru ctu res
establish the param eters within w hich su c h decisions are made.
W ithin sociology, deindustrialization is generally defined as a
process of redirecting profits and shifting of productive capital.
Bluestone and H arrison (1982, p. 6) sta te th a t "By deindustrialization
is m eant a w idespread, system atic disinvestm ent in th e nation's basic
productive capacity" (em phasis added). It is accom panied by and is
p a rt of a general p attern of investm ent which, according to Castells
(1980, p. 182), "tends n o t only to increase the capital-intensity of the
product in question, b u t also changes the quality of th e factor so as to
m ake fu rth er investm ents profitable." Implied in th e term deindus
trialization, then, is th e dislocation of factors of production according
to the criteria of profit. This suggests th a t factory closures need to be
examined w ithin th e broader context of capitalist development. For
example, su ch actions w hich in p a rt com prise the process of
deindustrialization in th e developed centers of the capitalist economy
contribute to and reproduce the characteristic conditions of uneven
developm ent--the progressive and u n eq u al economic differentiation of
regions (Smith 1986, pp. 87-103).
The process of deindustrialization is sum m arized in the current
sociological literature in term s of a variety of behaviors an d local
events referred to a s "capital flight," "runaw ay shops," "fugitive
industry" (McKenzie 1984), and "capital mobility" (Squires 1984).
Such term s express the complexity of th e phenom enon w hich covers
a range of concrete actions of capitalist firm s from lay-offs to actual
shutdow ns of production facilities In its m ost obvious an d severe form.
To such actions social scientists apply a variety of interpretations:
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from viewing them a s ultimately contributing to industrial
development and indicative of a vital economy (cf. McKenzie 1984} to
viewing them as destructive of b o th labor forces whose skills are made
superfluous and, ultimately, of com m unities (cf. Bluestone and
H arrison 1982). W ithin this general range of debate over the issu e of
deindustrialization,1 Bluestone an d H arrison's w ork h as gained the
m ost attention, an d within sociology the m ost su p p o rt (di Leonardo
1985, pp. 237-238).
Bluestone an d Harrison (1981, pp. 298-300, and 1982, pp. 7-8),
w hose work integrates major findings of com m unity level research,
outline a set of criteria which specifically characterize the
deindustrialization process:
1.

Redirection of profits where profits earned th ro u g h the operation

of one facility are shifted to an o th er or others w ithin the sam e
m ultibranch or m ultiplant operation. Profits are used to subsidize
new er facilities, p ro d u ct development, a n d /o r investm ent in new
areas. "Such m ilking of a profitable plant is especially common among
conglomerates, w hose m anagers tre a t some of th e ir acquisitions as
'cash cows'" (Harrison and Bluestone 1981, p. 299, cf. Bluestone and
H arrison 1982, p. 7).
1 R.D. Norton's (1986, pp. 1-40) extensive review of literature th a t h as
em erged on the process of industrial m aturity an d th e industrial policy
issue suggests th a t th e deindustrialization question h as been covered
from a wide variety of perspectives from left, right, and center. All of
these, th e article suggests, appear to share a t le ast some agreem ent
concerning the "mechanics" of industrialization, an d the cycle of
growth, and m aturity. Where they appear m ost significantly to differ is
upon interpretations and conclusions concerning th e im pacts or
consequences of th e process—interpretations w hich are th en
incorporated into d eb ates over "industrial policies” and the course of
"reindustrialization."
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2. In addition to savings in th e form of depreciation allowances
com panies m ight allow a p la n t to ru n down and redirect w hatever
profits are generated to other p lan ts an d endeavors.
3. Productive capacity of a p la n t can be underm ined through th e
removal of productive capital from one p la n t to another, usually from
an older to a new er facility.
4. P lants may be sh u t down altogether an d land an d equipm ent sold
on th e open m ark et or useful equipm ent moved to o th er operations.
5. A facility m ay be relocated to a new site in the form of the classic
runaw ay shop. H arrison an d Bluestone (1981, p. 300) state th at,
"some firms do load their equipm ent onto vans, tru ck s, or planes and
physically relocate substantially the sam e activity to a new site" an d to
a new labor force.
These five criteria are types or form s of capital shift and stages
in a single process th a t p la n ts may undergo. The first two stages take
place in the "form of finance capital (profits or savings reinvested
elsewhere)"; the o th er three are the actu al removal an d tran sfer of
physical capital (Harrison an d Bluestone 1981, p. 300). W hat th ey
sh are In common are consequences; those of the movement of capital
and its effect on workers and com m unities. Jobs move when capital
moves, and jobs are created an d destroyed w hen capital is created and
destroyed.
Along a sim ilar line, J u n e Nash (1985, p. 151), in developing the
theoretical context for h er com m unity stu d y of Pittsfield,
M assachusetts, offers this definition;
D eindustrialization is th e end resu lt of processes th a t may
involve a flight of whole industries to low wage sites w ithin the
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country or overseas, tran sfer of labor intensive production
processes w ith or w ithout conversion of existing facilities to new
autom ated or high-tech industries, buying u p sm aller p lan ts by
conglom erates th a t milk th em for profits and discard them soon
after, as well as plant shut-downs.
In the sam e way th a t Bluestone an d H arrison’s work integrated the
findings of local level studies, N ash's is exem plary of th e influence th a t
works su c h as the D eindustrialization of America have h ad on
subseq u en t com m unity studies. While Bluestone and H arrison turned
to com m unity studies in developing the concept of deindustrialization,
N ash's work dem onstrates th a t deindustrialization h as become an
im portant organizing concept in subsequent com m unity studies.
Similarly, Newman's (1985, pp. 5-19) discussion of th e im portance of
Bluestone an d H arrison's work, especially The D eindustrialization of
America, dem onstrates its influence in the form ation of a
deindustrialization perspective in u rb an and com m unity studies.
Generally, deindustrialization has been defined as a societal-level
process b oth constituted and Indicated by certain events am ong which
the plant shutdow n and dism antling and physical relocation of capital
stan d as its m ost ap p aren t forms. Analyses of th e deindustrialization
process by social scientists, particularly sociologists, have em phasized
the issue of factory closure in one form or another, e.g.. In term s of Its
national, regional, or industrial occurrence or in com m unity case
studies.
An historically oriented sociological w ork can m ake a n
im portant contribution to this disciplinary endeavor, since, w ithin
historical sociology, em phasis is placed on th e connection between
events an d social processes in th e long term. It is to th is effort th a t
th e present work is directed. If deindustrialization and
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Industrialization are unique and historically discernible processes,
th e n they should differ in term s of th e m eaning of the events which
contribute to their construction. It can be shown, however, th a t the
history of the steel in d u stry in the United States, in p articular by
com paring pre-1945 to p o st-1945 development, indicates th a t factory
closures play the sam e role during periods of industrialization as they
are assum ed to play during the cu rren t period of deindustrialization.
Events w hich are currently discussed as indicative of dein d u s
trialization are also indicative of, an d were in operation during, the
period of national industrial growth. Factories close and operations
move for the sam e reasons and according to the sam e logic th a t they
did in the pre-World War II era, th a t is, with respect to issu es of labor
control, consolidation an d formation of m arkets, and dynam ics of
capitalist competition. In a word, the definition of deindustrialization
offered by Bluestone and Harrison an d by su ch thinkers a s J u n e Nash
also describes processes characteristic of industrialization.
To summ arize: A socio-historical analysis can determ ine the
significance of factory closures in th e longer historical term by
delineating th e relationship between the factory closure a s local event
and th e operation of system ic processes. It will be shown th a t with
respect to the general process of capital accum ulation in th e domestic
context since the end of the Civil War, there is little difference in the
tactics of firms vis-a-vis factory closures in th e period of industrial
form ation and the period of its disformation or collapse. It is in this
light th a t th e theory of deindustrialization m u st be reconsidered, and
th e relationship between capital form ation an d disform ation specified
through a com parison of th e steel Industry in th e pre-1945 period of
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in d u strial growth w ith th a t of the p o st-1945 steel in d u stry in the
period of its relative decline. This will be a com parison, then, of th e
steel industry during the time th a t th e United S tates emerged as a
world economic an d political power (post-1865) w ith th e steel
in d u stry during the period of deterioration of th e hegemonic global
position of the United S tates (post-1970).
A Socio-Historical Analysis
One basic assum ption of th is work is th a t a full understanding of
social problems m u st rest on analysis of their history. This study is an
analysis of the historical role of a social process, defined as deindus
trialization by su ch observers as Bluestone and H arrison—again, a
process concretely expressed in definite actions su ch a s factory
closures. The American steel in d u stry provides an historical case of
the rise and decline of a basic industry w ithin the domestic context. A
sociological analysis of the history of th is Industry using historical
accoun ts of the development of steel in the U.S. since Reconstruction,
accoun ts of its m ajor labor disputes, national economic policy, and
case stu d ies of com m unities enter into th e development of a theory
taking into account the connection betw een organizational and class
dim ensions of deindustrialization.
In carrying o u t th is sociological analysis of the American steel
case, the writings of various historians of the steel in d u stry are vital.
Of particular im portance Is the work of William T. Hogan, whose w orks
include Economic H istory of the Iron an d Steel In dustry in the U nited
S ta te s (1971), a five-volume history of the steel in d u stry in America,
and The 1970's: Critical Years for the Steel Industry (1972), a volume
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w ritten as a follow-up to the first. In Hogan’s six volumes we have
w h a t stands a s th e single m o st comprehensive and widely cited
history of the American steel industry covered along the dim ensions of
corporate organization, labor relations and unionization, technological
developments In steel production, relations w ith other in d u stries, and
m arket stru ctu re and competition. Besides its breadth of historical
scope, w hat sta n d s out about Hogan's work is h is integration of sources
a n d his inclusion of lists of factory closings w ithin this general
discussion of steel industry development. H ogan's work, however,
lack s any significant attem pt to discuss the role of dism antled and
shut-dow n factories in this overall development, except to identify
th e m rather uncritically as p a rt of a process w hich he m etaphorically
desciibes as "tree pruning," i.e., destruction of "obsolete" cap ital and
restructu rin g to m ake further industrialization possible.
I argue in th is dissertation th a t bringing more recent
sociological an alyses of the problem and p ro cess of deindustrialization
in to confrontation with such broadly historical and largely narrative
w orks will refine an d stren g th en the sociological conceptualization of
th e meaning of factory shutdow ns by shifting attention from th e issue
of industrial development to th e more Inclusive issue of cap italist
development. T h is can be accomplished th ro u g h a sociological
analysis which com pares a period of Industrial growth to one of
decline, and assesses the role of particular actions, such a s factory
shutdow ns, in each period. In su c h an analysis industrialization and
deindustrialization are im portant only as m om ents within a general
p rocess of cap italist development.
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In su c h a study, historical writings are treated a s the "data" of
sociological inquiry, vital in com paring histories a t p articu lar points in
tim e. For example, the history of the B ritish steel in d u stry in th e face
of rising com petition from the American steel in d u stry can be
compared to th e American steel in d u stry in the face of Jap an ese
Industrial development. At the sam e time, sociological writings, su ch
a s com m unity studies, are treated as sources of historical m aterial
aiding com parison of "varying historiographical interpretations" of
b road processes and significant events (Skocpol 1984b, p. 382). Here,
case study literatu re provides accounts of com m unities living th e m ost
significant episodes in th e history of steel in d u stry development, such
a s im portant strikes or particular shutdow ns.
This stu d y , which analyzes the historical im portance of factory
closures in th e development of the steel industry, will proceed a s
follows:
In th e ch ap ter to follow, three issu es are addressed. First, I will
d iscu ss theoretical and methodological issu es beginning with th e
m eaning of historical sociology as a general approach to sociological
w ork and its particular application to th is dissertation. W ithin th is
approach, two general assum ptions are developed concerning th e
contingent asp ects of social stru ctu re and the articulation of social
processes th ro u g h time, an d the relationship betw een social
stru ctu res broadly defined, arising and recreated w ithin p articu lar
aren as of h u m a n action.
Secondly, I will d iscu ss treatm ents of th e issu e of plant
shutdow ns w ithin the cu rren t literature, particularly a s they relate to
debates arising within sociology, for example: the in d u strial
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restru ctu rin g th esis ("creative destruction") versus th e d eindustri
alization thesis (cf. Norton 1986. p. 13, "the destructive side of
creative destruction"); and m odem ization/postindustrlalisin v ersu s
new International division of labor/underdevelopm ent. In light of such
debates, the factory closure can be placed w ithin the context of the
process of the reproduction of capitalist society w here the firm an d its
processes are b u t one arena w herein class relations an d conditions of
capitalist com petition are recreated. The factory closure is therefore
viewed a s one am ong a range of actions und ertak en b y business firms
which historically have contributed to th e reproduction of capitalism
by, am ong other things, creating surplus labor and releasing capital for
reinvestm ent. In explicating th e relationship between the activities of
complex organizations and larger stru ctu ra l processes, factory closures
are am ong the "organizational solutions to problems posed In the
production and circulation of capital" (Storper and W alker 1982, p.
479). Since the shutdow n is a n event as historically im portant to
deindustrialization as it Is to industrialization, as relevant to growth as
to decline, both can be conceptually subsum ed u n d er the process of
capitalist reproduction.
Thirdly, I will identify an d discuss th e m ajor stages in th e
development of the steel in d u stry from its "take-off1 during
R econstruction to th e Homestead Strike of 1892; th e period of tru s t
form ation from 1892 to the crucial year of 1901 w hen the United
States Steel Corporation was formed; through its m ost im portant
period of growth in th e first h alf of the tw entieth century to its
decline in th e dom estic context in the p o st-1945 era; to the so-called
deindustrialization wave of th e 1970s. Also In chapter 2 I will em pha
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size th e latter, thereby constructing an account of the post-W orld W ar
II decline of th e American steel Industry to w hich accounts of preWorld W ar II industrial growth will be compared.
C hapter 3 begins the discussion of th e growth of th e United
S tates steel industry from the post-Civil War period to 1892. D uring
this period the steel industry emerged in the transform ation of iron
m anufacture. This transition took place against the backdrop of the
destruction of iron producing facilities, introduction of new
technologies, and labor struggles. In the steel industry, events su ch as
the Hom estead Strike are intelligible In term s of craft labor resistance
to the process of th e subsum ption (submission) of labor u n d er the
conditions of capitalistic production. The destruction of th e iron
industry and the shift to steel production is associated w ith the shift
to more capital intensive processes advancing th e in terests of owners
while circum venting and redefining the political in terests of w orkers.
As such it is both analogous and relevant to cu rren t discussions of
deindustrialization as tied to th e process of "deskilling'' or the process
through w hich craft is destroyed or emptied of content an d labor
power is converted to mere factor of production (Braverman 1974 pp.
131 an d 139). D eindustrialization as general process, or factory
closure a s particular event, m u st be viewed historically b oth as a m ani
festation or Institutional expression of the essential contradiction
between wage-labor and capital, an d as recreating this contradiction.
Besides its role in in ter-class processes, deindustrialization can
be viewed as an asp ect of in tra-class competition. This is th e central
focus of chapters 4 and 5 w hich cover the period of monopolization in
the steel industry from 1892-1901, the period of tru s t formation
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culm inating in the establishm ent of the United S tates Steel
Corporation, and from 1901 through the first h alf of th e tw entieth
century dom inated by U.S Steel b u t also w itnessing th e rise of other
monopoly corporate actors such a s Jones and Laughlln, Republic Steel,
and Bethlehem Steel, This history can Illustrate th e im portance of
sh u t down and dism antled p lan ts during periods of both growth and
decline in capitalist com petition within several contexts: between
individual capitals; across industries; across regions; and across
nations.
Currently, sociological discussions of th e effect of deindustriali
zation have focused attention on th e socially destructive aspects of
factory closures for communities, w hich are usually discussed as
outcom es of the in terests of capital against th e particular Interests of
com m unities. Decisions to sh u t down or move plants, m ade according
to the accum ulation dem ands of firms, disru p t com m unity life and are
made despite the locally situated social problem s—the social costs to
local com m unities—th a t these actions create.
The conclusions draw n by sociologists w ith regard to the issu e of
the social costs of deindustrialization come out of a body of studies
done from the late 1960s through th e 1970s focusing on th e wave of
deindustrialization of th e last decade. The scope of sociological
discussion of this issu e can be expanded by com paring case studies of
com m unities which experienced th e closure of steel mills during the
1970s to com m unities a t different points in th e history of steel
in d u stry development.
Community level sources will be used to com pare im pacts of
dislocations a t different points in time, and im pacts of destroying a
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steel com m unity to those of creating one. If the destruction of
com m unities is currently discussed in. relation to the criteria of
accum ulation according to w hich firms act, it m u st be rem em bered
th a t th e creation of com m unities in the first place occurred
historically with reference to th e sam e criteria.
Summary
This dissertation u ses the history of th e steel in d u stry in the
United States to assess the strength of the concept and theories of
deindustrialization. Deindustrialization h a s been defined w ithin
sociology in term s of a range of actions u ndertaken by capitalist
business firms. One such action em phasized in current literature is
the factory closure. In this work, I am interested in u nderstanding
the historical m eaning of factory closures in capitalist development. I
argue th a t sociological theories have placed insufficient em phasis upon
the im portance of su ch actions in the form ation of industries,
em phasizing Instead their role in, and taking them to indicate, the
decay of in d u stries in the dom estic context.
I will dem onstrate th a t factory closures are as definitive of
industrialization a s they are of deindustrialization, as currently
conceptualized, an d suggest th e need to place the shutdow n within
the context of the process of the reproduction of capitalist society. In
this way, the opening and closing of plants are viewed am ong a range
of actions taken by firms in the local setting through w hich capitalist
social relations and conditions of accum ulation are created, recreated,
extended, and intensified against, and for the purpose of
circum venting th e political resistance of w orkers on the one h an d and
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com peting capitalist in terests on the other. The m eaning of factory
shutdow ns, w hether occurring in th e historical context of the "take
off," growth, m aturity, or senility of an industry, rem ains consistent
with the logic of capital accum ulation.

CHAPTER II
DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AS AN ISSUE IN STEEL INDUSTRY
DEVELOPMENT: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST FIRMS,
AND REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY
Introduction
In th is dissertation a socio-historical approach w hich places the
factory shutdow n in th e context of the reproduction process of
capitalist society is developed. R ather th a n viewing shutdow ns as p art
of an industrialization or deindustrialization process, they are more
accurately seen w ithin a range of concrete actions tak en by capitalist
firms w hich contribute to the creation, re-creation, extension, and
intensification of social conditions of accum ulation w hich define
capitalist society. In th is way, industrialization and deindustrialization,
when viewed in th e longer historical term , are seen as subprocesses in
the m ore general process of capitalist social development. In d u stri
alization and deindustrialization are term s currently applied to the
process of industrial restru ctu rin g which is better understood as
subsum ed under th e process of capitalist reproduction, i.e., the social
reconstruction of conditions w hich m ake capitalist society possible.
The m o st im portant issu e is n o t th e m eaning of factory closures in
relation to an industrialization or deindustrialization process, i.e., the
construction or deconstruction of particular stru ctu res of industry, b u t
their m eaning in relation to the process through w hich th e m ost basic
social relationships of capitalist society, namely, class an d m arket, are
recreated within w hich industrial stru ctu re s are In reality contained.
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As th e historical record of steel in d u stry development in th e
U nited States shows, factory closures have been central to b o th the
industrialization process in the domestic context, where national
capacity to produce is progressively built, and to th e deindustrializa
tion process, w here national capacity to produce is progressively
dism antled in favor of the export of capital overseas and to other
locations. In th is chapter, the param eters of th is overall research
project are established through discussion of theory and th e sociohistorical m ethod, the deindustrialization debate w ithin sociology, and
a n historical overview of steel in d u stry development, especially its
post-W orld W ar II developments as they relate to the issue of deindus
trialization. I propose a socio-historical approach w hich links the
dom inant relations of capitalist society, namely, class and m arket, the
firm, and th e factory closure within th e unified process of the
reproduction of capitalist society.
The Reproduction of C apitalist Society, th e Firm, and the Factory
Closure
By reproduction I m ean the historical process through w hich
th e dom inant relationships th a t distinguish one type of society from all
others are re-created through h u m an action. It is in the process of
reproduction th a t societies appear to persist even a t the sam e time
th a t they undergo transform ations w hich m aintain them as
distinguishable social system s. The reproduction of capitalist society
is conditioned b y the re-creation of its dom inant social relations,
nam ely, class an d m arket which are am ong w hat Wolf (1981, p. 47)
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would describe a s the "salient characteristics" of capitalism a s a mode
of production.1
Here, class is understood as a relation between "groups of social
agents...defined principally b u t not exclusively by th eir place in the
production process, i.e., by th eir place in the economic sphere"
(Poulantzas 1974, p. 27). U nder capitalism , this relation exists m ost
basically between owners a n d non-ow ners of the m ean s of production
and therefore between buyers and sellers of labor power. Also, class is
understood to be more th a n merely a stru ctu ral relation or category of
hu m an actors. Class is a process, or a s E.P. Thom pson (1966, p. 9)
argues, "something th at h appens (and c a n be show n to have happened)

1There is a distinction betw een the w ay I am using th e term
reproduction and the way it is used w ithin th at body of literature
known a s social reproduction theory exemplified by the w ritings of
such th in k ers as Bowles an d Gintis, Pierre Bourdieu, and Henry
Giroux. According to Ja y MacLeod (1987, pp. 9-11) th e focus of social
reproduction theory is on individuals. The concern of social
reproduction theory is the process th ro u g h which class, for example,
is reproduced through institutional an d ideological processes, e.g.,
education, to w hich Individuals are subjected. In o th er words, social
reproduction theory is interested in how "the social relationships and
attitu d es needed to su stain th e existing relations of production in a
capitalist society" are perpetuated (MacLeod 1987, p. 9). As A bram s
(1982, p. 262) states, w ithin th is perspective, "the process of identity
form ation and th e process of social reproduction are th e same." My
work is n o t opposed to the project of social reproduction theorists, in
fact, I believe d ie two are quite com plementary an d consistent w ith
one another. I also believe b oth differ in their em phases. I am
interested in the role of the factory closure in the reproduction or re
creation of class an d m arket themselves as conditions historically
em ergent and definitive of capitalism a s a social system . I am n o t so
m uch interested in this work in the transm ission of class and m arket
position among individuals intergenerationally, although I also
u n d erstan d th a t som e su ch cultural o r ideological process m u st take
place in order for capitalism to be reproduced in general.
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In hu m an relationships." Therefore, as process, class is meaningful
historically.
M arket is also a relation between groups of social agents divided
essentially a s buyers and sellers. Specifically, Rothman (1978, p. 22)
discusses three types of m ark et situation suggested in W eber's work:
the labor m a rk e t, which divides society in to employers a n d employ
ees: th e m oney m ark et, w hich separates creditors from debtors; and
th e commodity m ark et, w hich distinguishes between b u y e rs and
sellers and landlords and ten an ts. This three-w ay m ark et differenti
ation is at th e h ea rt of the class system u n d e r capitalism an d suggests
th e extent to w hich m arket situations are related both to each other
and to class. For example, class position ca n be defined in term s of
the relation of individuals to the labor m ark et where b u y ers and sellers
of labor power confront one another and w here labor pow er takes the
form of a commodity which is subject, like other commodities, to
supply and dem and.
An approach through w hich these essential relations of
capitalism can be studied is suggested by Abrams (1982). Abrams
(1982, p. 89) argues th a t historical sociology, as it relates to the
analysis of capitalist society, should address the concerns of Marx on
the one han d an d Weber on the other. A bram s (1982, p. 89) states,
Capitalism ...is defined for Weber in term s of d istin ct economic
practices embodying a distinct complex of meaning. Whereas
for Marx capitalism is a type of relationship, a p articu lar form of
exploitation, for Weber it is a type of practice, a p artic u lar way of
organizing and giving m eaning to action, a way expressed most
clearly [but not solely) in the firm or enterprise.
While neither M arx nor W eber neglected th e question of th e relation
between stru ctu re and action, both exhibited a tendency to emphasize
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one over th e other. Therefore, Marx tended to define capitalism in
term s of th e stru ctu ral relationships w hich characterize it a mode of
production. Weber tended to emphasize th e firm as a n aren a of social
practice defining capitalism in term s of th e organizational context of
economic action, for example, discussing bureaucracy a s a n ideal type
and de-em phasizing its relation to the political-economic context in
which m odem industrial bureaucracies arose. In th is dissertation, it is
my intention to address th ese com plem entary concerns of Marx and
Weber by u sin g the history of factory closures in the steel industry in
order to explicate the m u tu ally contingent relationship between
structure a n d action.
In th is work, then, th e relationship betw een capitalism as social
system an d firm as mode of organization, is treated n eith er as one
where th e operation of societal level processes "derive im plications for
micro levels of social organization" nor a s one where m icro level
relations serve merely a s th e bases upon w hich "societal...level conse
quences can be derived" (Baron and Bielby 1980, p. 747). Rather, the
relationship between capitalism and the firm is treated a s a dialectical
one where th e present cou rse of capitalist development, itself the
outcome of p a s t action, co n strain s and enables organizational action
and where th e activities of firm s—e.g., th e opening an d closing of
factories—re-create the conditions under w hich capital accum ulation
Is possible. In other words, it is through specific actions w ithin the
organizational context of th e firm th a t th e essential relations of class
and m arket are reproduced. Therefore, capitalism is understood as a
type of society characterized b y certain stru c tu ra l relations, and the
firm as an a re n a of action w here those relations are actually practiced.
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In this schem e, th e factory closure is a n example of a particular kind
of corporate action w hich can be examined in th e broader context of
capitalist development and in w hich the relationship between the
development of Arms an d the reproduction of capitalist society can be
observed. According to Abrams (1982, p. 192), "through the strike
and the w ar [as events! we perceive classes and nations." The sam e is
true of th e factory shutdow n through which we perceive the ongoing
creation of capitalist society.
The factory closure, as a type of event, will be studied h isto r
ically so th a t Its relationship to th e process of capitalist development
can be analyzed. By doing this, the tendency in cu rren t social
scientific literature to em phasize th e im portance of su ch events only
w ith specific regard to th e theoretically form ulated process of
deindustrialization can be re-evaluated. The factory shutdow n m ay be
understood as an event a s historically im portant to the process of
deindustrialization a s it is to industrialization, a s im portant to the
cu rren t stage of in d u strial decline a s to the period of industrial growth
in the dom estic context. In this analysis, industrialization and
deindustrialization are viewed as im portant only as m om ents w ithin a
general process of capitalist development and n o t a s unique historical
stages of development themselves. Both are related to each other as
com plem entary aspects of the process of capitalist reproduction.
My basic approach will be to analyze the history of factory
closures in th e American steel in d u stry in relation to three aspects of
capitalist development—interclass processes, in traclass processes, and
processes concerned w ith the spatial development of capitalism .
First, th e role of the destruction of iron-m aking facilities in the
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formation of the steel in d u stry in the transition from iron production
to steel production in th e United S tates will be examined. The
relationship between the destruction of th e iron in d u stry an d the
destruction of craft-based labor, w hich brought w ith it th e intensified
subjection of labor to the conditions of capitalistic production, will be
em phasized in the discussion of th e historical role of the factory
closure in the cycle of labor control. In the history of the steel
industry, th is culm inated in the events surrounding the Homestead
Strike of 1892.
Secondly, the role of the factory closure in the process of tru s t
formation an d monopolization in the steel in d u stry will be discussed
em phasizing steel industry development u p to an d su b seq u en t to the
formation of th e United S tates Steel Corporation in 1901. In this, I
will also d iscu ss the place of the factory closure within the cycle of
capitalist com petition over horizontal, vertical, and spatial control of
production an d m arkets across intra- and inter-national regional
contexts—for example, in su ch things as the p u rchase of factories of
com petitors by others in order to s h u t them down and th e
dism antling of the Welsh tin plate Industry an d th e removal of its
facilities to th e United States.
Finally, I will discuss th e historical role of the factory closure in
th e geographic development of capitalism , i.e., in th e creation of the
"space economy" of capitalism which is the process through which
class and m ark et come to be embodied in the creation and
organization of space in a m anner consistent w ith th e im peratives of
capital accum ulation (Harvey 1982 and Sm ith 1986, p. 87). Especially
im portant here will be th e factory closure an d its relation to processes

27

of u rb a n and regional development in th e rise of m anufacturing cities
like Youngstown, Ohio, and Gary, Indiana, and with them the rise of
the m anufacturing belt. This will provide a n historical b asis of
com parison to cu rren t discussions in th e deindustrialization literature
w hich em phasize th e role of th e factory closure in contem porary
decline of "traditional" m anufacturing cities and regions of the United
States.
This approach will be presented in more detail in th is and later
chapters. Overall, factory closures can be located w ithin a general
process of investm ent and disinvestm ent, "mechanically" sim ilar to
th a t described currently as constituting deindustrialization. This
process w as as vital to the building of the nation's basic capacity to
produce an d to the rise of Its industrial heartland a t th e tu rn of the
century as to its dism antling in the contem porary period. This
suggests th a t factory closures are better understood in th e process of
capitalist development in general, th a t is. In the process through
w hich capitalist social relations are re-created. By com paring the
historical role of th e p lan t shutdow n in the process of monopolization
to its role in the contem porary process of conglomeration, the c la im m ade by certain proponents of deindustrialization theory—th a t the
n atu re of factory closures in the process of deindustrialization is
unique to cu rren t domestic economic an d social development can be
called into question.
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Historical Sociology. Industrial D evelopm ent
and the Production of C apitalist Society
Historical sociology is a n approach w herein sociological theories
are understood as explanations of historical Information, an d wherein
theories an d concepts are continually assessed and reassessed in light
of such information. I argue th a t since historical sociology addresses
th e issues of social stru ctu re, process, and event as well a s the rela
tionship between these, a socio-historical approach lends itself to
analysis of the m eaning and significance of factory closures which are
concrete events tak en w ithin cu rren t sociological discourse to
constitute the process of deindustrialization.
Two Theories of Economic and Social Development: Sociology
an d the Meaning of Factory Closures in the Process of "Creative
D estruction"
The necessity of a socio-historical approach to th e issu e of
factory closures is suggested by the tendency in cu rren t writings to
explain su ch events prim arily w ithin the context of post-World W ar II,
and especially p o st-1970 developments alone, w herein either of two
opposing theoretical perspectives are typically applied. The first m ay
be called the industrialization or m odernization thesis in which
developments in American capitalism are interpreted as p a rt of a
process of w hat Schum peter (1942, p. 23) h a s term ed "creative
destruction" w here old forms of capital accum ulation and organization
are destroyed in the course of competition in order to create new
ones. The second, influenced largely by Bluestone and H arrison's
(1982) work, m ay be called th e deindustrialization th e sis, w hich is a
critique of neoclassical economic theory and w hich asse rts th a t factory
closures and th eir im pacts indicate the "destructive side of creative
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destruction." Di Leonardo (1985, p. 242) argues th at b o th views
exhibit organization around biological m etaphors. Of th e se two
m etaphors in cu rren t use, th e first is stru c tu ra l functionalist in
orientation, w here "economies are envisioned as healthy o r ill bodies"
(di Leonardo 1985, p. 242). The other is a Social D arw inian m etaphor
which views "economies as com petitors in a h arsh environment" (di
Leonardo 1985, p. 242). A lthough both m etaphors tran scen d political
orientations of particular w riters, the first appears m ore characteristic
of the outlook of adherents to the deindustrialization th esis. It is
problematic to th e extent th a t the imagery of the "destructive side of
creative destruction" portrays factory closures as symptomatic,
dysfunctional, an d anom alous aspects of otherwise norm al processes of
social and economic development. The Social D arw inist/evolutionist
view of factory closures seem s more characteristic of th e neoclassicalinspired orientation. It is problem atic to th e extent th a t it asserts the
inevitability of progress rooted in the im plicit rationality of m arket
forces as definitive of capitalist society (cf. Stein2 1980, p. 9; and
Brown 1986, p. 50) where shutdow ns are explained in th e language of
neoclassical econom ics—as p a r t of the process of growth, progress,
and m odernization and therefore as ultim ately beneficial to society.3
2 On the n a tu re of the capitalist m arket system , Stein (1980, p. 9)
states, "We have a system th a t for two h u n d red years picked winners
successfully. T h at system is th e free m arket, the free enterprise
system in w hich people b et th eir own m oney on who th e w inners are
going to be."
3 See also Arnold and Goulet (1982, pp. 37-63) on the th ree basic
Institutions of American society and their supporting m y th s-capitalism an d th e myth of social mobility, technology a n d th e m yth of
progress, an d national security and the m yth of national interest.
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Factories are s h u t down or capital relocated in the process of in d u s
trial restru ctu rin g a s firms in com petition w ith one another undergo
changes directed a t making th em "tougher"--more competitive or
profitable, for exam ple—by adopting new technologies or shifting
investm ents into growth areas.
The creative destruction th e sis was influenced by the economic
theory of Joseph Schum peter (1942, p. 23), to whom th e United
S tates steel in d u stry was exemplary:
The opening u p of new m arkets, foreign or domestic, th e
organizational development from the craft shop and factory to
su ch concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate th e sam e process of
industrial m u tatio n —if I m ay use the biological term —th a t
incessantly revolutionizes th e economic stru ctu re from within,
incessantly destroying th e old one, Incessantly creating a new
one. This process of Creative D estruction is die essential fact
about capitalism . It is w h at capitalism consists In and w h at every
capitalist concern has got to live in.
In sociology, th is view finds expression in m odernization theory which
Is also known by o th er nam es, su c h as diffuslonlsm, developmentallsm,
and equilibrium theory, among others. Economically, m odernization
theory is neoclassical in orientation. Hechter (1975, p. 29) sta te s in
his description of diffusionism th at:
Neo-classical economic th eo ry holds th a t the expansion of
efficient capital, labor, an d commodity m arkets into regions
dominated b y traditionally oriented groups should decrease
regional econom ic Inequalities in the society as a whole. Once
th e peripheral region is b ro u g h t into th e national netw ork of
commercial flows and transactions, inequality might tem porarily
increase; b u t in time a n equilibrium will be reached and
economic integration will b e substantially achieved.
For th is reason, H echter describes diffusionism as an "osmotic model”
of economic growth, th a t Is, a m odel th at argues the equalization of
econom ic resources between regions, where benefits "flow" from an
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area of "high concentration" to one of "low concentration" u n til both
are brought into balance.
In th is view, backw ardness or m odernity of p articu lar regions
are perceived as historically intrinsic conditions. Thus, th e descrip
tion of a n area (or industry) as "backward" or "modem" is dependent
on its own historical perform ance w ith regard to developmental
processes. In sociology, culture is viewed a s having an influence on
w hether or not societies develop, i.e., to the extent th a t th e y are
governed by "traditional" or "modem" values. "Stagnated" areas are
seen as eventually able to enhance th eir developmental position as
cultural and m aterial "benefits" accrue to them from the develop
m ental processes of m ore advanced areas.
Benefits from developed regions reach m ore backw ard regions
because developed areas undergo a twofold process conducive to this
"trickle down" effect. First, developed areas become m ore service
oriented. Secondly, th ese areas face higher labor costs. B ecause of
this, producers are motivated to move to more "profitable" areas.
Thus, as an old industry moves out, it aids th e development of
backw ard areas and "makes room" for the fu rth er development of the
service or more advanced industrial economy. The m ajor assertion of
this model, then, is th a t in the course of economic and social devel
opment, there is a tendency toward equalization, i.e., equilibrium
betw een geographic regions. In other words, since the system tends
toward equilibrium, "present problem s...are n o t necessarily th e
harbingers of an alarm ing state of crisis. Rather, they are only a
reaffirm ation of a self-regulating m arket mechanism" (Watkins and
Perry 1977, p. 20 an d cf. Amin 1976 on center and periphery).
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According to th is view, disparities between in d u stries an d regions will
inevitably sm ooth themselves out.
Temporally, m odernization th eo rists view societies a s u n d er
going a generally linear course of upw ard development w here they
p a s s through stages ranging from traditional societies through various
degrees of modernity. For example, W.W. Rostow (1964, pp. 4-11)
identifies th ese stages as: traditional society, takeoff, m aturity,
followed by a period of high m ass consum ption. In incorporating
Daniel Bell's w ork into th e modernization scheme, a fifth stage of
national development can be added, th a t of post-industrial society. In
Bell's (1973. p. 127) view,
A post-industrial society Is based on services....If an industrial
society is defined by the q uantity of goods as m arking a standard
of living, th e post-industrial society Is defined by th e quality of
life as m easured b y services an d am enities...w hich are deemed
desirable and possible for everyone.
Furtherm ore, Bell conceptualizes th e passage to post-industrial society
a s originating in the advances m ade in the stage of high m ass
consum ption. He again states (1973, pp. 127-128):
In th e very development of in d u stry there is a necessary expan
sion of tran sp o rtatio n and public utilities a s auxiliary services in
the movement of goods and th e increasing u se of energy, and an
increase in the nonm anufacturing b u t still blue-collar force.
[Also] in the m ass consum ption of goods an d the growth of
populations there is an increase in distribution... and finance,
real estate, and insurance, th e traditional centers of white-collar
em ploym ent.
The m ajor transform ation in th e coming of post-industrial
society is the shift from the struggle between capitalist an d w orker to
"the clash betw een the professional an d the populace" (1973, p. 129,
a n d also 1978, pp. 147-148). T hus in Bell’s model there Is n o t only
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th e developm ent of the p ost-industrial society b u t the development
tow ard a post-capitalist society, a shift from the basic relations
between capital and labor "in the locus of the factoiy" to those between
professionals an d clients "in the organization an d com m unity” (Bell
1973, p. 129).4 This change is supposed to occur as the "technical
dem ands" of post-industrial society m ake "meritocratic sources of
intergenerational sta tu s persistence" (e.g., class) obsolete (Baron and
Bielby 1980, p.743). With reference to Bell's work, Richard Louv
(1983, pp. xvli-xviii) In America I describes th e difference betw een
industrial and post-industrial society and the passage from one to the
other.
America I is made u p of all those steel w orkers and middle
m anagers so bewildered by a society th at, m ore each day, does
n o t seem to need them ....A m erica I is all those people left
behind, outside the gates.... America II is alm ost adolescent in its
headstrong exuberance. It sees the nation transform ing into
som ething new and fresh; it perceives the future as a techno
logical frontier to be conquered and won.
In general, m odernization theory views th e factoiy closure
w ithin the process of "creative destruction" an d development toward
the post-industrial society w hich occurs as outm oded in d u stries are
shifted out of regions and replaced by "higher" forms of economic
activity more consistent w ith the rise of a service-oriented ra th e r th a n
production-oriented society. For example. Ju s e n iu s and Ledebur
(1984, pp. 83 an d 87) com m ent th a t the losses of industrial firms in
4 This appears consistent w ith Parson's suggestion th a t "capitalism is
no longer an appropriate nam e for th e advanced w estern economies
w hich should instead be identified a s 'bureaucratic industrialism ’..."
(Abrams 1982, p. 116). Like Bell's theory of the coming of p o st
industrial society, Parsons views history In term s of a unidirectional
evolution tow ard modernity (Abrams 1982, pp. 112-113).
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New England and th e rise of nonindustrial b u sin esses in th e region
"may be indicative of a movement of the New England economy toward
the long-anticipated 'post-industrial' economy...toward the provision of
services an d financial an d inform ation expertise." If this is th e case,
then the benefits w hich they assum e to attribute to such development
lead them to conclude th a t outm igration of blue-collar w orkers "may
be a desireable adjustm ent for th e region" (Ju sen iu s and Ledebur
1984, p. 117).
McKenzie (1984b, p. 3), the leading proponent of th is view as it
relates to factory closures, argues th e "case for p la n t closings."
There is a movement afoot th a t seeks to destroy one of th e last
rem aining vestiges of the free-enterprise system in th e United
S tates: the right of the firm to close u p shop. Make no m istake
ab o u t it—this movement is well financed, d u g in, broadening its
political support a t the federal and state levels, and (especially
w hen there is a ra s h of large p lan t closings) attracting m ore and
m ore m edia attention,
McKenzie and others assert th a t b u siness should n o t be restricted in
its decisions to locate, re-locate, or close down. B usinesses locate
their p la n ts to minimize production costs, and since this is th e m ark
of a dynam ic economy deindustrialization is considered a "nonexistent
trend" (McKenzie 1984c, p. 11 an d Bailey 1982, pp. 445-451).
"Economic conditions in any dynam ic economy are constantly chang
ing, and b u sin esses m u s t be allowed the flexibility to fit th eir location
to these conditions" (McKenzie 1984b, p. 8).
While factory closures may bring with them tem porary crises for
workforces or localities (nations, regions, or com m unities), especially
in the form of unem ploym ent and other "adjustm ent costs," th e se are
seen as th e necessary costs of growth and development, creating
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problem s no worse th a n those associated with o th e r forms of disloca
tion (Littman and Lee 1984, p. 128). Ultimately, capital mobility is a
process of industrial redistribution w hich resolves im balances between
regions an d Industries (Hekman an d Strong 1984, pp. 65-66).
D estruction of old form s and facilities of production in the end gives
way to m ore profitable, efficient economic stru c tu re s and practices,
the benefits of which gradually sp read to all segm ents of society.
Problems Eire held to arise only w hen there is interference in th is socalled "natural evolutionary" process, for example, w hen so-called
"industrial policies" m aintain outm oded practices beyond their "life
spans" an d block th e process of disinvestm ent from th e obsolete to
the m o d em (Thurow 1980, p. 77).
O n th e other h an d , the deindustrialization th e sis interprets
recent developments in American capitalism a s th e "destructive side
of creative destruction," exemplified m ost obviously b y a wave of
factory closures in th e 1970s (Norton 1986, p. 13). Bluestone an d
Harrison (1982), leading proponents of this view, argue from a critical
standpoint and explain factory shutdow ns as p a rt of the process of
decline, underdevelopm ent, and stagnation in the natio n 's basic cap a
city to produce. The costs of this are ultimately b o rn e by society--by
workers an d com m unitites who, am ong other things, face unem 
ployment and underem ployment, lo ss of income, loss of tax revenue,
and a ran g e of family, personal, emotional, and h e a lth problems.
The n atu re of changes in direction of economic development in
the post-W orld War II period and th e extent of problem s associated
with th em have directed a great deal of attention in sociology to the
issue of factory closures, especially since the 1970s. Of special
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concern to social scien tists working in th is area h a s been the case of
factory closures in th e United States steel industry. Among com m u
nity-based studies of factory closures, Lynd's (1982) an d Buss an d
R edbum ’s (1983) w orks on steel mill closings in Youngstown, Ohio,
have b een the m ost influential.
In 1977 Lykes Corporation, w h ich owned Youngstown S heet and
Tube Corporation as a subsidiary com pany, announced th a t it would
close th e Campbell W orks and th a t 4 ,1 0 0 workers w ould be p erm a
nently laid off. In 1978 Jo n es and Laughlin took over the Campbell
works, still closed, along with the B rier Hill Works, previously owned
by Youngstown Sheet a n d Tube. In 1980 Jones an d Laughlins closed
Brier Hill and 1,400 w orkers lost jo b s. In that sam e year United
States Steel Corporation closed its MacDonald and Youngstown W orks,
leaving 3,500 workers unemployed (B uss and R ed b u m 1983, p. 23).
Lynd, historian a n d labor lawyer who worked closely with th e
"Save O u r Valley" Com mittee, set o u t to docum ent th e political
dynam ics between u n io n , community, a n d corporation and the re s is
tance of workers and o th e r local in te re sts to the u n ilateral decisions of
corporations to close factories with th e purpose of offering policy
suggestions advocating "brownfleld" reindustrialization (see also Lynd
1981, pp. 33-36).5 B u s s and R edbum also examine th e political
dynam ics surrounding shutdow ns, b u t lay special em phasis upon th e
effects of social stresses on com m unities experiencing factory clos
ures, including physical, emotional, a n d financial s tra in s which w ork

5 Brownfleld ^in d u strializatio n refers to a polity of reinvestm ent in
existing p la n ts or "traditional" in d u strial regions.
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ers a n d families undergo as a resu lt of term ination an d "the 'ripple
effect’ of massive jo b and income losses throughout the com m unity’s
economy” (Buss an d R edbum 1983, p. 7). The ultim ate purpose of
th eir w ork is to suggest changes in h u m an services policy dealing with
m ass unem ploym ent (Buss an d R edbum 1983, pp. 149-159).
The influence of studies of Youngstown h as been su ch th a t the
experience of th is com munity h a s come to be considered the
quintessential case for the analysis of the dynam ics an d im pact of
factory closings. O n the significance of Youngstown, J o h n Logue
(1985, p. 75) h a s written:
Youngstown is a microcosm of the problem s of th e aging
industrial tow ns of the Northeast: th e predatory conglomerate,
system atic disinvestm ent, th e flight south, th e trained labor
force suddenly unemployed, the collapse of th e com m unity ta x
b ase, and th e obsolescence of the ru stin g mills th a t once
employed thousands.
Similarly, B ensm an and Lynch (1987, p. 7), in their stu d y of factory
closures in the Chicago area describe S outheast Chicago as a "micro
cosm of America's industrial decline." Com munity studies are valuable
as ra th e r local "snapshots" of deindustrialization, freezing a m om ent in
the larg er social process th a t reveals m uch th a t is Im portant concern
ing th e events subsequent to th e shutdow n of a plant. They also point
to th e seriousness of the issue by docum enting the problem as a
problem. For instance, Buss an d R edbum ’s work on w h at they consid
er th e "Ruhr Valley of America" is intended to expand th e "research
base" for beliefs ab o u t the im pacts and "public policies to address
these directly" (1983, pp. 5-6). However, while these kinds of
com m unity studies are im portant sources of historical and sociological
inform ation, it is im portant to recognize (without devaluing their
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contribution) th a t with th eir em phasis on the microcosmic, they have
a tendency to tre a t shutdow ns as isolated events. So, they carry with
them lim itation of scope b o th spatially and temporally. The reason
such stu d ies ten d toward lim itations like these m ay be attrib u ted to
the fact th a t "the im pacts of closings are concentrated regionally and
often reinforced by th e relative lack of new offsetting economic
opportunity" (Buss and R edbum 1983, p. 4). However, it is necessary
to recognize th a t despite regional concentration of effects, even when
m anifested in particular shutdow ns, deindustrialization involves more
th a n locally situated processes. Also, while th e effects of p la n t
closures may be regionally concentrated, the factory closure a s a
problem is n o t historically limited b u t is characteristic of every period
of indu strial development. The use of the term "microcosm" by Logue
and B ensm an and Lynch is significant. It is indicative of a m u ch larger
though unspecified historical context. It tells u s som ething im portant
about th e character of the com m unity case study. B uss and R edbum ’s
and Lynd's studies are "local histories" (i.e., localized histories). This
is consistent w ith Moore's (1987, p. 727) description of fieldwork as
the creation of "current history" and ethnography as historical writing,
"a prim ary source in the making." Their m ajor contribution h a s been
in the analysis and identification of th e direct effects of factory
closures, th e political dynam ics surrounding these local events, and,
especially, th eir social costs to local com m unities, including th e
docum entation of increased stress levels and associated m edical and
emotional problem s among individuals a t the sam e time th a t
com m unities lose the resources to handle them .
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In essence, both approaches view plant closings as p a rt of a
process of Industrial restru ctu rin g an d the movements of firm s into
m ore profitable areas an d industries. Also, Bluestone and Harrison
(1982, p. 15) describe th e cu rren t problem of deindustrialization as
unique to th e post-World War II period, and although asserting a
position w hich is critical of the neoclassical view and influential in
leftist academ ic discourse, they describe deindustrialization as an
aberration of the otherwise "normal and often healthy disinvestm ent
process."6 For them, th e problem is not deindustrialization or factory
closure per se, b u t one of scale w here conditions of post-w ar expan
sion created "a torrent of capital flight" so th a t th e disinvestm ent
process, especially of th e 1970s, h a s been decidedly u n h ealth y (Bluesto n e and H arrison 1982, p. 15). The m odernization and deindustri
alization views differ, however, in th eir interpretations of th e impacts
of th is process as either p art of the "natural," upw ard evolutionary
development of the capitalist economy or as deindustrialization, i.e.,
"industrial devolution" (Peet 1987a, p. 29). The term s 'industrializa
tion' and 'deindustrialization,' and related term s currently in use in
th e lite ra tu re -lik e 'capital flight,’ 'disinvestm ent,' 'reindustrialization,'

6 Along a sim ilar line, Alfred Slote (1969) in h is Term ination: The
Closing a t B aker Plant, presents a case study w herein the socially
destructive aspects of p lan t closings upon w orkers and com m unities
are illum inated. Quoting Sidney Cobb, who describes the p la n t closing
a s a "genuine social emergency" w hich m eans "pain, humiliation, and
despair" for those affected, it is also adm itted th a t "Change is neces
sa ry for progress. And it is imperative th a t we n o t adopt law s and
regulations w hich would seriously Inhibit change and progress" (Slote
1969, p. 331). The implication here is also th a t the accum ulation
process is norm ally healthy, and p lan t closings constitute a n emer
gency or an aberration.
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'modernization,' 'industrial devolution,' or 'coming of post-industrial
society'--all variously describe the connotations, either beneficial or
destructive, of the process of industrial restru ctu rin g w ithin w hich
factory closures are tak en to play a part.
While the debate over deindustrialization an d th e m eaning of
factory closures is a n essential startin g point of th is socio-hlstorical
analysis, my purpose is n o t to defend either the m odernization or
deindustrialization thesis over the other. In fact, I assert th a t th e
historical example of the American steel industry since th e close of
the Civil War can show th a t factory closures are as easily situated in the
process of industrial growth in the national context a s they can be in
the decline of an industry or the industrial capacity of a region or
nation. Historically, factory closures have been p a rt of the process
through which nations develop a basic capacity to produce as well as
p a rt of the process through which su ch capacity is dism antled. If this
is the case, th en cu rren t explanations of factory closures m u st be
reassessed since it would seem to indicate th a t the reed issue is n o t
the building or dism antling of capacity to produce b u t th e role th a t
factory closures play in th e creation an d re-creation of the basic social
relationships of capitalist society, regardless of w h eth er or not su ch
events occur w ithin th e context of Industrialization or deindustrializa
tion. Therefore, the issu e is not the place of factory closures in the
development of in d u strial structure; m ore im portantly, the issue is the
relationship between su c h events and th e historical development of
capitalist society.
R ather th a n viewing factory closures as 'industrialization' or 'deindustrialization' an d treatin g them in a wider historical framework,
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they ca n be explained In a way w hich links the firm, as one constituent
organization of capitalist society, and its actions In local situations, e.g.,
p la n t shutdow ns, to the reproduction of capitalist systemic relations.
Factory closures m u st be explained In the context of the relationship
betw een the capitalist mode of production a n d th e capitalist firm, th a t
is, w ithin the context of capitalism as a system of social relations
defined in term s of class and m arket and capitalism as social practice,
or th e confrontation between social actors in a n organizational setting
w here systemically defined relations are played out. Here, th e firm
sta n d s as one social arena w here the confrontation between social
actors produces or reproduces, in spite of or against resistance, the
essential relations of class and m arket. Viewed in this light, the
factory closure is a specific action taken by p articular representatives
of capital, whose interests are defined In term s of a p articular firm,
against other representatives of capital and ag ain st labor forces. The
firm a s organization and the factory closure as specific action are
analyzed historically vis-a-vis th e determ ination of power a t the m ost
Inclusive social level (cf. Bottomore 1979, p. 7).7 This is consistent
w ith th e overall project of historical sociology, w hich addresses the
process through w hich social stru ctu res are hum anly created, the
conditioning of action by structure, and stru ctu re by h u m an action
7 A bram s (1982, p. 36) states: "each mode of production [e.g., capital
ism] is also a specific mode of power. And in tu rn each mode of power
is a defining context for action, a definite way th e p a s t im poses itself
on the present." T hus, capitalism , as a mode of power, conditions
action. Actions in tu rn hold consequences for th e mode of power, i.e.,
its persistence, abolition, or transform ation. Factory closures sure held
in th is study to en ter into this dynam ic as p articu lar actions situated in
the cycle of capitalist reproduction.
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(Calllnicos 1988, p. 1; Abram s 1982, p, 200; and Giddens 1977, p. 14,
and 1979, p. 69-73).8
The development of this view of th e historical role of factory
closures will include a n historical overview of steel in d u stry develop
m ent in th e United States. And, in th is chapter, th e development of
the in d u stry since the end of World W ar II as It relates to the issu e of
deindustrialization is em phasized. Throughout th is work, factory
closures will be treated a s local events undertaken b y firms whose
activities are vital in th e extension of adm inistrative control over
workforces, resources, productive activities, and geographical space.
Such practices are Intelligible w ithin th e general capital accum ulation
process an d operate in th e extension an d intensification of com peti
tion between capitals, i.e., firms, an d the progressive su bsum ption of
labor u n d er the conditions of capitalistic production a s labor
increasingly h as imposed upon It the appearance of m ere factor of
production (Marx 1863-1866/1977, p. 1020).
8 Such a n approach is also consistent, I believe, w ith a view of history
which em phasizes th e central place of class struggle in social change.
There are of course, o th er theories of social change n o t concerned
with class struggle. For example, th e cyclical views of Spengler and
Toynbee; th e evolutionary/equilibrium perspective influenced by
D urkheim through T alcott Parsons (which inform ed th e sociological
view of diffusionisn discussed above); an d the conflict perspective
influenced by Weber. One of the m ost valuable aspects of a M arxian
approach to history, especially for historical sociology, rests in a
fundam ental assum ption of historical m aterialism concerning th e
inseparability of h u m an agency and history. R ather th a n viewing
history as a n outside force operating according to its own dynam ic to
which h u m a n s are passively subject, history is viewed as the total
process of h u m an production of society w here h u m a n societies are
understood as "embedded in their own past" (Abrams 1982, p. 35).
This sta n d s opposed to, for example, th e Parsonian view of social
evolution w hich describes "structural change divorced from historical
action" (Abrams 1982, p. 116).
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Overview of Steel Industry Development: The United States Steel
Industry in th e Pre- an d Post-World War II Periods
Steel production is synonym ous with industrialization. To a
great extent, the history of steel production in the U nited States is th e
history of the nation's development as a world capitalist power w hich,
among o th er capitalist nations, underw ent m assive industrialization
during the second half of the nineteenth century. Heilbroner and
Singer (1984, p. 171) point out th a t a t the tim e of th e American Rev
olution, steel could be produced only in sm all quantities "In crucibles
not m uch larger th a n a vase. At th e Crystal Palace Exposition of 1851
a 2 -1 /2 to n ingot of steel (made by combining th e o u tp u ts of m any
crucibles) w as a sensation." W hen Andrew Carnegie's Edgar Thom son
works began production in 1875, th e Bessem er Converter, which
revolutionized steel production, could p u t o u t ab o u t five tons of steel
in less th a n h alf an hour. In 1900 mechanized steel p la n ts used
massive converters w hich could p u t out 20 to n s of steel a t a time
(Heilbroner an d Singer 1984, pp. 170-172), so th a t by th e tu rn of th e
century th e international competitive position of capitalist nations,
national strength, and soundness of a nation's foothold in modernity
were m easured in millions of tons of steel output.
In th e United States, the transform ation of the iron industry an d
th e growth of th e steel industry w as rapid after the Civil War. The
stages of its development correspond to advances in capacity of firm s
to control increasingly large m arkets and integrate all aspects of steel
production, from ore processing to finished steel products, under

44

single corporate adm inistrations. As Sam ir Amin (1975, p. 357) h a s
argued,
Eveiy p h ase of [capitalist economic] expansion is characterized
by a particular accum ulation model: a type of propelling in d u s
try, specific forms of competition and a definite kind of firm.
Along a sim ilar line, Hymer (1975, p. 37) believes th a t th e stages of
capitalist development have been accom panied and propelled through
development an d tran sitio n in concurrent stages characterized by
dom inance of representative types of b u sin ess organizations. Such
forms have developed from the w orkshop, single factory company,
national corporation, multidivisional corporation, and m ost recently
th e m ultinational corporation.
T hus, in the specific case of th e domestic steel industry, it is in
tu rn asserted th a t its stages of development are dem arcated by
changes in the form of th e capitalist business firm—an organizational
level model of capitalist accum ulation, competition, and lab o r control
u n d er which production is carried out. The history of th e steel in d u s
try can then, for example, be traced through th e history of its firms,
th e forms of w hich rise historically in response to problem s presented
in th e process of capitalist accum ulation, e.g., its history from the
Carnegie Steel Company; to Carnegie Steel Company, Limited; to
U nited States Steel Corporation; to USX. This socio-historical analysis
of th e factory closure issue explicates th e relationship betw een the
development of firms and th e reproduction of capitalist society.
Besides th ese organizationally defined stages, the history of iron
and steel production in the United S tates can be broadly divided into
two stages of national development: pre- and post-Second World War.
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The choice of 1945 as a dividing p oint between two eras is n o t made
arbitrarily. The stages correspond to the period of the rise of th e
United S tates a s a world industrial capitalist power from the Civil War
to its relative and gradual decline a s su ch In th e years following World
W ar II9 w hich Mandel (1978, p. 122) describes a s "characterized by
decelerated capital accum ulation."
C urrent deindustrialization literature in sociology is concerned
largely with th e discussion of factory closures in relation to p o st-1945
developments. In my work, em phasis is placed on p re -1945 history in
relation to w hich post-w ar development will be understood. P articu
larly, the focus of th is w ork is iron an d steel in d u stry development
from Reconstruction to ab o u t 1929—to the height of its development
in th e pre-World War II world. This, of course, does not cover the
complete history of iron an d steel production in America, so som e
reference to pre-Civil W ar industrial development is im portant in
establishing th e context of a study w hich places a great deal of
em phasis on post-Civil W ar history.
From W orkshop to Factory: Industrialization and Capitalist
D evelopm ent
Iron production in America d ates to colonial tim es w hen the
first blast furnace was constructed a t Saugus, M assachusetts, in 1645
(Davis 1933, p. 139, and Hogan 1971, p. 1). The first iron w orks built
outside of New England were constructed in New Jersey in 1716.
9 In this work, 1945 is considered to be a turning point in the
economic an d political history of th e United S tates m arking its
transition from growth on the one h an d to hegemony and decline on
the other.
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From these tim es until th e first decades of the n in eteen th century,
iron production rem ained a very small scale, geographically scattered,
largely craft-oriented endeavor, supplying only local m ark ets (cf.
W arren 1973, p. 11; Potter 1969, pp. 47-50; and Szym anski 1978, pp.
151-161).
Supplying the needs of small agricultural m arkets, th e produc
tion of iron in the United S tates was itself "analogous to agriculture"
(Warren 1973, p. 11). While in Britain, b y the beginning of the nine
teen th century, advances h a d been m ade in the use of coal to provide
th e blast for its furnaces, in th e United S tates m anufacture of w rought
iron depended on charcoal fuel almost u n til the time of th e Civil W ar.10
T his required v ast am ounts of tim berland since a typical ru ra l blast
furnace m ight require some two to five th o u san d acres to supply it
w ith sufficient fuel for a year (Warren 1973, p. 11; and Temin 1964, p.
85). One com m entator sum m arized the character of iron production
in America in these terms:
'the m anufacturing operations in th e United S tates are all car
ried on in little ham lets, which often appear to sp rin g up in the
bosom of some forest, gathered aro u n d the waterfall th a t serves
to tu rn th e mill-wheel. These villages are scattered over a vast
extent of th e country, from Indiana to the Atlantic a n d from
Maine to North Carolina, instead of being collected together, as
10 A sim ilar system of charcoal-produced iron rem ained in operation in
Sweden, w hich lacked a dom estic source of coal, until th e late nine
teen th and early tw entieth century. Sw eden’s iron in d u stry remained
fairly lucrative as it supplied the steel w orks in Great B ritain and in
dustrializing United States a n d Germany u n til it was finally displaced
a s a source of ferrous in p u t in steel m alting with the introduction of
basic open-hearth steel (Soderlund 1960, p. 60-64). In th e openh e a rth process, molten iron could be directly charged in to the furnace
an d a greater portion of th e charge could consist of scrap iron and
steel.
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they are In England In great m anufacturing districts' (Warren
1973, p. I I ) .11
Iron production rem ained largely a ru ral endeavor for the first h alf of
th e nineteenth century in a system where m anufacture took place
u n d e r the direction of an artisan ironm aster who supervised th e whole
process from the m aking of w rought iron to the finished product.
Production a t these sites w as carried out until fuel was exhausted or it
becam e too difficult and costly to tran sp o rt wood for charcoaling as
the forest steadily receded from the mill.
For th e first half of the nineteenth century th e United S tates
rem ained a nation th a t was largely agricultural, and the nation's iron
in d u stry rem ained relatively sm all in scale an d largely oriented to
supplying agricultural m arkets. The picture changed som ew hat in the
1840s and 1850s with the expansion of railroad building (Biyant and
Dethloff 1983, p. 114). Much of th is construction utilized B ritish
im ported rails, an d the role of domestic iron producers in th is period
rem ained relatively small in supplying the rail m arket u n til after the
Civil W ar w ith th e erection of effective protectionist b arriers (Potter
1969, p. 47, an d Agnew 1987, p. 39).
Hogan (1971, p. 11) sta te s th a t "it w as som ew hat presum ptious
or prem ature to speak of an iron and steel industry" in th e United
S tates In 1860. The so-called take-off of the steel in d u stry an d the
rise of industrialization in America began with th e end of the Civil War
11 W arren is quoting Zachariah Allen's (1829) work Science and
M echanics. Also quoted in connection with th e character of early iron
m anufacture is F.W. Taussig (1931), in whose Some A spects of the
Tariff Q uestion is w ritten, '"Tiny Ironworks everywhere, b u t p articu 
larly in Pennsylvania, with poor equipm ent an d uneconom ic force of
m en, passed rapidly from b irth to death; they rose and fluttered like
May flies'" (Warren 1971, p. 11).
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an d th e p o st-1865 political conditions of Reconstruction, i.e., those
conditions w hich led to th e transition of th e United S tates from a
largely agricultural nation to an industrial one. From the earlier
decades of the nineteenth century, American capital faced several
m ajor political problems. Forem ost am ong these w as competition
from B ritain's more advanced industrial economy w hich placed
A m erican capitalists In com petition w ith foreign capital over control of
th e dom estic m arket. In addition, th e pre-Civil W ar domestic
economy w as dominated by Southern slave-owning agricultural wealth,
disinterested in and opposed to full-scale dom estic industrial
developm ent since it benefited from trad e with industrialized Britain.
Also, since the nation w as from the tim e of Independence largely a
household and skilled independent a rtisan economy, America suffered
a chronic Industrial labor shortage.
Domestically, the full development of the U nited States a s a
capitalist industrial nation rested on the outcome of a political struggle
on two fronts: between wealth-owning factions an d th e dom ination of
the factory over the plantation, and between industrial capital and
direct producers over the shift of the location of production from
m anufacture in the household and w orkshop to industrial production
in th e factory. Fundam entally, this m ean t th a t the "trick" w as to get
direct producers off the farm , out of th e workshop, an d into the
factory. Not unique to the American case or iron in d u stry case, the
problem of wage labor recruitm ent w as historically th e m ost essential
problem of capitalist in d u strial development.
B ritain's Industrial Revolution of th e eighteenth century was
centered especially on the industrialization of textile production. The
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subsum ption of labor to the dem ands of capitalistic factoiy production
was accom plished w ith the development of th e pow er loom, spinning
jenny, an d , eventually, the self-operating mule. Such Innovations made
the centralization of capital an d therefore th e factoiy and mill town
possible, and represented the appropriation of the m eans of produc
tion an d subsistence as capital. Along w ith these innovations, the
industrial wage labor force w as created a s a n outcome of land enclos
ures, foreclosures, an d evictions, especially in Celtic regions like Ire
land, w hich forced p ea san t proprietors and ru ral a rtisan s from th e
countryside to growing in d u strial centers like M anchester (Engels
1845/1987, pp. 52-53, 66, an d 280).12
As recognized by Raymond Williams (1973, p. 302), the
development of Industrial capitalism is a process w here countryside is
eclipsed b y city. Tilly (1983, pp. 123-124) discusses the process of
urban industrialization as th e relocation of m anufacture from the
countryside to cities, a process w hich he describes a s th e deindustri
alization of the countryside as m eans of production were concentrated
as capital in the cities. If in England the growth of industrial u rb an
centers involved p u sh in g labor off the farm an d out of the workshop
12 The creation of th is industrial proletariat w as not dissim ilar in
process from the creation of a n agricultural proletariat in B ritain as
feudalism gave way to agrarian capitalism. Enclosure forced serfs and
villeins off their holdings, and common lan d s as land w as given over to
the p astu rag e of sheep so th a t wool could be sold on th e growing con
tinental m ark et (see Cohen's 1978, p. 175-180 discussion of th is and
his com m ents on Its im portance to Marx's form ulation of the tra n si
tion from feudalism to capitalism in the process of primitive accum u
lation). T he creation of a proletariat necessarily implies the dispos
session o f independent direct producers, th eir separation from the
m eans of production—once independently owned, an d their su b m is
sion to capital in exchange for wages (Zeitlin 1981, p. 110-111).
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into the factory, industrialization of the United States, w hich also
centered on textile production, pulled labor into factory. At places
like Lowell, M assachusetts, and M anchester, New H am pshire, centers
of textile in d u stry growth in the U nited States, unm arried daughters
of farm families in New England com prised a su rp lu s labor force
brough t to th e factories by prom ises of benevolent corporate p ater
nalism . The mill in terests preached a philosophy of "benevolent
control" w hich in the w ords of Hareven and Langenbach13 (1978, p.
14),
treated w orkers a s the "corporation’s children" an d w hich
perm eated all aspects of life; th e organization of work, the strict
m anagem ent of boardinghouses, the founding of charities, and
the endow m ent of churches....[T]he Company also regulated th eir
behavior after working hours in order to reassu re th eir parents.
The boardinghouses were locked a t 10:00 P.M., ch u rch atten 
dance w as compulsory, and alcoholic consum ption w as
prohibited.
In this way, "the m ills...sought to recru it into th eir workrooms and
carefully supervised boardinghouses single young women from the
'virtuous ru ra l homes' of middling yeomen" (Prude 1983, p. 2).14
13 B arbara W ertheim er (1977, pp. 16-84), in h e r discussion of the
factory bell, relates a sim ilar story of the rise of com pany control over
th e lives of working women.
14 W hen these daughters of "virtuous rural homes" finally organized the
Fem ale Labor Reform Association (FLRA) in 1845 and began asserting
th e ir rights a s "free-born Americans, children of the Revolution and
equal in b irth rig h t to th e mill owners" and dem anded reduced hours
a n d participation in establishing working conditions (Wright 1982, p.
ii), blacklisting and strik es became m ore common. Mill owners
sou g h t "greener pastures" in the labor of agriculturally displaced Irish
an d later French-C anadian im m igrants (Hareven and Langenbach
1978, p. 14). See also Bridges (1986, pp. 163-164) who argues th a t
th e "Lowell girls" exemplified artisan s of the Jack so n ian age who
viewed them selves a s "proud bearers of the ideology of Paine and the
American Revolution" an d who based political claims as laborers upon
appeals to equality and n atu ral right.
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Industrial revolution does n o t represent th e m ere restru ctu rin g
of economic life—th e giving u p of th e farm an d w orkshop for the
pattern of industrial life of the factory. Industrial revolution is also a
revolution of capital involving th e conversion of labor processes into
processes of capital accum ulation, th a t is, th e passing of control over
labor processes from direct producers to capitalists. Industrial
revolution is therefore political revolution. Com pulsion of laborers to
the discipline of th e factoiy is m ade possible by technological and
organizational changes which m ake previous forms of production
unnecessary and brin g the seller of labor power into a dependent
relationship with capital because th e seller of labor power confronts
the buyer of labor power as owner, controller, and m anager of th e
m eans of production and subsistence. This is consistent with Mane's
(1863-1866/1977, pp. 1019-1023) discussion of the process of
subsum ption of labor to the conditions of capitalistic production,
where th e first stage in the process of separation of labor from the
m eans of production necessitates change in th e scale of production
through m echanization, centralization of production, or some other
m eans w hich for all practical purposes m akes handicraft or artisanal
production impossible. In both th e British an d American cases,
industrial revolution, the rise of th e textile industry, an d the rise of
the factoiy took place with the dislocation of agricultural labor forces.
Also in each case, industrialization of textile production provided th e
im petus for the industrialization of other aspects of production an d
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destruction of craft in those areas a s well, especially resource
extraction, energy, transportation, an d m ost notably Iron production.15
Changes in th e scale of production cam e w ith the introduction of
coal fuels and w ith advances in river, canal, an d rail tran sp o rt which
m ade it possible to mechanize an d to build p erm an en t factories
around w hich mill com m unities could be built so th a t industrialization
w as a process through which "old artisanal centers were bypassed and
eventually ruined" (Chirot 1986, p. 224).16 Still, in the iron industry,
these changes came a t first not to production of basic w rought iron
itself, b u t only to factories m aking finished an d sem i-finished
products. For example, in 1812, th e first rolling mill w as b u ilt a t
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for the production of rods for nail m aking
and hardw are articles. Typical of th e time, th e mill was still depen
dent u p o n rural a rtisan s for the iron which w as worked u p into
finished products. T his kind of m echanization of production, occur
ring in the context of the labor shortage of early industrialization, was
directed a t replacing unskilled labor so th a t m ore scarce craft labor
could be focused on "jobs requiring more skill, judgem ent, an d
complexity" (Sennett an d Cobb 1972, p. 12).
It w as not u n til 1818-1819 th a t iron production began to move
completely into the factory. At th a t time, a rolling mill w as b u ilt at
P ittsburgh given over to the production of w rought iron Itself and
selling semi-finished sheets and b ars. The move from the countryside
15 See also Elisha P. Douglas (1971), The Coming of Age of American
B usiness: Three C enturies of E nterprise. 1600-1900.
is "(EJvery new factory built in the country b ears In it the germ of a
m anufacturing town" (Engels 1845/1987, p. 66).
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to the factory was pushed by the adoption in America of techniques
which had been in use in B ritain since the latter p art of th e eighteenth
century, particularly u se of coal as fuel an d the replacem ent of the
open forge w ith the introduction of the so-called reverberatory or
"puddling" furnace. The puddling furnace m ade refinem ent of
com paratively large b atch es of iron possible representing, therefore,
change in the scale of iron production w ithout fundam entally changing
th e craft of iron m aking. The change in scale, however, did neces
sitate th e replacem ent of th e artisan 's ham m er with mills consisting of
series of grooved rolls (Hunter 1969, p. 90).17 It was n o t u n til the
Introduction of the Bessem er converter for steel m aking th a t skilled
craft labor would begin to be replaced by m echanization a s th e con
verter m ade th e craft of iron puddling unnecessary (O’C onnor 1935,
pp. 29-30; an d cf. Sennett and Cobb 1972, p. 12). W hat th e power
loom and spinning jen n y were to the m ovem ent of textile production
from the household to th e factoiy, so the puddling furnace an d steam driven rolling mill were to th e subsum ption of the craft of ironmaklng.

17 On B ritish iron producing developments of a century earlier and of
iron puddling, Engels (1845/1987) wrote:
The rich iron deposits of England h ad hitherto been little
developed; iron h ad always been sm elted by m eans of charcoal,
which becam e gradually more expensive as agriculture improved
and forests were c u t away. The beginning of die u se of coke in
iron-sm elting had been made in the la st century, an d in 1780 a
new m ethod of converting into available wrought iro n cokesm elted iron, which u p to th a t time h ad been convertible into
cast iron only. This process, known a s ’puddling', consisted in
w ithdraw ing the carbon w hich had mixed with the iron during
the process of smelting, an d opened a wholly new field for the
production of English iron.
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and w ith It the iron m aster, to th e conditions of capitalistic
production. However, while Iron production w as relocated from the
w orkshop to the factory u n d er the com pulsion of th e reverberatory
furnace, th e Iron industry, like other em ergent in d u stries In th e
United S tates, rem ained scattered and uncoordinated.
The formation of the domestic Iron in d u stry as a genuine
ind u stry Intensified following N orthern victory in the Civil War, which
brought ab o u t political changes facilitating the protection and
therefore the growth of the domestic industrial capitalist class. It was
Reconstruction w hich created conditions favorable to national in d u s
trial capitalist development against foreign, largely British, capital—
consolidation of the domestic m arket, and in the area of labor control,
creation of the conditions for the further transform ation of th e w ork
force from a craft-based to an industrial one. This w as eventually
accom plished through su ch policies as th e erection of trade barriers,
provision of a federal reserve system , an d imm igration policies all of
which w ere m ade possible by th e U nion's victoiy. The Civil War, in
essence, broke, in favor of rising N orthern in d u strial capital, th e
economic and political force of th e long-standing alliance betw een
N orthern m erchant capital an d S outhern slave-owning plan ter w ealth
which h ad hitherto benefited from "free trade" w ith B ritain
(Szymanski 1978, p. 153). On the outcome of the Civil War, Douglas
Dowd (1977, p. 62) wrote:
If we m ay judge th e intentions of w arriors by w h at they do after
victory, die organization an d functioning of th e American federal
governm ent during and after the Civil W ar tells u s th a t northern
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intentions were to ad ap t federal power to th e needs of in d u s
trial, n o t planter, capitalism .18
American Industrialization advanced rapidly w ith th e su p p o rt of
th e state. W estern expansion provided new m arkets and new sources
of fuel and other raw m aterials.

The country w as soon carpeted w ith

railroads, an d if the pre-Civil War political economic orientation of the
country radiated S outh to North along the M ississippi River, it
changed direction from E ast to West along th e T ranscontinental
Railroad.
From Com pany to Corporation: The Transition to Steel Production
The first stage in the development of the steel in d u stry in the
U nited S tates began in the post-Civil W ar period around 1865 and
culm inated in 1892 w ith the strike a t Homestead, Pennsylvania. This
w as th e period of transition from iron production to th e emergence of

18 There is a parallel to be drawn between the political struggles
represented by th e debates over the English C om Laws in the first half
of the nineteenth century an d the American Civil War. Both repre
sented political conflict between the interests of in d u strial capital
ag ain st agrarian wealth, both were victories of Industrial over landed
wealth, and both resulted in changes of direction of state policy in
su p p o rt of su ch interests. For Britain, where industrialization was well
advanced in com parison to other capitalist nations, the repeal of the
C om Laws supported a free trade policy and access of British capital to
foreign m arkets and goods. In the U nited States, a n emerging in d u s
trial capitalist nation w hich had to compete w ith B ritain even over
control of its own dom estic m arket. Union victory established the
b asis upon w hich industrialization could advance, especially in the
form of protectionist policies (cf. Kaufm an 1982, pp. xxvill an d 18-20).
One question th a t historians have debated is why, in the American
case, the industrial-agrarian conflict led to w ar an d not to a legislative
solution (Genovese 1965, pp. 5-10). My position on th e issue Is n o t to
ask w hether or n o t the w ar was inevitable. Since the w ar did take
place, it is m ore im portant for this stu d y to u n d erstan d its conse
quences for political economic development and its relation to the
development of th e iron an d steel industry.
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the nation's steel industry. Set against the backdrop of the dism an
tling of iron producing facilities was th e adoption of steel producing
techniques su c h as the replacem ent of th e puddling furnace w ith the
B essem er converter; the complete adoption of coal fuel and steam
power; th e shift from an agricultural m arket to an industrial one as
com panies ru sh ed to supply steel rails for railroad expansion; and
m ost im portantly, represented by th e defeat of th e Amalgamated
Association of Iron and Steel Workers a t Homestead, the final tra n s 
form ation of th e labor force from a craft based an d highly skilled one
to a n industrial labor force. In basic steel production, this created a
workforce of semi-skilled operatives subject to th e political a n d
economic costs of advancing m echanization. At th e beginning of the
period, "Steelworkers had been the m anipulators of raw m aterials and
m olten metal. They becam e the tenders of m achines" (Brody 1960, p.
31).is
These tren d s in steel production were accom panied by other
changes in th e industiy. The steel in d u stry was developing aw ay from
local m arkets an d scattered, decentralized production to regional and
national m arkets and the growth of m ore centralized steel producing
districts in and around places like Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Chicago,
Illinois; Youngstown, Ohio; Wheeling, W est Virginia; and Birmingham,
Alabama. Geographic centralization and the urbanization wave of the
19 Brody (1960, p. 30) offers th is example:
Where m echanization w as perfected, the steel w as rolled entire
ly w ithout direct h u m a n contact. Visiting Englishm en sa w the
operation of Pennsylvania rail mills conducted "practically by the
agency of unseen hands." There w as "no labour a t all at th e
rolls."
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late nineteenth century were taking place along side of corporate
centralization.
As in o th er industries, like railroads and oil, th e corporate
landscape of the steel Industry w as changing from one in w hich small,
independent, often single factory concerns predom inated toward
com binations characteristic of the post-Civil W ar m erger movement.
In 1889, the precedent for su c h development w as set w ith the for
m ation of th e Illinois Steel Company, the first large-scale com bination
in th e industry (cf. Jennings 1926, p. 449). By 1890, in a climate of
m echanization an d merger, the United S tates steel in d u stry surpassed
th a t of G reat Britain in output of basic steel.
From 1892 to 1901, th e merger movement in Am erican
capitalism continued and in steel th e great tru sts of the in d u stry were
formed, culm inating in 1901 w ith the formation of th e United States
Steel Corporation. United S tates Steel brought together u n d er a
single corporate adm inistration th e largest steel tru sts in basic, semi
finished, and finished steel products. These included Carnegie Steel
Company, Ltd.; the Moore G roup of steel concerns; the M organ Group,
w hich held Illinois Steel am ong its other concerns; Am erican Steel
an d Wire Company, which a t one time controlled seventy-five percent
of th e nation's wire production, and Shelby Steel Tube Company,
estim ated to have controlled ninety percent of th e natio n 's seam less
steel tube capacity (Boore 1951, pp. 60-61).
Where th ese tru sts h ad previously combined m any independent
producers an d gained control over aspects of th e steel m arket, United
S tates Steel com bined tru sts and contributed to the dom ination of the
dom estic economy by huge monopolies. Concerning the m agnitude of
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the form ation of U nited States Steel, according to Foster (1986, p.
64),
It h a s been estim ated th a t between a q u a rte r and a th ird of all
U.S. capital stock in m anufacturing was directly affected by
m ergers taking place betw een 1898 and 1902 alone. T he
form ation of U.S. Steel in 1901 fused 165 separate com panies to
create a monopolistic corporation controlling approxim ately 60
percent of th e total steel industry.
These tren d s in the concentration of the In d u stiy continued through
the first h alf of the tw entieth centuiy. In addition to U.S. Steel, other
corporate actors, su c h a s Jones a n d Laughlin, Bethlehem Steel, and
Republic Steel, rose to pre-em inence.
E ach stage in th e growth an d expansion of the steel in d u stry in
the post-Civil War period, each transition to w ider and more consoli
dated m arkets and to more centralized production by the Industry's
firms, w as accompanied by rounds of factoiy closures. First, th e
transition from iron to steel production was accom panied by th e
abandonm ent of iron producing facilities. Jo n e s an d Laughlin, for
example, closed 32 iron puddling furnaces by 1892. By th e tu r n of the
century, th e basic steel producing companies, all of which w ere
producers of w rought iron in th e 1800s, had completely ceased iron
production (Brody 1960, p. 8).
Secondly, u n d er th e protection of the M orrill Tariff of 1861, the
McKinley Tariff of 1891, and the Dingley Tariff of 1897, all of w hich
represented the progressive severing of B ritish steel producers from
access to the American market, th ere was the exportation of B ritish
steel capital to the United States. T his is especially true of th e 1890s
when th e American tin plate in d u stry grew u sin g facilities im ported
from Wales and followed by m igration of Welsh labor (Hogan 1971, p.
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351; an d Knox 1944, p. 12). It Is against th is background, of Britain
challenged in the 1880s an d overtaken In the 1890s by "upstart"
industrial capitalist nations like th e United S tates and Germany, th a t
British M arxist historians trace the decline of B ritain as a n industrial
power (Caslin 1987, p. 257). With special regard to its steel industiy,
Hobsbawm (1968, p. 134) notes:
From then on Britain w as one of a group of great in d u strial
powers, b u t not the leader of industrialization. Indeed, among
th e industrial powers it was th e m ost sluggish and th e one
w hich showed the m ost obvious signs of relative decline.
Thirdly, the m erger movement in steel gained m om entum in
the la st years of th e nineteenth century, leading toward th e formation
of United States Steel Corporation in 1901. Between 1898 a n d 1900,
for example, eleven large m ergers occurred involving alm ost two
h un d red independent com panies. D uring th is period, steel com panies
were n o t only buying and building plants, b u t th is process also brought
plant shutdow ns, dism antled facilities, and capital flight a s companies
sought to establish m arket control, organizational coordination, and
geographic centralization of production. An outstanding exam ple of
this is found In the history of the Shelby Steel Tube Com pany prior to
its acquisition by United S tates Steel. Shelby p u rsued a policy of
acquiring th e p lan ts of com petitors in order to s h u t them down,
dism antling facilities and transferring them to other Shelby plants,
especially those located in and around Toledo an d Shelby, Ohio.
Fourthly, in the process of m onopolization, United S tate s Steel
Corporation closed or abandoned 33 p lan ts from the time of its
formation to 1905. From 1910 to 1920 there w as another wave of
closures undertaken by the corporation, am ong w hich w as th e
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reduction from 34 to 26 p lan ts operated by USS's National Tube
Company, and from 1923 to 1929, U nited States Steel dism antled or
abandoned 30 of its plants. At the sam e time the corporation was
undergoing v ast external an d internal expansions an d w as consolidat
ing its monopoly position, for example, between 1906 and 1911,
U nited States Steel built its huge steel producing facilities an d the city
itself of Gary, Indiana. Throughout th is time sim ilar developments
were taking place within o th er steel corporations. In general, the
drive toward m ore centralized and expanded production w as
accompanied a t each stage b y a parallel drive to s h u t plants down.
A bandonm ent and dism antling of p lan ts historically have been p art of
corporate policies w hich seek to concentrate operations.
From Corporation to Conglomerate: The Decline of Steel Production
in th e United S tates and Post-World W ar II Developments
Domination of the U nited States economy by large, multidivi
sional, nationally organized firms initiated the consolidation of the
hegemonic position of the American steel industry in the world
m arket, a position which in th e post-World War II y ears h as been
steadily eroding. The position of the dom estic steel in d u stry w as
established upon expanding internal m ark ets for steel related to the
needs of large-scale militarization, the growth of th e autom obile
industry, massive urbanization, and, in general, expansion an d intensi
fication of consum er as well as industrial m arkets (Warren 1973, pp.
214-230). The global position of American steel accom panied the
growth of w hat W arren calls world steel districts. The United States
steel industry grew into a "world industry” in the w ake of the great
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boom of post-w ar "world reconstruction," based on a foundation of
American capital. In 1945 a t the apex of its development, th e
American steel in d u stry provided th e world w ith 62 percent of its
steel fWarren 1973, p. 9). From th a t year through the 1950s and
1960s th e position of American steel relative to world m arkets was
declining. By 1968, the United S tates accounted for only 22.5 percent
of th e world's steel, and "In 1971 for th e first tim e since 1890 her
o u tp u t of steel w as exceeded by another nation w hen the U.S.S.R.
pulled ahead" (Warren 1973, p. 10 an d cf. Chirot 1986, p. 229).20
As the "moment of truth" for B ritish steel cam e in th e 1880s and
1890s, the m ost critical y ears for the steel in d u stry of th e United
S tates came in th e late 1960s and 1970s. It w as during th is tim e th a t
the international position of the in d u stry began its m ost severe decline
as it w as Increasingly challenged by foreign producers, particularly
Ja p a n . Referring to these developments, Bluestone and H arrison's
(1982, p. 5) description of th e contem porary United States a n d the
cu rren t deindustrialization crisis is strikingly sim ilar in tone and
sentim ent to Hobsbawm's description, cited above, of the decline of
B ritain in th e nineteenth a n d early tw entieth centuries:
[E]ven before the 1980s began, th e American stan d ard of living
no longer placed u s first among th e developed nations of the
20 D uring the 1950s, the development of Soviet steel industry w as
pushed by Stalin's consideration of steel production as the b asis for all
further Soviet industrialization. Thus, steel was considered a "leading
link" in Soviet planning, a n industrial sector w hich com manded de
velopm ental priority even a t the expense of the development of other
sectors (Clark 1956, pp. 267-277; N aum 1961, pp. 236-237; an d
Ellman 1979, p. 18). As N aum (1961, p. 237) sta te s about post-w ar
Soviet Industrial development, "Everything else w as largely neglected-the m ore so, th e less it happened to be connected with steel."
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world...-Adding to th e economic despair is America's apparent
inability to compete in th e global m arketplace. O ur share of the
world's m anufactured exports h a s fallen from m ore th a n 25
percent to less th a n 17 percent in th e last tw enty years, and
relative to o u r strongest competitors, it could easily be argued
th a t we are being rapidly pushed to th e sidelines.... [And] the
num ber one product sold to America w as passenger motor
vehicles, followed by iron and steel plates....
An im portant organizational development th a t propelled the advance
of Ja p an ese steel an d the decline of American steel w as the m ost
significant m erger in the whole history of global steel since the
establishm ent of United States Steel in 1901: the form ation of Nippon
Steel Company.
Nippon Steel, which merged Yawata and Fuji Steel Companies,
produced a corporation of unprecedented size in th e steel industry.
In th e very first year of operation, 1970, th e new company,
...produced m ore steel...than the United S tates Steel Corporation
which up to th a t time, h ad been th e unchallenged leader in
world steel production. U.S. Steel's o u tp u t of crude steel in
1970 was 3 1 .4 million n e t tons, while Nippon Steel’s w as 37
million n e t to n s (Hogan 1972, pp. 114-115).
Led by Nippon Steel, by 1971 J a p a n took the lead in productivity of
basic steel when it surpassed th e levels of o u tp u t of th e European
Economic Com munity (EEC) an d the United S tates (Warren 1975, p.
224; an d Hirschmeier and Yui 1981, p. 302). In 1985, Jap an ese steel
o u tp u t w as 105 million tons, 14 percent of the world's total output,
while th e United S tates accounted for 80 million to n s or 11 percent of
the to ta l—this dispite the absence in J a p a n of domestic sources of
iron, coal, or energy (Yachir 1988, p. 17).21
21 Acs (1984, p. 83) also points o u t th a t by 1980, the United States
steel industry w as third in o u tp u t behind th e Soviet Union and Ja p a n
in addition to lagging behind in combined o u tp u t of the EEC. On this
point, Yachir's (1988, pp. 17-18) study show s th a t in 1985, EEC
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As the United S tates emerged a s a leader am ong capitalist
in d u strial nations in th e 1870s to 1890s depression, th e increasing
im portance of Ja p a n among capitalist nations and a s a steel producer
took place in the context of the recession of the 1970s. In steel
production, capacity across th e developed capitalist countries h a s
declined. In North America it h a s fallen from 156 million tons in
1978 to its present level of 136 million tons and, it is estim ated, m u st
be fu rth e r reduced to 125 million tons by 1993. Ja p a n e se steel
capacity h a s fallen too, b u t not at quite the velocity. Through the
1980s Ja p an ese steel capacity w ent from 142 to 125 million tons and
is expected to hold a t ab o u t th is level for the im m ediate future. In
general, capacity use across the developed world w as ab o u t 58 percent
(Yachir 1988, pp. 6-7).
Idled steel capacity h a s brought w ith it an em ploym ent crisis
th rough o u t the developed capitalist world. As is tru e in general of the
cu rren t crisis in steel w ith regard to national production levels, export
levels, degree of internationalization of production, an d level of
capacity use, the employment crisis across the capitalist world varies
in severity. Least affected h as been Ja p an , whose labor force in the
steel in d u stry declined 22 percent between 1973 and 1982. In the
United S tates the steel labor force fell by 38 percent over the same
period a n d by 59 percent in the United Kingdom. Across the EEC
some 800,000 jo b s were lo st—ab o u t one-third of those employed in
steel production (Yachir 1988, p. 8). The unprecedented decline of

nations together accounted for 121 million tons of steel or 17 percent
of th e w orld's total.
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capacity use in the world’s steel industry h a s m ade factory closure a
problem acro ss the world.
It is against these international developments an d in a b u siness
clim ate cu rren tly explained by steel producers and com m entators
alike in term s of the "challenge from foreign competition"22 th a t th e
presen t condition of the dom estic steel in d u stry is discussed (cf.
Mueller 1982, pp. 76-77; an d Cox 1987, pp. 318-320). Paul Tiffany
(1988, p. 3) sum m arizes th e condition of American steel production
since the Second World War;
The Am erican steel in d u stry h as degenerated to a n ap p aren t
state of perm anent contraction. Steel mills, once surging w ith
orders to be filled, are now forever shuttered in m any p arts of
the nation. Numerous companies have filed for bankruptcy,
while o th ers escaped by only the th in n est of m argins.23
W orkers, once "idled," were th en perm anently elim inated, and
22 At the time th a t it was filing for bankruptcy in Ju ly of 1986, LTV
Corporation, th e nation's second largest steel producer, placed a full
page advertisem ent in the New York Times in order to explain the
need for th e corporation's reorganization. The advertisem ent w hich
appeared on 18 Ju ly 1986 quoted chairm an an d chief executive officer
Raymond A. Hay, who said "The w eakness in th e steel an d energy
sectors is due in large part, to an unprecedented and su stain ed level of
im ports over th e p ast several years which continues, virtually u n 
abated. It is estim ated th a t direct and indirect im ports account for
ab o u t 51 percent of total steel consum ption in the United States."
23 For example, in Ju ly 1986, LTV, the nation's second largest steel
producer filed for bankruptcy and operation u n d er C hapter 11 for a
period of one an d a half to four years, citing the "slump" in the U.S.
steel industry a s its reason. Operating u n d er protection of C hapter 11,
LTV posted a $610.4 million loss in Septem ber of th a t y ea r (Time. 28
J u ly 1986, an d New York T im es. 11 Septem ber 1986). The condition
of the United S tates steel Industry which drove the value of USX stock
down also m ade th is m ajor domestic steel producer the object of a
potential take-over led by "corporate raiders" Carl Ichan an d T. Boone
Pickens, who h ad been buying up sh ares of USX stock in Septem ber
an d October of 1986 (Wall S treet Jo u rn a l. 22 Septem ber 1986; New
York Times. 2 October 1986; and Prokesch New York T im es. 26
Septem ber 1986).
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steel im ports displaced an ever larger sh are of the domestic
m arket.
Several m ajor interrelated trends can be more specifically identified
concerning th e p resen t stage of development of th e American steel
in d u stry a t hom e in th e post-w ar period including the conglomeration
an d diversification m ovem ent representing the flight of dom estic steel
producers from steel production, a n d the rise of decentralized,
nonunionized, sm aller scale specialty steel producers.
The basic stru ctu re of the U nited States steel industry
rem ained, for th e most, p a rt unchanged from th e time of the
form ation of the United S tates Steel Corporation u n til the opening of
th e 1960s (Hogan 1972, p. 11). From th a t time, the direction of steel
in d u stry development w as toward concentration of control over steel
production through th e acquisition of steel firm s engaged in sim ilar
processes an d steel firm s engaged in processes located on longer
ch ain s of production. In other words, the dom estic steel in d u stry
grew largely through in train d u stry acquisitions—steel firms acquiring
th e properly of other steel firms.
Changes in the corporate stru ctu re of th e steel in d u stry were
precipitated by a developing condition where th e requirem ents of
profitable steel mill investm ent have become m ore costly an d lower in
ra te of retu rn . Such is th e case in th e climate of world steel
production b u t more so in the United States. Describing the condition
of "frozen Investm ent in fixed steel capital," w hich h as been steadily
decreasing since about 1970, Yachir (1988, pp. 6-7) states:
From 1975 the figure of $US5.7 billion of investm ent (in $US
1975) for the m ain capitalist countries tak en as a whole m u st be
appreciated in relation to the co st of a single big steel plant.
The investm ent expenditures of the US, J a p a n , and th e EEC
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would in 1978 hardly finance the building of two steel p lan ts of
a n average size! Investm ent in W estern steel in d u stry is now
lim ited to m odernization an d capitalist rationalization of
production. The age of accum ulation in the steel Industry is
definitely over in the big capitalist countries.
This condition is associated w ith a major reorganization movement in
the steel industry. In the United States th is h a s been taking th e form
of conglom erate diversification or the retrea t of American firms from
production of basic steel, the shift of capital from traditional leaders in
the steel in d u stry from steel production to unrelated industries, in tra
industry mergers a n d take-overs of steel firm s by other conglomerates.
Steel firm s are b oth taking over and being tak en over by unrelated
concerns.
T he extent of diversification is illustrated by th ese examples
(Hogan 1972, pp. 12-14):
• In 1964, United S tates Steel Corporation moved into the chemical
Industry by buying the assets of Industrial Chemical an d Protective
Coating Division of Pittsburgh Chemical Company. In 1966 United
States Steel formed its USS Chemicals Division, and in 1969 the
Corporation became a producer of plastics w ith its acquisition of
G eneral American T ransportation Corporation. United S tates Steel
also undertook ventures In titanium , engineering, consulting, an d real
estate.
• At ab o u t the sam e time, Bethlehem Steel Corporation acquired
Kusan, a producer of plastic p arts, and an eighty percent share of
Multicon, a company producing houses.
• In 1968 National Steel Corporation entered alum inum production
with an investm ent of more th a n $100 million. Through the
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acquisition of alum inum concerns National p u t together a fully
integrated alum inum operation from sm elting to distribution.
• In 1969 Republic Steel organized Republic Steel Enterprises, Inc., a
wholly owned subsidiary w hich brought Republic Steel into real estate
and housing. Sim ilar developments took place in Inland Steel
Corporation and Armco, the la tte r explaining the drive to diversify for
"the m axim um benefit of its shareholders" (Hogan 1972, p. 14).24
The symbolic if not the actu al height of the diversification
movement affecting the steel in d u stry w as reached in 1986 w hen
United States Steel Corporation changed its nam e from USS to USX.
In the newly reorganized holding company, steel an d related p ro d u c
tion, organized in a corporate su b u n it w hich retains th e nam e U.S.S.,
accounts for only 31 percent of corporate interests.25 U.S.S. division
stands am ong three other subdivisions of USX including M arathon Oil
Company, Texas Oil and Gas Corporation, an d U.S. Diversified Group,
the la tte r of which is involved in chemicals, engineering, and real
estate (Hicks, New York Times. 9 Jiffy 1986). The recent reorgani
zation resulting in th e formation of USX is the culm ination of a move
m ent in th e steel industry to direct investm ents away from steel an d
toward th e production of other m aterials in order to establish flexi
bility a n d control over a variety of areas. The m ost im portant consid
eration in investm ent, defined b y the dem ands of capital accum ulation,
is not th e survival of a particular industry or nation b u t the survival and
24 Hogan is quoting a letter from the president and chairm an of Armco
which accom panied th e corporation's 1966 Annual R eport.
25 M arquis (1984, p. 25) reports th a t in 1984, U.S. Steel's sales of
steel accounted for only thirty-four percent of all of its revenues.
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advancem ent of capital. For example, conventional w isdom accounts
for th e decline of th e steel industry explaining th a t s h u t down of steel
plants is a n outcome of product substitution, e.g., th a t "aluminum,
plastic, an d other m aterial...have su b stitu ted for the product" (Time 23
J u n e 1986). But, steel corporations are n o t the passive victims of
substitu tio n . At a 1969 press conference, Edgar Speer, then
ascending to the presidency of United S tates Steel Corporation, was
asked, "What does U.S. Steel intend to do about the u se of plastics by
the autom obile industry?" He replied, "Go into the p lastics business"
(Hogan 1972, p. 13).
Accompanying diversification am ong steel producers, beginning
in the 1960s, w as an "abrupt o u tb u rst of another form of corporate
change—th e steel takeover" (Hogan 1972, p. 16). A ssets of steel
com panies were increasingly being tak en over by other conglomerates.
At th e height of th is movement in 1968, five out of th e top 20 steel
producers were taken over by conglomerates. Included am ong these
were Lykes Corporation’s takeover of th e nation's eighth largest steel
m aker, Youngstown S heet and Tube, an d Ling-Temco-Vought's (LTV)
takeover of Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, followed in 1984 by
LTV's takeover of Republic Steel (Hogan 1972, p. 17; B u ss and Redb u m 1983, p. 20; and Time. 28 Ju ly 1988).
P art of the tren d toward the conglomeration of th e traditional
integrated steel producers w as the decline of their role in the
dom estic production of steel. Along w ith th e m ovem ents to diversify
and tow ard corporate takeover, Adams an d Mueller (1986, p. 83)
state:
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Major Jap an ese steel producers have acquired equity sh ares in
several integrated American steel firm s [and] jo in t ventures
[between domestic an d foreign firms] have been organized to
build and operate new steel installations.
In oth er words, "The geographic area of th e United S tates is...not
necessarily synonym ous w ith the ’hom e m ark et’ of the American steel
industry" (Adams and Mueller, 1986, p. 77). This refers to an old
battle. In 1865, the geographic area of th e United S tates also w as not
synonym ous w ith the Am erican home m arket, and from th e end of the
Civil War through the second half of the nineteenth century American
iron an d steel producers were engaged in a struggle w ith British steel
capital over control of th e American m ark et in the period of the
industry 's formation. Presently, in the period of its decline, there is
a n ongoing increase in th e proportion of integrated steel products
supplied by foreign producers (Adams an d Mueller, 1986, p. 79).
Yet American steel producers are n o t to be th o u g h t of as th e
passive victims of parasitical foreign competition. One of the
alternatives considered by USX in the attem p t to head off a takeover
and increase th e value of its stock was to look for a foreign buyer for
its steel m aking division. Prokesch (New York Tim es. 26 Septem ber
1986) wrote:
Potential purchasers could come from J a p a n or S o u th Korea.
B ut m ost Japanese steelm akers already have p artn e rs in the
United States....A nd, th e Koreans...seem com m itted to
developing their dom estic steelm aking capacity ra th e r th a n
m aking foreign acquisitions.
At th e sam e tim e th a t these developments were taking place, the
U nited S tates government finalized a trad e agreem ent w ith Europe
outlining a program involving im portation of E uropean produced steel
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and steel pro d u cts In exchange for more open access of U.S.
producers to European m arkets for th e sale of citru s fruit.
With respect to foreign m arkets and in relation to foreign steel
producers, su c h is the legacy of the United States steel in d u stry
subseq u en t to the form ation of th e U nited S tates Steel Corporation.
Following World War I, opportunities were seen by m any in th e steel
industry, including Elbert Gary, to secure a place in foreign m ark ets by
supplying th e steel needs of the world's w ar-torn economies. Tiffany
(1988, p. 10) states:
O perational m anagers of U SS...sought to expand their foreign
b u sin ess by exploiting the void in European production caused
by th e destruction of capacity during th e war. This objective
cam e Into conflict, however, w ith American investm ent b an k ers
who foresaw great opportunities in Europe th ro u g h profits th a t
could be secured from underw riting loans to reco n stru ct
E uropean industry...."Should the American steel industry let the
foreign steel producers take away its world m arkets?" asked one
b an k er bluntly in 1927. "It should," he answered.
With a sim ilar approach tak en in the rebuilding of th e steel in d u stry
following World W ar II, finance profits were contingent upon the
success of th e steel in d u stries of other nations In w hich b an k ers were
invested.
This m ean t th a t Am erican steel producers were to avoid im ped
ing E uropean and Aslan steel production if loans were to be repaid
(Tiffany 1988, pp. 10 an d 168-169).26 Tiffany's overall argum ent.
26 For example, a s Chirot (1986, pp. 194-203) com m ents, the M ar
shall Plan of 1948 was designed to provide th e capital to be invested
in E uropean in d u stry in order to produce exports, in tu rn , in order to
p ay for American im ports so th a t betw een 1945 and 1955, $38 billion
dollars in lo an s and grants were provided for the in d u strial develop
m en t of other nations, seventy-five percent of which w ent to J a p a n
a n d Europe. The Bretton Woods Agreement four y ears earlier estab 
lished United States currency as world currency an d u sh ered in th e
so-called Pax A m ericana. This w as the political b asis upon w hich th e
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based on his account of post-w ar steel in d u stry development, is th a t
the cu rren t condition of th e steel industry is the outcom e of d estru c
tive and wrong decisions which have led to its decline domestically.
The purpose he gives for writing th e book is the hope th a t the lessons
of the steel industry since 1945 will help u s to avoid sim ilar m istakes
in other in d u stries (Tiffany 1988, p. 190). There is no denying th e
extent to w hich cu rren t social conditions are outcomes of decisions
m ade and actions taken in the p ast. W hat h e seems to neglect,
however, is the criteria w hich govern or a t le a st constrain decision
making. Overall, su ch criteria have less to do with the dem ands of
industrial development and more to do w ith th e historical necessity in
a capitalist world-system to accum ulate w ealth. While th e decisions to
which he refers may have ru n counter to th e development of the steel
industry, they may have made more sense in the context of an
economy dom inated by finance capital. It m u st be borne in mind, for
example, th a t U.S.S. w as a creation of finance capital, a n invention of
banking interests led b y J.P. Morgan. To Tiffany, the decisions m ade
concerning the nation's steel in d u stry w ith respect to foreign
m arkets—the decision to accum ulate w ealth In the form of interest on
loans to rebuild industries of other nations—w as the m oral equivalent
of the Trojans allowing the wooden horse w ithin their w alls, knowing

United S tates established itself as a n exporter of finance a s opposed to
industrial capital.

72

full well It w ould lead to th eir downfall.27 T hus, Tiffany (1988, p. 11)
concludes:
The dom estic steel industry's p lan s for global hegem ony were
th u s dash ed by the very force th a t brought it to life: th e nation's
powerful private investm ent banking com munity. The
steelm akers, for all th eir supposed power a n d influence, in fact
were th e subordinate actors in the dram a.
Along w ith all of th e se changes affecting large steel com panies,
the "form" of domestic steel production is shifting from a m ark et
dom inated by th e traditional large, integrated firm s to the rise of
"mini-mills" and, to a lesser extent, th a t of the so-called specialty steel
producers. This growth h a s been accom panied by the geographic shift
from a relatively high wage to a lower wage, generally nonunionized
labor force (Agnew 1987, p. 167; Cox 1987, pp. 318-320; A dam s and
M ueller 1986; Acs 1984, p. 98; B arn ett and Schorch 1983, pp. 83103; Sabel 1982, pp. 204-205; and Hogan 1972, p. 11). T he im pact of

27 Reading Tiffany's account of the fall of the American steel industry,
w ith his em phasis on m istakes and b ad decision making, rem inded
me of B arbara W. T uchm an's (1984) work, The M arch of Folly: From
Troy to V ietnam . It too is a history of m istakes, although w ith respect
to m ilitary history. To Tuchm an, the imagery of th e Trojan horse as It
h a s come down to u s in folklore an d legend is striking and provides
h er w ith the central organizing concept of her survey of w ar. "The
episode of the Horse exemplifies policy pursued contrary to selfinterest—in the face of u rg en t w arning and feasible alternative" (Tuch
m an 1984, p. 37). With respect to h is discussion o f the relationship
betw een finance capital an d domestic steelm akers, it is a m etaphor
w ith w hich I th in k Tiffany would agree and a type of which pervades
his work. But, a s T uchm an (1984. p. 36) recognized, in the tale of the
Horse, the gods are the ultim ate motivator^, so m u s t it be rem em 
bered th a t b u sin ess decisions are m ade ultim ately with reference to
the constraints an d within th e param eters of the logic of capital
accum ulation, so th a t the "downfall" of a n industry cannot be explained
w ith reference to decision m aking alone.
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these non-integrated producers on the conglomerate sector of the
industry is illustrated in this example from Acs (1984, p. 101):
The R aritan River Company in Perth Amboy, New Jersey,
reopened in 1980, h as a capacity of 800,000 tons of finished
steel per year. The plant produces high quality wire rod. It is
one of the m ost technologically advanced of the new mini-mills.
The firm produces its product for the autom obile Industry and
sells in over 30 states a t a co st of about 300 dollars p er ton. The
R aritan River firm was instrum ental in forcing U.S. Steel out of
the wire rod business. In 1983, U.S. Steel closed ab o u t 20 per
cent of its capacity and took a 1.2 billion dollar write-off.
The mini-m ills are, therefore, offering a new source of dom estic
com petition to the large scale integrated corporations and have been
described as the "dynamic com ponent of an otherwise sick steel
industry in th e United States" (Cox 1987, p. 333).
The mini-mills are the equivalent of the "high-tech" sector of
th e steel industry, able to utilize advanced technology on a sm aller
scale to produce for specially m arkets with cheaper m aterials; e.g., the
ferrous in p u t of mini-mills is largely scrap steel a s opposed to iron ore
(cf. Agnew 1987, p. 167). Also, in m any ways, th e rise of th e minimills rep resen ts a reversion to a n earlier stage o f steel in d u stry
development to the extent that th ey are located close to local m arkets
(and so are not tied to old steel centers) and therefore are highly
geographically decentralized. The m o st im portant advantage of the
mini-mills is found in th e political flexibility from th e point of view of
employers, to avoid unionized workforces and freedom from w h at has
become th e weight of large organization. Cox (1987, p. 333) explains:
Large scale no longer necessarily has economic advantage and
m ay have the competitive disadvantage of rigidity, a rigidity
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derived both from heavy investm ent in a technology th a t m ust be
am ortized28 over a longer time and from bureaucratic rules....
Domestically, mini-mills are capturing increasingly large m ark ets from
th e integrated producers w ho are them selves "adopting som e of their
features" (Cox 1987, p. 333). It is estim ated th a t by about 1991, minimills, w hich currently account for 18 to 2 0 percent of dom estic steel
production, will account for ab o u t 30 p ercen t of the steel produced in
th e United States, and by th e end of the cen tu ry they will account for
ab o u t forty percent of total national steel production (Time 1986, 23
Ju n e , and Hicks, New York Times. 31 J u ly 1986).
Changes in the dom estic steel in d u stry of the United S tates re
flect a wider crisis in world capitalism, particularly in steel production
w hich h as h ad an im pact on all developed capitalist nations. Yachir
(1988, p. 5) sum m arizes th e m ain points of th is crisis in general and
in its specific effect on the steel Industry of th e United S tates.
In 1975, for the first tim e since th e Second World W ar, th e
production of steel fell spectacularly in all the main capitalist
countries. The phenom enon first appeared in line w ith the
cyclical development of the steel in d u stry whose expansion
since 1950, had shown quite regular fluctuations. However, it
soon becam e obvious th a t this crisis w as not like the others.
The fall in production, which was striking in Its extent, was only
28 A m ortization refers to the rate of renewal of fixed capital or the
am ount of value th a t m u st be accum ulated in order to renew fixed
capital. In m odem , capital intensive, highly centralized capitalism .
T his m eans th a t if the rate of m arket expansion is low or m ark ets me
shrinking or rem ain co n stan t over a given period of time, a n d
increasingly large investm ents in fixed capital are being m ade, then
th e period over w hich th a t capital m u st be am ortized expands. This
problem of accum ulation is especially acu te w hen combined w ith the
com plem entary tendency for th e tu rn over tim e of fixed cap ital to
shorten. This forms an im portant contradiction of "late capitalism ."
th e tendency tow ard the sim ultaneous increase in investm ent in fixed
capital, am ortization, and velocity of tu rn over tim e of fixed capital
(Mandel 1978, pp. 230-231).
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the first sign of a series of troubles w hich affected employment,
investm ent, m arkets, prices and profits. World-wide, the crisis
stru ck all the steel in d u stries of th e developed cap italist world
a t th e sam e time, although with a differentiated im pact. All of
this reflected a situ atio n m uch m ore complex th a n a m ere
conjunctural dow nturn in their economies.
Of th e steel industries of the developed capitalist countries, th a t
of the United S tates h as b e e n m ost seriously affected. The combined
steel capacities of the U nited States, th e EEC, and J a p a n fell between
1973 and 1975 from 400 to 330 million tons. In 1985, U nited S tates
steel o u tp u t h a d decreased 35 percent com pared to the 1979 level,
th a t of the EEC, by 15 percent, and th a t of Ja p a n by 6 percent (Yachir
1988, p. 6). So, even Ja p a n , considered to be the up-and-com ing cap
italist nation an d a leader in world steel production an d technology,
h a s not been unaffected. An im portant reaso n for these developments
in the world steel industry have been attrib u ted to the emergence of
new producing countries in socialist an d Third World n atio n s contrib
uting to th e shrinkage of international m ark ets and access to high
quality ores. For example, th e share of th e Third World steel pro
ducers in w orld production increased from 1.6 percent in 1955 to 5
percent in 1974 and 10 p ercen t in 1985, a s th e economic crisis of
th e 1970s "accelerated th e international redistribution of production"
away from th e United S tates an d toward J a p a n and other nations
(Yachir 1988, pp . 18-19; an d Amin 1988, pp. 1-2).29
29 Currently, Socialist countries, primarily th e Soviet Union and
People’s Republic of China, together acco u n t for 38.1 p ercen t of the
total volume of world steel production. The U.S., EEC, an d J a p a n
account for 41 percent an d other advanced capitalist n atio n s account
for an additional 9 percent (Yachir 1988, p. 18). This m ean s th a t
participation in world steel production is sp lit fairly evenly betw een all
advanced cap italist nations an d the rest of th e world, w ith the former
accounting for a total of 50 percent and th e latter 48.1 percen t of
global steel production.
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The leveling of competitive conditions betw een developed and
other capitalist nations h as led to th e adoption by the enterprises in
th e capitalist world of relocation program s directed a t Investm ent,
especially In th e Third World w here cheap labor forces an d cheap
energy and other resources can be utilized (Amin 1988, pp. 1-2). This
investm ent p attern in steel as in other industries h a s served to shift
capacity from and develop the Industry in other countries according to
a pattern w hich involves th e shut-dow n of p lan ts In traditional
producing areas and th e opening of new ones (Frank 1980, pp. 81 an d
153).
The development of the steel industry in th e Third World h a s
been generally consistent with the model of dependent Industrializa
tion offered by Evans (1979) and B om schier (1981), th a t is, in d u stri
alization conforming for th e m ost p a rt to a natio n 's "dependent inte
gration into th e world capitalist system ” (Amin 1988, p. I).30 In this
definition, dependence sta n d s as a "situation in w hich th e rate and
direction of capital accum ulation are externally conditioned" (Evans
1979, p. 27). With special regard to th e steel industry, establishm ent
of state-ru n enterprises In nations like Brazil, Chile, and Argentina,
am ong w hat Amin (1988, p. 2) calls "semi-industrialized" countries,
were able to assert them selves as new com petitors of m ultinational
concerns of th e core (Evans, 1979, p. 45).

30 Although certainly n o t suggested b y m any of th e adherents of this
view, the choice of die word dependency is probably poor an d should
n o t suggest th a t Third World nations are powerless to exercise influ
ence over the course of th eir own development. The power of the
First World, while considerable, is n o t absolute—a s history b ears out.
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Overall, th e position of J a p a n as the leader among capitalist
n atio n s with respect to world, including Third World, steel m arkets,
re sts on its ability to expand exports, create m arkets for them , and
export production. This is accompanied by a parallel inability of
A m erican producers to do so (Yachir 1988, p. 19). For example, w ith
resp ect to one of the traditional U.S. m arkets of Latin America, the
ideology of desenvolvim entism o in Brazil, a form of "economic
nationalism ," accom panied political nationalism an d w as translated
into policy w hich Increased th e role of the state in th a t natio n 's in d u s
trialization an d development in order to "dis-involve" foreign con
cern s.31 This industrialization policy was based upon the substitution
of foreign im ports for domestically produced consum er an d industrial
goods. Here, industrialization is bolstered by state-supported protec
tio n ist barriers, governm ent program s involving the shift of income
aw ay from export consum ption to domestic consum ption, investm ent
in Infrastructure, and the established position of th e state as an agent
of foreign investm ent. All of these things com bined to lim it the role of
foreign determ ination of th e Brazilian economy. As Cardoso and
Faletto (1979, p. 129) observe, "This w as the tim e of national steel
foundries, oil refineries, an d electrical power stations." By 1964, the
Brazilian public sector controlled m o st of the steel Industry and w as a
prim ary exporter of iron ore w hich u n d ercu t th e Influence of Ameri
31 T he particular case of Brazil, it could be argued, dem onstrates w hat
C hirot (1986, p. 195) following Block (1977, pp. 70-118) calls the
assertio n by "’national capitalist'" forces of a right wing "nationalist
closure" of the domestic economy w hich "promised a safer economic
environm ent free from international, and particularly American,
competition" (Chirot 1986, p. 195).
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can com panies like the United S tates Steel Corporation (Evans 1979,
pp. 33 and 252-253; and Cardoso and Faletto 1979, p. 139). Thus, the
relationship between United S tates steel producers to certain nations
of the Third World changed in the post-w ar period as nations like
Brazil were able, as Evans (1979, p. 81) states, to "internalize" aspects
of its m anufacturing. Where American interests controlled three-fifths
of all direct investm ents in Brazil in the imm ediate post-w ar period,
this share h a s been steadily declining a t the sam e tim e th a t the share
of J a p a n and the European countries h a s been expanding in in tern a
tional m arkets (Evans 1979, p. 82).
Not only did the relationship between U nited States steel
producers and Third World m arkets change, b u t so did their situation
with respect to Europe and Ja p an .
From the late fifties onw ards...it became clear th a t North Ameri
can firm s were no longer competing so m uch w ith a declining
British empire as w ith a rising com bination of Japanese,
German, an d other E uropean firms (Evans 1979, p. 82).
In th e early 1960s, the strategy of Increasing geographic diversifi
cation by expanding U.S.-owned steel m anufacturing in Europe w as
abandoned owing to the high costs necessary for capital intensive
investm ent (Tiffany 1988, pp. 180-181). In 1960 Benjam in Fairless,
speaking on behalf of the American Iron and Steel Institute, stated,
"We can 't very well scrap our existing plants, representing a n invest
m ent of m any billions of dollars, and spend more billions to build new
p lan ts overseas’" (Tiffany 1988, p. 181). Apparently, though, they
could scrap p la n ts in order to p u rsu e m ore secure investm ents in oil,
chemicals, plastics, alum inum , real estate, insurance, etc. Therefore,
the strategy of corporate development am ong the steel com panies was
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product diversification an d conglomeration a s opposed to geographic
diversification of steel production.
Related to all of th ese developments in th e steel industry of the
U nited S tates—diversification, takeover, loss of or su rren d er of the
dom estic steel m arket, and the rise of m ini-m ills—is the "deindus
trialization wave" of the 1970s, the progressive disinvestm ent in and
dism antling of the nation's basic capacity to produce. Of these
changes, H ans Mueller (1982, pp. 76-77) states:
In the late 1970s...several of the large [steel firms] launched a
drive to elim inate some of their stru ctu ra l deficiencies, involving
a t tim es m ajor surgery on the su b stan ce of th eir com panies. The
task w as facilitated by the ease w ith w hich public reaction to
p lan t closures could b e deflected against Imports.
It is in light of su ch stream lining operations, as Mueller calls them ,
th a t current social scientific em phasis on the Issue of factory closures
arises, as does the concept of deindustrialization in an attem pt to ex
plain them in th e post-World W ar II historical context. At the h ea rt of
both the deindustrialization process, as it is currently described, and
th is drive to elim inate stru ctu ra l deficiencies through conglomeration
is th e closure of factories. For example, of United S tates Steel Corpo
ration's diversification into nonsteel areas, Bluestone and H arrison
(1982, p. 4) state:
In Pittsburgh, the U.S. Steel Corporation called a press confer
ence [in 1970] to announce th a t it would perm anently close
down fourteen mills in eight states (principally in Pennsylvania
an d Ohio) w ithin the year, th u s laying off over 13,000 workers.
Its reward w as an $850 million tax break from the federal
government, w hich it later p u t tow ard the down paym ent o n the
purchase of M arathon oil.
Overall, in the seven-year period from 1979 to its reorganization as
USX, United S tates Steel Corporation alone closed "more th a n 150 of
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Its plants an d facilities...and trim m ed more th a n 50,000 workers from
its steel force" (Hicks. New York Times. 9 Ju ly 1986).32 Factory
closures have always been p a rt of the process of capitalist industrial
development, an d in order to u n d erstan d them fully they m u st be
studied historically.
Conclusions
The deindustrialization view, particularly th a t developed by
B luestone an d Harrison, is central to contem porary sociological w ork
aim ed a t explaining the direction of economic developm ent since the
Second World War. But the deindustrialization thesis h a s come u n d er
a ttac k from both the left and the right. Conservatives call the concept
of deindustrialization mythical, descriptive of a nonexistent process
w hich in actuality is nothing more th a n th e norm al operation of th e
m echanism s of a dynamic, progressive, an d ultim ately benevolent
econom y (cf. McKenzie 1984c, p. 11-27). The em phasis in the dein
dustrialization literature upon the social costs of factory closures—th eir
dislocating an d destructive influence u p o n individuals, com m unities,
regions, and n atio n s—speaks to this criticism by moving away from the
conservative tendency to tre a t workers as m ere factors of production
su b ject to "adjustm ent costs." A djustm ent costs become a m uch m ore
serious issue w hen they involve alcoholism, suicide, th e lose of hom es,
th e loss of security, erosion of com munity ta x base, an d other
problem s associated with m ass unem ploym ent.

32 United S tates Steel Corporation once employed ab o u t 50,000
w orkers in th e Monongahela Valley alone. By 1986, employment h ad
dropped to only 5,100 (Marquis 1986, p. 23).
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From the left, the internal logic of th e deindustrialization thesis
is questioned. D eindustrialization is held to refer to concrete social
processes, b u t also to mystify them (di Leonardo 1985, pp. 237-257;
and H ouston 1984, pp. 257-260). In other words, B luestone and
H arrison's conclusions are limited to th e im pacts of th e cu rren t wave
of disinvestm ent characteristic of p o st-1945 economic developments,
b u t it is only implicitly th a t the m eaning of su ch developments are
discussed in relation to the process of capitalist production and
accum ulation itself—its m eaning in term s of class and m ark et rela
tions. Factory closures, for example, are adequately and successfully
placed w ithin the context of th e post-w ar rise of m ergers and con
glomeration, b u t these in tu rn are not placed within th e context of th e
historical process of capital accum ulation itself. Of fundam ental imp
ortance here is th e tendency to subm erge the "fundam ental reality of
class" by discussing factory closures prim arily as a problem of unem 
ploym ent (Houston 1984, p. 259). As H ouston (1984, p. 259) states:
[Bluestone and Harrison's] analysis depends upon how capital is
accum ulating. If the process of capital accum ulation results in
stable high paying jo b s as in the 1950s and 1960s th e n it's
acceptable. B ut if deindustrialization in the 1970s an d 1980s
leads to a loss of these Jobs, th en it is not. This kind of
nationalistic perspective is limited a n d m u st be a t least
questioned.
By referring to the deindustrialization thesis as a nationalistic per
spective, H ouston is implying th a t its problem s stem from a limitation
of scope associated w ith the reality of capitalism as a world-system.
This is a criticism w ith w hich di Leonardo (1985, p. 243) would agree.
In th is work I contend also th a t ideas concerning deindustriali
zation are limited in historical scope, so th a t the b est w ay to question
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the concept of deindustrialization is to exam ine th e factory closure not
merely as a contem porary social problem b u t as an historical problem.
As Zeitlin (1984, p. 363) argues, in order to u n d erstan d any social
phenom enon it m u st be studied historically because historical study
allows u s to observe the "alternations" of society. By limiting its
analysis prim arily to domestic developments since 1945, the cu rren t
analysis of deindustrialization exhibits a k ind of historical "tunnel
vision." By analyzing factory closures, central to th e deindustrialization
thesis, in the alternation betw een industrial growth an d Industrial
decline, th eir relation to specific processes of in d u strial development
can be seen to be less im portant and th e ir role in th e general process
of the creation an d recreation of capitalist society specified. In so
doing a n explanation of factory closures ca n be developed w hich
recognizes th a t they are characteristic of b oth in d u strial growth and
industrial decline th a t does n o t necessitate the association of su c h
growth w ith social stability. Industrial growth need n o t imply th e
acceptability of capital accumulation.
The essential purpose of a socio-historical approach to an y
aspect of social life is to clarify the connection betw een stru ctu re,
process, and event. Such an approach lends itself to analysis of the
m eaning or significance of factory closures which are concrete events
held in cu rren t sociological analyses to constitute th e process of
deindustrialization, and w hich I argue are better placed within the
process of capitalist reproduction. In essence, th is w ork is directed a t
analyzing w hat it is about the factory closure th a t m akes capitalist
society possible. As "event is th e empirical form of system" (Sahlins
1985, p. 153), the factory closure, as p articu lar event, is an em pirical

form o r concrete expression of the relations an d processes of
capitalism .

CHAPTER III
IRON, STEEL, AND THE 'COMING OF AGE' OF U.S. CAPITALISM
IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR PERIOD: 1865-1892
Introduction
The events of the period after th e end of the Civil W ar In the
U nited States, the p o st-1865 era through the 1890s, were crucial
both In the general development of American capitalism an d p articu 
larly In the domestic iron and steel industry. It w as a crucial period
because it w as then th a t American capitalism becam e genuinely
industrial, dom inated by a capitalist class whose w ealth was industrial
wealth, characterized by a working class whose labor power, formerly
rooted in craft, was utilized In the overseeing of m achines; an d it was
th en th a t the steel industry, upon th e b asis of th e destruction of iron
m anufacture, emerged as a genuine industry. Internationally, it was
also a crucial period since th e years 1873-1895 were those of "Great
Depression" in the world economy (Beaud 1983, pp. 117-144). The
development of the steel in d u stry domestically can be linked to the
cauldron of events and processes unfolding a t th is time on th e world
stage, especially those concerned w ith th e decline of British
hegemony during this "age of imperialism." The y ears of the first
m ajor development of the domestic steel industry, roughly from the
end of the Civil War In 1865 to th e Homestead Strike of 1892,
correspond to those of th is "Great Depression" of th e second h a lf of
th e nineteenth century and form the focus of th is chapter.
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E ach a t different points in history, the industrialization of the
United S tates and its deindustrialization are related to w hat ChaseD unn (1978, p. 110) identifies as a tendency for capitalism , b y virtue
of its in tern al logic, to develop from "unicentric" (hegemony) to
"multicentric" (equalization) control of m ark ets.1 Capitalism, then, is
predisposed to crises of accum ulation associated with th e leveling of
competitive advantages. The cu rren t decline of the American steel
industry, the shift of investm ent out of steel production an d into other
endeavors, along w ith resu ltan t factory closures comprising th e
"deindustrialization wave," are understood w ithin th e context of the
recession of the 1970s and 1980s. This crisis, generalized acro ss the
major world capitalist powers, affected each differently. So, J a p a n , for
example, affected relatively less severely th a n th e United States, h as
risen to pre-em inence as a world steel producer as the hegemonic
position of the U.S. w as and is steadily eroded. In the second half of
the n in eteen th century, the United States rose to pre-em inence as a
capitalist power an d as a steel-producing power a s well during a
period of global crisis w hich also h ad differential effects on th e world
capitalist "old guard," such as G reat Britain and France, and global
"newcomers" su ch a s the United S tates and G erm any (cf. Chirot 1986,
p. 244). T hus, the period of British decline w as a t the sam e tim e the
period w hen the United S tates came into its own a s a significant.
1 The description of the distribution of competitive advantages as
"unicentric" and "multicentric" is relevant to a variety of contexts
within w hich capitalist com petition tak es place—within th e worldsystem betw een capitalist nation-states, between firms acting on the
international level, w ithin nations between regions, and betw een firms
with each other.
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industrial capitalist power in th e world a re n a (rising to m eet Britain
on its way down). As Chlrot (1986, p. 203) observes, "as in the case of
the B ritish in the nineteenth century, [the United States] h a s been
unable to prevent serious economic rivals from growing." Not only
could th e United S tates n o t prevent economic rivals from growing, b u t
it p u rsu ed a trajectory of accum ulation w hich involved investm ent in
the industrial growth of other capitalist nations.
B eaud's (1983, p. 121) assessm ent of th e Great D epression of
the 1873-1895 period provides a general guide for explaining and
analyzing the conditions w ithin which the U.S. iron and steel industry
developed. His identification of im portant factors contributing to the
crisis provides th e "sign posts" along w hich th e historical narrative of
iron an d steel development can be presented. Beaud argues th a t the
1873-1895 depression, like o th er capitalist crises, "result from the
Interaction of four fundam ental contradictions.” These include, in his
term s: (1) "the contradiction between labor an d capital, th a t is,
concretely, between capitalist companies a n d the working classes"—
attention to w hich is fundam ental in any analysis of capitalist proc
esses; (2) "the contradiction between capitalists (either in th e same
sector or betw een sectors)," w here com petition both conditions and is
conditioned by th e extent an d intensity of class conflict; (3) "the
contradiction between national capitalisms," a s an aspect of capitalist
competition, between nationally defined segm ents of th e capitalist
class, over the establishm ent of m arkets for labor and o th er commodi
ties; an d (4) "the competition between d om inant capitalism s and
dom inated peoples, countries, an d regions," again as a n asp ect of the
process of m arket and class formation (Beaud 1983, p. 121). In
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essence, the dynam ics of class conflict, capitalist com petition both
domestically and Internationally, and im perialism are fundam entally
im portant to understanding and discussing an y aspect of capitalist
developm ent.
It is with reference to this schem e th a t th e development of the
steel in d u stry and the destruction of iron production in th e United
States will be approached. Therefore, the following issues, particularly
im portant to the emergence of th e domestic steel industry, are em 
phasized: (1) the events surrounding the labor conflict a t Homestead,
Pennsylvania; (2) th e relationship between the iron and steel industry
and the railroads an d owners of steel capital w ith each other; (3) the
im pact of post-Civil W ar developments upon th e supersession of the
United S tates over B ritain as an industrial capitalist power; and (4) the
struggle between American and B ritish capitalists over control of the
United S tates m arket. Here, state su p p o rt for th e domestic develop
m ent of industrial capital in the form of a program of protectionism is
understood as a "direct analogue" of imperialism, especially w ith ref
erence to B ritain's scram ble for foreign m arkets (Chirot 1986, p. 85).
Of all of these issues, developments on th e front betw een capital
and labor are m ost im portant. B eaud (1983, p. 121) points to the
relationship between th e crisis of 1873-1895 an d the intensified
resistance of workers to the conditions of capitalist production.
During th is period internationally, "the working classes organized and
asserted them selves a n d by the end of the period had a discernible
effect in th e functioning of national capitalism s." It was th e period of
"affirmation of the working classes" where the "capitalist bourgeoisie
had to contend with a working class w hich w as increasingly conscious
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of its own position...and finally imposed a new balance of forces"
(Beaud 1983, p 125).
In the United States, th ese international tre n d s in the organiza
tion of th e working class took form in th e establishm ent of various
w orkers' political organizations, the trad e s union movement, and
strikes w hich Jerem y Brecher calls th e "Great Upheaval" of 1877.
B recher (1972, pp. xxiv-1) describes th e post-Civil W ar depression in
these term s:
D epressions h ad been a regular feature of capitalist society since
its start. B u t by 1877, depression h ad lasted longer th a n any
tim e before in American history. For workers, conditions were
quite desperate. Wages throughout industry h ad been c u t more
th a n twenty-five percent, below subsistence in m any cases, while
a n estim ated one million workers were unemployed.
In the face of su c h conditions,
Ju ly , 1877...m arks the first great American m ass strike, a
movement w hich was viewed at th e time a s a violent rebellion.
S trikers stopped and seized the n atio n 's m o st Im portant
Industry, th e railroads, an d crowds defeated or won over first
th e police, th e n the sta te militias, an d In som e cases even the
Federal Troops. General strikes stopped all activity in a dozen
m ajor cities, and strikers took over social authority in
com m unities across th e nation.
The G reat Upheaval, insofar a s It represented th e initiation of worker
organization and resistance, w as a com plem entary process to th e
D epression of 1873-1895.
In post-Civil W ar America, the political struggle between capital
and labor, and the essential "tone" of the G reat Upheaval, emerged
from th is issue of labor-use, described by Brecher (1972, p. 21):
The enorm ous expansion of industry after th e Civil War h ad
transform ed millions of people who h ad grown u p as farm ers
a n d self-employed a rtisa n s and en trep ren eu rs into employees,
growing th o u san d s of w hom were concentrated within each of
th e new corporate em pires.
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In th e steel Industry, the Homestead Strike of 1892 represented both
the final stage an d the final act of resistance to th is transform ation.
The Homestead Strike, as a particular event in th e political struggle
over labor control and labor use. and its relationship to the destruction
of the iron Industry, form a particularly im portant focus of this
chapter.
The Civil War and the Issue of Industrialization
My concern in th is section is not so m uch w ith the Civil War
itself a s it is w ith its m eaning and im pact on th e course of capitalist
development in America, and ultimately, development of th e iron and
steel industry. For my purposes, th e m ost im portant considerations of
the w ar are those th a t have to do w ith the political conflict th a t the
war represented and the political-economic conditions th a t post-w ar
"reconstruction" brought into being, along w ith th eir role in
development of industrial capitalism in the United States.
The im pact of the w ar on the process of industrialization w as n ot
direct. The mobilization for w ar and w ar production were no great
stim uli to the nation's rate and level of industrialization. In fact, there
is som e evidence to the contrary, th a t the w ar itself actually stifled
industrialization (cf. C ochran 1969, p. 140-149).
W ith regard to the issue of the effect of th e w ar on the industrial
development of the nation, Cochran (1969, p. 146) raises th e follow
ing im portant general point:
By m odem stan d ard s the Civil W ar was still unm echanized. It
w as fought w ith rifles, bayonets, an d sabers by m en on horse
back. Artillery w as more used th a n in previous wars, b u t was
still a relatively m inor consum er of iron and steel. The railroad
w as brought into use, b u t the building of m ilitary lines offset only
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a sm all percentage of th e over-all drop from the prew ar level of
civilian railroad construction. Had all of these things not been
true, the Confederacy with its sm all industrial development
could never have fought through four y ears of increasingly
effective blockade.
On this sam e point, Hogan (1971, p. 14) writes:
One m ight assum e th a t the Civil War would have given consider
able im petus to the iron Industry of th e country, y et th is w as by
no m eans the case. The industry, located principally in the
n o rth ern states... depended o n the so u th ern sta tes for a relative
ly sizeable sh are of its m arket, and th is w as lost during the w ar
years. Expansion of the nation's railroads w as curtailed an d rail
dem and declined sharply. The m arket w as not replaced as
m ight be expected by w ar-time activity since the conflict w as
carried o u t on a m odest scale in com parison w ith tw entieth
century w ars. In fact, ordnance requirem ents were so limited
th a t it w as not until 1863 th a t pig iron production recovered to
the 1860 level.2
While, directly, the w ar h ad little Immediate effect on the course
of industrialization, it did change the political climate of th e nation In
favor of the emerging u rb an Industrial capitalist class. If the Civil War

2 Cochran argues th a t according to all Indications, the Civil W ar h ad the
effect of retarding "a curve of production th a t w as tending to rise a t a
high rate" before the w ar (1969, p. 142). With specific regard to pig
iron production, C ochran (1969, p. 142) relates the following:
Pig-iron production in tons, perhaps the m ost significant
commodify index of n ineteenth century American industrial
growth, is available year-by-year from 1854 on. Taking total
production for five year periods, o u tp u t increased 9 p er cent
between th e block of years from 1856 to 1860 and th e block
from 1861 to 1865. T hat even this slight Increase m ight not
have b een registered except for the fact th a t 1857 to 1860 were
years of interm ittent depression is indicated by a n 81 per cent
Increase over the w ar years in the block of years from 1866 to
1870. If an n u al production is taken a t five-year Intervals, s ta rt
ing In 1850, the increase is 2 4 per cen t from 1850 to 1855; 17
per cen t from 1855 to 1860; 1 per cent from 1860 to 1865; and
100 p er cen t from 1865 to 1870. While there is n o figure avail
able for 1845, the period from 1840 to 1850 show s 97 per cent
increase In shipm ents, while for the period 1870 to 1880 the
Increase w as 130 per cent.

91

in America affected industrialization, it did so for reasons th a t had to
do with th e political assertion of th e interests of industrial/w age-labor
capital over those of agricultural/slave-labor wealth, both of w hich by
m id-century were locked In b itter com petition for dom inance over
control of the state to advance those interests. The m ost Im portant
aspect of th e w ar w as th a t it represented a change in the "tone" of the
American economy th a t is, its industrialization. Northern victory
represented in essence the political victory of th e industrial capitalist
class over th e "southern slave owning oligarchy" for undisputed
hegemony w ithin the domestic economic order (Baran and Sweezy
1966, p. 252) and for th e right to call on sta te power for security in
the international context.
The Civil W ar and Nation-Building: From "King Cotton" to
"The Gleaming Metal on Which Am erican Settlem ent Advanced"
An exam ination of th e interests of Northern industrial capital
and S outhern p lanters reveals w here those in terests collided. In
general it can be said th a t the Interests of these two m ajor factions
within the domestic owning class were not split over the issu e of
slavery. B aran and Sweezy's (1966) work as well a s the works of
others (cf. Bogart 1930; Beard and Beard 1960; Cochran 1969; and
Moore 1966, to nam e a few) argue convincingly th a t the "point" of the
Civil War w as not the abolition of slavery, b u t th a t "the abolition of
slavery w as a by-product of the struggle, not its purpose" (Baran and
Sweezy 1966, p. 252). The conflict betw een "free states" an d "slave
states" w as in actuality a conflict betw een states where wealth accum 
ulation w as based on the exploitation of "free" or wage labor w ith those
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where w ealth accum ulation was based on th e exploitation of slave
labor. In one sense the Civil War can be viewed as a conflict between
owning factions, each aspiring to control regionally discrete "econo
mies" existing w ithin the sam e nation an d struggling over rights to
create th e nation-state in th eir own image.
In fact Barrington Moore, J r. (1966, p. 114) asks: "Slave
societies do n o t have th e sam e political form as those b ased on free
labor. B ut...is th a t any reason why they have to flgjit?" In general, his
answ er to th is question is "No, they do n o t have to fight." Kaufman
(1982, p. xxv) comments:
If there is any agreem ent am ong those writing on antebellum
history, it is th a t th e Civil War w as not the re su lt of inexorable
economic forces. The tariff, a national bank, a national
tran sp o rtatio n system , and other m atters were all negotiable if
the p arty system h ad been capable of m anaging th e conflicting
interests and achieving a workable national unity.
In fact, th ere is no inherent inconsistency between a slave agricultural
and a wage-labor industrial economy. In the early stages of industri
alization in America, w hich w as fueled by the growth of th e domestic
textile industry, n o rth ern industrialists benefited from th e southern
m arket for finished products as well a s from the source of cheap
cotton th a t th e southern agrarian economy provided.
Moore continues (1966, p. 114, em phasis added):
One m ight sta rt w ith a general notion to the effect th a t there is
an inherent conflict between slavery and th e capitalist system of
formally free wage labor. fHowever.l...cotton produced bv slave
labor plaved a decisive role in the growth not only of American
capitalism b u t of English ranitaHsm ton. Capitalists had no
objection to obtaining goods produced by slavery a s long as a
profit could be m ade by working them u p and reselling them.
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There is n o inherent conflict betw een slavery and w age-labor system s
of production. However, a t a tim e w hen it w as in th e interests of
N orthern industrialists to challenge the power of so u th e rn plantation
owners, ideological appeals to th e abolition of slavery were m ade. "As
long as th e South h ad th is rich source of cheap labor, its interests
[through th e state] would be served" (Smith 1981, p. 336).3 The Civil
War and th e reconstruction period rep resen t th e processes of
political-economic transform ation from th e dom ination of agricultural
capital served by industrial capital to the dom ination of Industrial
capital served by agriculture.4
3 Smith (1981, p.337) goes on to elaborate th e ideological use of
abolitionism in the struggle between industrialists an d slave owners.
It w as In the m aterial Interest of northern in d u strialists to break
the power of southern planters and agriculturalists. Ready to u se
in th e struggle were the n o rth ern b u sin essm an 's set of ideas and
beliefs. A free contract freely entered into by two equal h u m an
beings w as th eir notion of how they were doing b usiness. If they
th e n used this ideology to discredit the South, it w as all the
b etter for unfree workers who h ad been oppressed by th a t very
"peculiar" institution of slavery.
4 Genovese's (1961, p. 159) com parison of this period to the lessons of
m odem colonialism is Insightful.
If th e re is one lesson to be learned from the experience of both
developed and undeveloped countries, it is th a t industrialization
is unthinkable w ithout an agrarian revolution w hich sh atters the
old regime in th e countryside. While the p easan try rem ains tied
to th e land, burdened w ith debt, and limited to m inim al p u r
ch asin g power, the labor recruitm ent and m ark et preconditions
for extensive m anufacturing cannot emerge. "Land reform "--that
is, agrarian revolution—constitutes the essential first step in the
creation of an u rb an working class, th e reorganization of agricul
tu re to feed growing cities, an d the development of a home
m arket.
If, as according to Barrington Moore (1966, p. 136), It is correct to
regard post-Civil War sharecroppers a s a class of p easan ts in American
society, th e n the Civil War, in a very real sense, w as ju s t su ch an
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If, as h as been effectively argued by various writers, the w ar was
not essentially fought over th e Issue of th e abolition of slavery, a
stronger interpretation of th e m eaning of the w ar can be developed by
looking a t it from the point of view of capitalist com petition—in
particular, com petition over m arkets an d rights in th e state to create
conditions conducive to particular forms of production. From th is
point of view, th e Civil W ar can be viewed in two com plem entary ways:
as a political conflict between northern industrial wage-labor capital
against southern slave-owning landed wealth, and as a w ar of American
industrial capital against B ritish industrial capital.
In pre-Civil W ar America, "different kinds of capital cam e to
dom inate the different geographical regions of the country" (Smith
1981, p. 143)—plantation capital in th e South, industrial capital in the
North, and in th e expanding West, non-slave-owning landholders.5

agrarian revolution in American history. Also, here, th e term "agrarian
revolution" is w h at is essentially m eant by the term "Reconstruction," a
term u sed in traditional accounts of th e post-w ar period.
5 Since, by the outbreak of the war, W estern landow ners h ad entered
into a n alliance w ith Northern industrialists against Southern slave
holders, I will n o t discuss th e history of the W esterners' dem ands on
the state. Suffice it to say th a t W estern agricultural influence h ad
begun to wane since the end of the Jack so n ian era. Moore (1966, p.
115-116) states.
The expansion of the country westward m ade it seem for a
m oment, u n d er President Jack so n in th e 1830's, th a t th e
principles of agrarian democracy, in practice a n absolute
m inim um of central authority and a tendency to favor debtors
over creditors, had won a perm anent victory....Even in Jack so n 's
own time, however, agrarian dem ocracy h ad severe difficulties.
Two closely related developments were to destroy it: th e
fu rth er growth of in d u strial capitalism in th e N ortheast an d the
establishm ent of an export m arket for Southern cotton.
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Each kind of capital and therefore each geographical region required
different federal-level state policies. The in terests of S ou th ern
planters and N orthern Industrialists, by virtue of th e contradictory
n atu re of their respective form s of property ownership, differed with
respect to the issue of the organization of relations to domestic and
foreign m arkets.
According to Parker (1969, p. 136):
The Industrializing regions a t th is time had two m ajor needs:
sufficiently large m arkets to perm it economies of scale in
tran sp o rt and u rb an services, and sufficient saving to perm it the
u se of resources in building canals, rail lines, cities, plants, and
equipm ent.
For N orthern industrialists, th is m eant th e complete integration of the
national m arket through the proliferation of railroads and, especially,
through th e building of the transcontinental railroad. In addition.
N orthern industrial capitalists h ad pushed for the establishm ent of a
Federal Reserve System w hich would facilitate saving and mobility of
finance capital.
In addition to conflicts over the dom estic economic situation.
Northern in d u strialists and Southern p lan ters differed over th e
national economic relation w ith Britain. B ritain w as the S outh's m ost
im portant export m arket for cotton. B ritain, w ith its highly developed
textile Industry, w as not only the biggest com petitor of su ch domestic
m anufacturing centers as Lowell, M assachusetts, a n d M anchester, New
Ham pshire, b u t it w as the favored custom er of Southern raw cotton
W estern landow ners had allied them selves with industrialists against
S outhern slave owners who were interested in expanding the
plantation economy westward an d and bringing w estern lands under
cotton production in the wake of the Mexican American War.
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producers. B arrington Moore, J r . (1966, p. 116) illu strates th is point
as follows:
By 1849, sixty-four percent of th e cotton crop w ent abroad,
m ainly to England. From 1840 to the time of the Civil War,
G reat B ritain drew from the Southern sta tes four-fifths of ail her
cotton im ports.
American m anufacturers were on th e periphery of th e plantation
economy. Their position w as su ch th a t in supplying finished products
to agriculture they supported S outhern planters in th eir dealings w ith
N orthern in d u stry 's biggest com petitor.
If N orthern industrial capitalists hoped to escape the influence
of S outhern power in the dom estic economy, they n o t only needed
dom estic conditions conducive to in terstate investm ent and trade, b u t
they needed protection by th e sta te from the influence of B ritish capi
tal in the dom estic m arket. Southern planters resisted the Imple
m entation of any of th e aforementioned policies. With particular
regard to th e issu e of m arket protection, Bogart (1930, p. 483)
observes:
The planting economy w as based upon territorial specialization,
w hich involved exchange w ith other regions. It w as to their
in terests to have complete freedom of trade, an d after 1816 they
consistently opposed th e policy of protection advocated by th e
growing m anufacturing Interests of the north.
Secession of th e Southern states w as followed by w ar w hen growing
influence of th e N orthern states in th e federal governm ent eroded the
ability of S outhern representatives to advance the interests of the
plantation economy.
The form ation of th e Confederacy represented th e w ithdraw al of
a national elite faction from one nation-state w here competition w ith
a n emerging Industrial elite w as becoming more an d m ore difficult in

97

order to form a n Independent national system which w ould see to the
support of th e plantation economy (hopefully w ith the su p p o rt of
Britain). The relationship between S outhern planters an d British
industrialists w as of su ch significance th a t it is no w onder th a t the
Union's m ost im portant strategy in fighting th e w ar w as th e estab
lishm ent of a complete naval blockade of S outhern states' access to
Atlantic shipping routes.6
Reconstruction was, in essence, th e process of rebuilding the
post-w ar nation In favor of industrialization an d the dem ands of the
interests of industrial capital. The war w as followed by a massive wave
of urbanization in the n o rth ern and, to some extent, in so u th ern
states. This, along with new im m igration legislation, propelled the
process of proletarianization through the nineteenth an d early
tw entieth centuries. In addition, the economic landscape of the
nation w as re-created as industrial prom oters began to '"Bring the
mills to th e cotton!"' and Birmingham, Alabama, became "’the
Pittsburgh of the South'" (Beard and Beard 1960, p. 286).
Among the greatest achievements on b ehalf of in d u strial
capitalists of th e post-w ar period was the establishm ent of th e Federal
Reserve System, the approval an d building of the Transcontinental
Railroad, and th e im plem entation of effective m easures of protection
against com petition from B ritish industry. Among those w ho stood to
benefit the m ost from these m easures, especially in land g ran ts for
railroad building and in protection from im ports of cheaper British
6 In one sense, th e establishm ent of protectionist policies in the post
w ar period rep resen t the peace-tim e extension of the m ilitary strategy
of blockade.
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m anufactured goods, were "crucial segm ents of N orthern Society"
(Moore 1966, p. 143), Including railroad com panies an d th e iron arid
steel in terests of Pennsylvania. In the th ree years imm ediately follow
ing th e w ar, 1865-1868, railroad in terests and iron an d steel m a n u 
facturers wielded a great deal of influence in the government, an d
throug h th eir representation by the group of Radical Republicans,
"m ounted a n offensive ag ain st the plantation system" (Moore 1966, p.
142) and, in their su p p o rt of im port regulation, defense of th e hom e
m arket.
An im portant step in forming th e steel in d u stry w as the securing
of th e dom estic m arket from incursions of British capital in the postCivil W ar period. W hether or not the American m ark et would be
prim arily a n outlet for B ritish exports, or a m arket u n d er th e control
of dom estic iron and steel producers, w as, for a tim e a t least, som e
thing of an open question. Winning control of the domestic m arket
was a precondition to th e formation of th e American industry, an d this
in tu rn would have a strong influence in its subseq u en t development.
T hus, th e establishm ent of protectionist policies in law w as a direct
extension of pre-war designs of an emerging industrial capitalist class
in the United States and w as b om of the "free trade" versus tariff
debates which dom inated political economic discourse (cf. Kaufman
1982).
The Issue of Protectionism in General in the N ineteenth Century
The United States w as im portant to British capitalists in the
1800s for two essential reasons. The U nited S tates w as an im portant
foreign m arket for British goods. In fact, B ritain’s well-being as a
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capitalist industrial power w as tied closely to its ability to control
foreign m arkets. This is a fact noted by Eric Hobsbawm In h is work,
In d u stry and Empire (1969, p. 136, em phasis added):
In the m ajor in d u stries the foreign m arket played...[a]...decisive
role. This is m ost obvious in cotton, w hich exported over half
the total value of its o u tp u t a t the beginning of the nineteenth
century an d alm ost four fifths a t the end, an d iron an d steel
w hich relied on overseas m arkets for ab o u t forty percent of its
gross production from th e m id-nineteenth century.
W ith p articular regard to th e relationship between Britain an d the
United S tates, Potter (1969, p. 15) notes the central "importance to
B ritain of American supplies of prim ary produce," su ch a s cotton and
w heat, and "the significance for B ritish producers of American
m arkets."
Besides the im portance of America as an outlet for B ritish goods,
control of the American m ark et w as viewed by B ritish m anufacturers
a s vital in im peding the assertion of a n American capitalist class
increasingly growing in strength. Control of th e American m ark et was
necessary to keep American capitalists out of com petition w ith the
British, since a t th is time, th e U.S. w as emerging n o t only by Itself b u t
along with a competing group of capitalist Industrial powers, e.g.,
Germany. Essentially, th e rise of the American Industrial capitalist
class w as threatening to u n d o British control of the United S tates
m arket, re-established w ith th e end of th e War of 1812. W ith the
Treaty of G hent of 1815, "Cheap British m anufactured goods soon
strangled th e infant American in d u stries and created economic havoc"
(Kaufman 1982, p. 41).
In this period and w ithin the context of international capitalist
com petition, economic in terests and political rivalry (I.e., rivalry
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betw een nation-states) became m utually identifiable. This is w hat is
m ost significantly m eant by th e description of th e period a s th e "age of
imperialism," the integration of state an d economic policy. Hobsbawm
com m ents (1969, p. 131, em phasis added):
One further consequence of the era of th e G reat Depression, th a t
is of the emergence of a com peting group of industrial an d
economically advanced powers, m u st be noted. It is th e fusion of
political an d economical rivalry, the fusion of private enterprise
w ith governm ent backing, which is already visible in th e growth
of protectionism and im perialist friction. Increasingly bu sin ess,
in one wav or another, called on th e state n o t only to give it a
free hand, b u t to save it.7
If th is w as tru e from B ritain's point of view, it w as equally true
from th e point of view of American capitalists in general and those

7 The m eaning of imperialism as the integration of state an d private
enterprise interests is evident in, and starkly illustrated by th is quote
from Cecil Rhodes (1895) provided by B eaud (1983, p. 139):
I w as in the E ast End of London yesterday an d attended a m eet
ing of th e unemployed. I listened to the wild speeches, which
were ju s t a ciy for "bread," ’bread," an d on m y way home I pon
dered over th e scene an d I becam e more th a n ever convinced of
th e im portance of imperialism....M y cherished idea is a solution
for the social problem, i.e., in order to save th e 40,000,000
in h ab itan ts of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil w ar, we
colonial statesm en m u st acquire new lands for settling th e s u r
p lu s population, to provide new m arkets for th e goods produced
in the factories and m ines. The Empire, as I have always said, is
a bread and b u tte r question. If you w ant to avoid civil w ar, you
m u st become im perialists.
And, further, from Ju le s Ferry: '"Colonial policy is th e daughter of
industrial policy"1 (from Beaud 1983, p. 140).
Imperialism represents th e unity of sta te policy and n ational
capitalist class interests. This un ity Is expressed n o t only in sta te
policies concerning dom inated areas, b u t also in sta te policies relevant
to the establishm ent and protection of dom estic m arkets. S tate
policies both advance capitalist interests in the establishm ent of
m arkets, and In th e protection of m arkets from th e advances of
foreign capital.
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engaged in Iron an d steel production In the second h alf of th e nine
teenth century. Both British capitalists an d American capitalists were
calling on their governm ents to save them . The former sought state
policies which supported international "free trade" and m ade empire a
"bread and butter" issue. The latter called upon the state to support
the protection of th e expanding dom estic m ark et from foreign con
trol. Here, "free trade" is understood as a state policy an d a n ideology
of a national capitalist class interested In m aintaining hegemonic
dom ination of foreign m arkets by establishing a n environm ent w herein
comparative advantages can be readily asserted. Protectionism, on the
other h an d , reflects a national capitalist class aspiring to hegemony by
creating a n environm ent w herein its w eaknesses or disadvantages can
be counteracted. Potter (1969, p. 48) sta te s the following concerning
the im portance of th e issue of protectionism in the middle of the
nineteenth century:
The im position of the highly protective tariff of 1864, more th a n
any other single act, announced the severance by the U.S.A of
h er ancient commercial links with th e old world an d constituted
a declaration of American economic independence.
In th e aren a of international capitalist competition, th e con
frontation of American and B ritish capitalist in terests Is evident in the
following statem en ts cited by Hogan (1971 p. 173, em phasis added).
First, from Lord B rougham 's (1816) speech to Parliam ent:
It is well w orth while to in c u r a loss u p o n the first exportation,
in order by th e glut to stifle in the cradle those m anufacturers in
th e United S tates w hich th e w ar h a s forced into existence
contrary to th e n atural course of things.
Secondly, and closer to the period under discussion, in a report of a
B ritish Parliam entary Commission in 1854:
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The labouring classes generally, in the m anufacturing districts of
this country and especially in the iron and coal districts, are very
little aware of the extent to which they are often indebted for
their being employed a t all to th e Immense losses w hich th eir
employers voluntarily in cu r in bad tim es in order to destroy
foreign m ark ets....The large capitals of th is country are th e great
in stru m en ts of warfare against competing capitals of foreign
countries, an d th e m ost essential instrum ents now rem aining by
w hich our m anufacturing suprem acy can be m aintained.
(Em phasis added.)
American supporters of protectionism tu rn ed to statem en ts
su c h a s these in arguing for establishm ent of tariffs which they con
sidered necessary in order to neutralize aggressive policies of B ritish
firms. Those arguing on behalf of protectionism also claimed th a t
B ritish designs on th e American m arket led to th e "degradation of the
B ritish workingman" and cited various studies by British com m en
ta to rs pointing to increased "pauperism in England" (Hogan 1971, p.
173-174).8
Protection of th e American Iron and Steel M arket: The Morill Tariff
The Morill Tariff, established in 1861, set im port duties o n iron
products. These were: for pig iron, $9.00 per ton; for iron rails,
$12.00 per ton; and, in 1862, the rate for iron rails w as raised to
$13.50 per ton (Hogan 1971, p. 174).9 American m anufacturers.
8 A further example of this is the following cited by Hogan (1971, p.
174), S upporters of protectionism cite a May 29, 1875, article w hich
appeared in London Iron which found th a t women worked "unceas
ingly a t th e forge twelve or thirteen h o u rs a day for from six shillings
to seven shillings a week."
9 Moore (1966, p. 150) states,
The Morrill Tariff of 1861 was the beginning of a sh a rp upw ard climb
in tariff rates from 20 percent of value to 47 percent, more th a n
double the rates prevailing in 1860. Designed a t first to raise revenues
for th e w artim e Union treasury, it established protectionism deeply in
A m erican economic policies.
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citing Information from B ritish sources which showed th a t B ritish
im ports h ad increased since 1866 a t the sam e time th a t American
production decreased, called for higher tariffs in 1867,10 The
American Iron an d Steel Association assessed th e situation this way;
The steel m anufacturer is suffering severly from th e effects of
foreign competition, th e im portation la s t year am ounting to
21,308 n e t tons, about 53 percent of th e quantity consum ed in
the country. O ur steel works, as well a s our iron works have
am ple facilities for supplying the dem and for th eir products and
it is w ithout doubt, th e policy as well a s th e d uty of the
Government to give them a n opportunity to do so .11
In 1871, a new tariff was established; however, contrary to th e
desires of American m anufacturers, it set a reduced rate on imported
pig iron to $7.00 per ton. In th eir A nnual Report for 1871, the
American Iron an d Steel Association called th is m easure "'unwise, and
injurious to the general in terests of the country'" (Hogan 1971, p.
174). In this sam e report, th e Association continued to argue th a t th e
governm ent’s duty w as to establish and m aintain protectionist m eas
u res and added th a t ineffective tariffs would necessitate industryw ide
reductions in order to prevent,
H undreds of th o u san d s of workingmen...[from] being throw n into
idleness or into agriculture, th u s overstocking th e m arkets for
10 B ritish im ports in 1866 were 312,500 n et to n s of iron and steel
combined. In 1867, British Board of Trade inform ation showed th a t
im ports into the U.S. h ad increased to 433,724 n et tons of iron and
21,308 n e t to n s of steel (Hogan 1971, p. 174).
11 This statem en t is from the A nnual Statistical Report for 1867
quoted in Hogan (1971, p. 174). It is a com m ent by American steel
m anufacturers concerning n o t only the perceived condition of Ameri
can production in the face of com petition from Britain b u t dem on
strates as well th e ideological reliance on com petition by certain
segm ents of the capitalist class in th e justification of the unity of sta te
policy an d economic interest.
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farm products, and leaving th e country to the mercy of foreign
ers for needed supplies of m anufactured goods. (Quoted in
Hogan 1971, p. 175.)
However, by 1872 it becam e ap p aren t to sup p o rters of protec
tionism th a t even the lower rate s were adequate to "preserve the
m ajor portion of th e dom estic m arket to the American producer"
(Hogan 1971, p. 176). The m anufacturers them selves confirmed this
assessm en t in th e 1872 A nnual Report of the American Iron and Steel
Association which contained th is resolution:
RESOLVED—T hat th is Association attrib u tes th e general
prosperity of the iron trade of the country to the tariff policy of
th e Government, which h a s fostered home in d u stry an d enabled
m any branches of m anufacturers to attain a position rendering
them independent to foreign rivalry. (Quoted in Hogan, 1971, p.
176).
The growth of the American iron and steel in d u stry from 1860
to 1880 was closely tied to the expansion of the railroads and the
m arket for rails. Among construction, m achinery, shipbuilding,
agriculture, oil an d gas, and the container Industry, the railroads stood
out a s th e foremost steel consum ing industry. Railroad expansion
occurred rapidly in the period following th e Civil War, m arked
especially by the completion of the transcontinental railroad In 1869.
In th e decade from 1870 to 1880 there w as a 75 percent increase In
railroad mileage from 52,922 miles to 93,267 miles. T hroughout the
1860s rails were m ade prim arily from iron. In th e 1870s th e dem and
for steel rails, for new lines an d to replace iron rails, increased. In the
U nited States, "virtually all B essem er steel produced...w as converted
into rails" (Hogan 1971, p.114).
The Im portance of steel rail production to th e accelerated
growth of the United S tates steel industry is illustrated by a particular
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exam ple from M atthew Jo sep h so n (1962, p. 109) concerning Andrew
Carnegie's "flagship" rail rolling facility, th e Edgar Thom son Works,
established in 1875:
W ith inim itable tact Carnegie decided to nam e th e mills after his
largest prospective custom er, the h ead of th e Pennsylvania
Railroad, th e "J. Edgar Thomson Works."
G reat B ritain began exporting steel rails Into th e United S tates
in 1862 for the Pennsylvania Railroad. W ith the discovery of a source
of iron ore suitable for the production of Bessem er steel in 1867, n ear
Steelton, Pennsylvania, large scale production of steel rails in th e U.S.
becam e possible. "The Pennsylvania Steel Company w as organized
there to build a Bessem er p lan t. The Pennsylvania Railroad subscribed
to a little more th a n one th ird of its capital stock" (Hogan 1971, p.
115).
The dem and for steel rails was great, b u t it w as also subject to
severe fluctuations as periods of rapid railroad expansion were
followed by periods of slowdown. Steel producers ru sh ed to supply
the m arket, m aking for a very unstable a n d intensely competitive
situation.12
12 The Instability o f the rail situation an d its relation to trajectory of
steel in d u stry development is Illustrated in the following from Michel
Beaud (1983, p. 118). First,
In th e United States th e length of completed railroad lines in
creased by 5 0 percent between 1869 and 1873; w hen specula
tion, scarcity of labor power, and a rise in prices combined,
profitability fell, railroad com panies w ent b an k ru p t, b an k s failed,
a n d there w as a frantic stock exchange panic. Since railroad
construction w as an essential outlet for the production of c a st
iron, the price of cast iro n fell by 27 percent betw een 1872 and
1875. Unemployment rose, wages fell, and th e crisis reached
textiles and th e building trades. In England exports fell by 25
percent betw een 1872 a n d 1875; th e num ber of bankruptcies
Increased (7,490 in 1873, 13,130 in 1879); unem ploym ent
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While dom estic steel producing capacity expanded to m eet the
dem ands of the railroads, it rem ained n ecessaiy for som e years to
supplem ent dom estically produced rails w ith B ritish im ports (Hogan
1971, p. 113). B ut in the early 1870s, American m anufacturers began
to call for the establishm ent of tariffs against the im portation of British
im ported steel—m uch as they had done earlier against th e im portation
of B ritish iron—w hich a t th a t time could be produced a t lower cost
th a n American rails.
Prom 1867 to 1870 there was a decline in the price of B ritish
steel rails a t American ports. American steel m anufacturing interests
urged Congress to increase the duty on steel im ports an d claimed th a t
B ritish producers were m anipulating prices in a n attem p t to interfere
with th e production of steel rails by American firms. O n Ja n u a ry 1,
1871, the duly w as set a t $28.00 per ton. With this, th e production of

extended an d prices fell. S urplus production capacities were
enorm ous: while forge owners in 1873 were able to produce 2.5
million tons of rails, consum ption fell to 500,000 to n s and their
price dropped by 60 percent betw een 1872 and 1881.
Secondly,
[By 1884] The construction of railroads in the U nited States,
w hich had in fact started u p again (4,300 Ion in 1878, b u t
18,600 km in 1882), gave way to th e "railroad panic": only
6,300 km of railroad lines were constructed in 1884. The rail
road com panies were caught betw een rising construction costs
an d the com petition they engaged in am ong them selves. The
price of Union Pacific stock collapsed, an d this w as followed by
th e collapse of several other railroad securities. B anks failed and
there w as a slowdown in industrial activity, with bankruptcies,
m ore unem ploym ent, an d wage reductions (from 15 to 22 per
cent in metallurgy, from 25 to 3 0 percent in textiles). During
th is crisis th e Carnegie group grew stronger, particularly
through p u rchasing com peting factories at low prices.
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steel rails, which w as negligible prior to 1870, Increased by 100
percent (Hogan 1971, p. 178).13
From 1879 to 1880, v ast Increases in railroad production would
necessitate an increase in im ports and, during the sam e period, prices
for domestically produced rails would increase. B ut the protectionist
policies concerning steel rails, along with decreasing prices for basic
steel products due to th e "economizing movement" of steel com panies
in the la st three decades of the nineteenth century, vastly improved
the situ atio n of American steel firm s (Hogan 1971, pp. 178-179).
Clearly, th e protectionist m easures urged by steel m anufacturers in
the post-Civil W ar period established the American steel m arket as the
dom ain of American firms, and, by limiting the role of British
suppliers, h ad an influence on the formation of capital In America
around th e production of steel.
The T ransition from Iron to Steel Production
and the Confrontation_between Labor and Capital
W ith the dom estic m arket secure for American producers, the
United S tates steel in d u stry came into Its own and eventually
su rpassed G reat B ritain's by the la st decade of th e century. The
turning point was th e year 1890 w hen "the U.S. had passed England—

13 Domestic steel rail production for 1871 w as 38,500 n et tons; for
1872, 94,070 n e t tons; for 1874, 144,944 n e t tons; and, for th e
period from 1875 to 1878, production doubled to 1.5 million tons.
There w as a parallel decline in im ports for the sam e period. For
example, im ports for 1872 were 149,786 n e t tons; for 1874, 100,486
net tons; and between 1875 and 1878, there were less th a n 18,000
net tons imported (Hogan 1971, p. 178).
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permanently" in th e production of steel ingots.14 The period from the
late 1880s through the 1890s w as a period of intensified transition
from iron to steel production, an d therefore a period also of dism an
tling iron facilities. Brody (1960, p. 8) gives th e following brief
account exemplary of trends growing in strength in the la st tw enty
years of the n in eteen th century:
The course of the Republic Iron and Steel Company, a m erger of
twenty-seven iron mills w ith a capacity of over a million to n s
indicated th e extent to w hich puddling [the craft of stirring
molten ore into wrought iron] seemed inconsistent w ith p ro s
perity. The company, shortly after being formed in 1899, began
abandoning th e iron mills, erecting in th eir stead a large steel
plant at Youngstown.
Companies p u rsu in g so-called economizing efforts were m aking
the transition to steel production a t a rapid pace. In general, produc
tivity w as rising a s a consequence, a t the sam e tim e th a t downward
p ressu re on wages w as becoming m ore apparent. Here are two brief
exam ples of th is trend, both from information on th e Cam bria Steel
Com pany (a non-union firm). A "laborer first class" (unskilled occu14 The following figures com paring production of steel Ingots for each
n atio n (000,000 tons) are quoted b y B um (1961, p. 82), from the
R eport of the Tariff Commission.
For th e United Kingdom: in 1889 production w as 3.57; 1890, 3.58:
1893, 2.95; 1894, 3.11; 1895, 3.26; and in 1896 production w as 4.13
hundred thousand tons.
For th e United S tates: production w as in 1889, 3.39; 1890, 4.28;
1893, 4.02; 1894, 4.41; 1895, 6.11; and, in 1896, 5.28 hundred
thousand tons.
In th is transitional y ear of 1890, Carnegie also w as successful in p re
venting the organization of the D uquesne works by the Amalgamated
Association of Iron an d Steel W orkers. Also, 1892 w as the year w hen
for th e first tim e dom estic production of steel su rp assed th a t of iron.
It w as also the y ear of the Hom estead Steel Strike.

109

patlon) working a t a blast furnace earned, for a twelve h o u r day, $1.10
in 1880, $1.04 in 1885, $1.00 in 1890 and 1895. A "rail mill roller"
(skilled occupation) earned, p er h u n d red to n s, $6.10 in 1880, $4.23
in 1885, $4.61 in 1890, and $3.18 in 1895.15
The shift from Iron production to m ore m echanized steel pro
du ctio n was cheapening both skilled and unskilled labor a s it progres
sively underm ined th e necessity of each. T his process w as embedded
in a n d intensified by the dism antling of iron works. Skilled labor w as
cheapened not only because m echanization w as making it less vital to
production, b u t because the dism antling of iron works w as releasing a
su rp lu s of labor to th e labor m arket.
Certainly, th e transition to steel production brought with it
changes in the n a tu re of labor-use. For instance, Brody (1960, p. 8)
states:
The largest iron producer, Jo n e s and Laughlins, h a d operated
110 puddling furnaces. In 1884 the firm built a five ton con
verter, th e n two more in 1890, and beg an reducing its iron
production. It closed down thirty-three furnaces in February
1892 because iron was being "crowded out." Its employees were
advised to seek work elsewhere. Soon after, the Carnegie Com
pany began shutting down its eighty four furnaces. The basic
steel com panies, all iron m an u factu rers in 1890, employed
hardly a p u d d ler among them in 1900.

15 T hese figures a re from Report on Im m igration. VIII quoted in Brody
(1960, pp. 44-45). Brody (1960, p. 45) sta te s th a t "wages declined
u n d e r th e p ressu re of mechanization."
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Iron Production and Labor Organization: Craft. Craft Unionism, and
th e Form ation of the Amalgamated Association of Iron an d Steel
W orkers
The Amagamated Association of Iron an d Steel W orkers had its
origins in th e period w hen iron production w as predom inant and steel
w as produced on a very limited basis. Politically, th e organization
viewed itself, a s did other craft unions, as an association of craftsm en
bound by tradition and whose influence w as felt to rest on the
possession an d control of scarce knowledge an d skills. In th is case,
su c h skills were those connected w ith the production of w rought iron.
The n atu re of the production of w rought iron w as su ch th a t attem pts
to m echanize it were largely unsuccessful, dem onstrating its depen
dence on highly skilled labor. The technical problem s of iron produc
tion prevented the establishm ent of "economies of scale" since the
"character" of th e m aterial itself limited the size of puddling furnaces
an d required a great degree of direct m anipulation on th e p a rt of the
w orkers. Iron production w as highly resistan t to m echanization and
strongly tied to craft lab o r.16 In th e production of iron.
The procedures were entirely m anual. The puddler agitated
small b atch es of m olten pig iron and cinder until th e purified
metal crystallized into bajls--"coming into nature," It w as called.
The succeeding squeezing an d rolling operations were likewise
m anual (Brody 1960, p. 8).
16 In his The Iron Puddler: Mv Life in the Rolling Mills and W hat Came
It, Davis (1922, pp. 30, 91, and 110-111) describes th e craft of the
iron puddler. Trade secrets were passed on from father to son as "a
legacy of great value, and were never told to persons outside the
family." He calls the craft a "mental act," one of "good guessing,"
w here the "artist and sculptor m u st have the sam e sense of
proportion." It w as this highly intuitive n atu re of iron puddling w hich
required the experience of the artisan th a t m ade th e process resistan t
to m echanization. (Jam es J . Davis w as later to become Secretary of
Labor in the Harding Administration.)
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So, th ese skilled laborers, u sin g th e facilities of th e capitalist, m ain 
tained considerable control over the process of production because
they possessed th e "recipe" for producing iron and, through th eir
organizations, h ad control over access to th a t knowledge, and some
influence a s to how it w as to be utilized.
Up until ab o u t the 1890s, wages were paid according to a
tonnage rate w here skilled w orkers were paid according to o u tp u t on
a sliding scale. T h at is. wages for skilled labor were se t according to
the m ark et price for iron, fluctuating a t or above a n established wage
floor. For example, the sliding scale rate for puddling in 1865 w as
$4.00 to $9.00 p er 2,240 pounds of purified iron "as th e price of iron
w ent from 2 1 /2 cen ts to 8 1 /2 cents per pound" (Hogan 1971, p. 85).
The sliding scale and the tonnage rate should n o t be confused
with w h at we would today call "piece work" since the sliding scale was
also attach ed to a "contract system ," w here employers were in effect
"contracting out" Jobs to skilled craftsm en for a price se t by the
m a rk e t.17 K atherine Stone com m ents as follows (1974, pp. 117-118,
em phasis added):
The sliding scale was actually an arrangem ent for sharing the
profits betw een two p a rtn e rs in production, th e skilled w orkers
an d th e steel m asters...(where! the division of labor and th e pace
of work w as decided by th e workers them selves. Thus, th e
17 This reflected, a s Ware (1924, p. xiv) points out, th e term s of a labor
co n tract where,
...renum eration of the [skilled] m echanic was ’price'. It referred
to his product rath er th a n to his labor, for it w as h is product
th a t he sold....The term 'wage' th a t (eventually! displaced 'price'
as the Industrial Revolution advanced h ad formerly applied only
to day labor, an d the extension of th e term to th e skilled w orker
w as regarded by him as a symbol of a deeper change.
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sliding scale an d the contra c t system defined th e relationship
betw een capital and labor in the nineteenth century.
The sliding scale and the contingency of wages on m arket price
reflected am ong these skilled w orkers a feeling of p artn ersh ip b e
tween capital and labor (cf. Ware 1924, pp. xviii-xix an d Bridges 1986,
p. 159). This feeling of partnership was reciprocated b y capitalists, a t
least during the period w hen production and therefore accum ulation
depended on skilled labor. In h is A utobiography (quoted by Stone
1974, p. 117), Andrew Carnegie said about th e sliding scale
arrangem ent: "It is th e solution to the capital and labor problem
because it really m akes them partners--alike in prosperity and
adversity."
F u rth e r evidence of the influence th a t skilled laborers had over
the production process is found in th e arrangem ent w here puddlers
and those in other skilled occupations had discretionary power in
hiring th eir own unskilled help, who were n o t paid by th e tonnage
rate, b u t by the day. Unskilled w orkers would be paid o u t of the wages
of skilled w orkers (and som etim es th e com pany would add an incre
m en t to th e pay of unskilled workers) (Montgomery 1976, p. 488).
So, for example, in Pittsburgh in 1878, a puddler received $ 5 .0 0 /to n
and out of th is paid a helper 1 /3 w ith an additional 5% paid by the
com pany (Hogan 1971, p. 85).
The labor force in the in d u stry was divided into a two-tiered
stru ctu re of highly skilled and organized craftsm en on th e one hand,
an d unskilled, unorganized wage-laborers on th e other. W hen com
panies becam e interested in underm ining the influence of unions in
th e transition from iron to steel production, they could p it unskilled
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labor ag ain st skilled labor, as for example, in the Wheeling Strike (to
be discussed below).
E arly labor organization was of skilled w orkers on a highly
localized b asis and centered on issu es connected w ith tonnage rates.
One of th e earliest conflicts took place in 1842 w hen boilers in
Pittsburgh rolling mills staged an unsuccessful strike against wage
cuts. Hogan (1971, p. 85) states:
At the beginning of th a t year, wages paid for boiling were $5.50
p er ton, with $3.50 paid for puddling. This represented a
su b stan tia l reduction from 1837 levels w hen boilers received
$ 7 .0 0 per ton and puddlers $4.25. The strike, called in
February, 1842, w hich followed a fu rth er reduction in boilers’
ra te s to $5.00 per ton, lasted u n til Ju ly 9 of th a t year w hen
w orkers conceded.
In subsequent years, skilled w orkers in the iron trade beg an to
form craft associations. Their purpose w as to formalize relations
between skilled workers a n d the mills. One of the more successful of
these associations was th e Sons of Vulcan, established In secrecy in
1858 by Pittsburgh iron puddlers. "By 1876, the Sons of Vulcan had
become one of the strongest unions In th e United States" (Hogan
1971, p. 86). The m ost significant accom plishm ents of the Sons of
Vulcan Included: successful resistance to wage-reductions in th e face
of pressu re created by th e post-Civil W ar Depression; formal adoption
of the sliding scale itself, for the first tim e in Pittsburgh according to
the M em orandum of Agreement of 1865 (the sliding scale would
eventually be accepted on a n industrywide basis); and recognition of
the union throughout th e iron puddling trade (Hogan 1971, p. 86;
Stone 1974, p. 117; and Brooks 1940, p. 21).
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O ther of the m ore prom inent craft-oriented labor unions
established In the m id-1800s included the following: first, in 1861,
the Associated Brotherhood of Iron and Steel Heaters, Rollers and
Roughers w as formed by rollers in the rail mills of Chicago. Brooks
(1940, p. 22) observes:
D uring the 'sixties, locals were established in other iron centers,
an d in 1872 th e union extended its jurisdiction to o th er rolled
products in addition to rails....[And, in] 1875...a lodge [was]
established in Pittsburgh.
Secondly, the Iron and Steel Roll H ands of the United S tates w as
formed in Chicago in 1874. This union w as unique since it organized
not only skilled workers, b u t all workers aro u n d the rolls, including
unskilled w orkers (Hogan 1971, p. 88).
In 1876 these three unions, along w ith th e United Nailers of
America, were consolidated into the Amalgamated Association of Iron
and Steel W orkers. Hogan (1971, p. 89) com ments:
At th e tim e th e Amalgamated Association w as formed th e steel
in d u stry w as still poised on th e threshold of Its development,
th e Amalgamated Association w as alm ost exclusively a n iron
w orkers union w ith 85% of Its total m em bership com ing from
the Sons of Vulcan.
Wheeling.JVest Virginia, and Homestead. Pennsylvania: Capital’s
Victory over Labor in the T ransition from Iron to Steel Production
The Wheeling Strike of 1885-1886 an d th e Hom estead Strike of
1892 are significant events in the history of th e development of th e
steel industry. The im portance of each lay In w h at they represent of
the changing n atu re of relations between capital and labor since the
late 1870s and th e implications they hold for su b seq u en t development
of the in d u stry for th e rem ainder of th e nineteenth century.
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In one sense, th e strikes are m anifestations of th e struggle
betw een labor and capital over control of the production process, i.e.,
the craft an d skill of th e laborer ag ain st th e progressive m echanization
and centralization of steel production. In another sense, the strikes
represen t events expressing the desire of capitalists to free them 
selves from dependence on craft labor in order to build a degree of
predictability and control over the process of production w ithin the
very volatile climate of capitalist competition an d m arket relations at
the tim e. From the 1870s to the end of the century, discretionary
control over production passed into the h an d s of capital. For capital,
gaining control over production, "dealing labor out" of decision making
over th e production process, w as a precondition to getting control
over m ark ets through centralization an d concentration. Labor power
in the form of craft as a scarce commodity w as increasingly converted
to a m ore readily available and replaceable commodity.
In essence, the problem for capital w as the transform ation of its
labor force from one suited for the production of Iron to one suited for
the production of steel. The transition of capital from iron production
to steel production necessitated the conversion of the iron producing
labor force into a steel producing labor force, am ounting to the
conversion of a craft labor force to a progressively non-craft, i.e.,
deskilled labor force. The Wheeling an d Homstead strikes are events
in the political struggle over this transition.

The Wheeling Strike of 1885-1886: Craft as Political Power and its
Circum vention in the T ransition to Steel Production. The traditional
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b asis of w orker political power In the Iron Industry w as the control
th a t w orkers held over the craft of Iron production. Control over skills
could be tran slated Into rights over the process itself; rights, th a t is,
relevant to decision m aking over various aspects of production includ
ing output, pace of work, and quantity of labor, am ong other things (cf.
Montgomery 1976, p. 488). The relationship betw een capital an d
labor w as em bedded in an ideology of partnership betw een direct
producers and owners of the m eans of production. The Wheeling
Strike of 1885-1886 and th e Hom estead Strike of 1892 dem onstrate
the operation of forces th a t were changing the relationship betw een
capital and labor, manifested a s it was In conflicts betw een the unions
and mill operators. The owning in terests were becom ing decidedly
anti-union a s th e shift from iron to steel offered them a way to break
their dependence on skilled labor and gain u nshared control over
production, an d in so doing p u t them selves In a b e tte r position to
w rest control of m arkets. The events th a t took place in Wheeling
from 1885-1886 stan d as an example, or a s a prelude, to the fall of
craft unionism an d th e erosion of labor's political pow er in the
transitio n from iron to steel.
The W heeling Strike involved a conflict betw een nailers,
puddlers, and mill operators in the district which led the nation in
o u tp u t of w rought iron nails. In Wheeling (Hogan 1971, p. 228):
Nailers held a n enviable position,...Like their com m unity s ta n d 
ing, th eir earnings were high for, during the 1880s under a
contract wage system, a nailer m ade $12 to $ 20 p er day. A
skilled craftsm an with carefully guarded trade secrets, he
seldom, if ever, performed th e m an u al operations connected
with nailm aking, b u t rather, subcontracted th ese to a group
w hich he supervised. C ontract w orkers received substantially
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less th a n a nailer; a feeder for example, who w orked u n d er him
on a percentage basis, received about $2 per day.
Com panies In th e Wheeling district began to produce nails from
steel, and in the process closed down m any of the puddling furnaces.
Puddlers, a s the m ost Influential craft group within th e Amalgamated
Association, w anted the wage scale increased by 20% for producing
steel as opposed to w rought iron nails. Their argum ent was th a t steel
w as a h ard er m aterial th a n iron; therefore, th e process of nailm aking
h ad become more difficult. Hogan points o u t th a t th e puddlers in the
union advanced this argum ent in a n attem pt to discourage steel
production an d encourage a re tu rn to iron production (1971, p. 228).
Apparently, th e tactic w as to u se th e wage scale for nailers to m ake
steel fabricated nails less economical (or a t le a st to m ake it as costly as
m aking n ails from Iron). The nailers, however, were ag ain st th is since
they believed th a t su c h a dem and would prom pt an unnecessary
confrontation with mill interests.
The nailers paid th e heaviest per capita dues in th e Association
and received sm all recognition in the union councils and th e
distribution of offices. R ather th an ris k their in d u stry position
to p ro tect the jo b s of the puddlers. th e nailers w ithdrew from
the Amalgamated Association by J u n e 1, 1885, a n d revived the
U nited Nailers of America (Hogan 1971, p. 228).
With th e wage scale agreem ent due to expire, th e mill concerns
proposed a reduced scale for 1885-1886, claim ing th a t th is would
allow the resum ption of iron puddling in com petition w ith steel.
E ither way th e mills would win since the w ages of puddlers would
have to come down to compete w ith less expensive steel-produced
nails. The lower scale w as rejected and th e Amalgamated Association
proposed h ig h er rates for certain other trad es.
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In their dealings w ith the nailers, th e com panies sought a
reduction of rate s from 21 cents to 19 cents per keg of common nails,
arguing th a t th e nailers in the eastern mills, w hich were largely n o n 
union, received lower rates. On J u n e 1, 1885, b o th the Amalgamated
Association and the United Nailers w ent on strike (Hogan 1971, pp.
228-229).
The mill operators got around an y further discussion w ith th e
un io n s during th e strike by, first, hiring heaters an d rollers from the
outside (against the Amalgamated Association); and, secondly, by
inviting and agreeing to train feeders a s nailers (against the U nited
Nailers). These tactics led to some violent reprisals from strikers, but
eventually, th e nailers were compelled to agree to a compromise and
th e production of nails w ith steel wire became firmly established in
Wheeling "and nailers as a class of skilled workers gradually d isap 
peared from th e scene" (Hogan 1971, p. 229).

Capital and Labor in Homestead: Carnegie, the Amalgamated A ssoci
ation. and Union Breaking. 1889-1892. At the tim e of the Wheeling
Strike, in 1886, Andrew Carnegie (1886, p. 119) w rote th is a b o u t the
w orkers’ right to organize unions in "An Employer's View of th e Labor
Question":
The right of workingmen to combine and to form trade-unions is
no less sacred th a n the right of th e m anufacturer to en ter into
associations and conferences w ith his fellows a n d sooner o r later
m u st be conceded. Indeed, it gives one b u t a poor opinion of the
American w orkm an if he perm its him self to be deprived of a
right w hich his fellow in England h a s conquered long since. My
experience h a s been th a t trade unions upon th e whole are
beneficial to both labor and capital.
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Carnegie's very "friendly" view of labor is rem iniscent of and
typical of th e tim es in the in d u stry w hen production was very m uch
dependent on skilled labor. In fact, the craft associations an d unions
of skilled laborers were generally viewed by th e operators of m ills to
act as a kind of stabilizing force w here com petition between capitals
w as fierce and m arkets were unpredictable. F o u r major stabilizing
influences of the Amalgamated Association can b e identified: (1) it
participated in the negotiation of uniform wage scales for w estern
mills; (2) it negotiated the equalization of hours, output, an d working
conditions; (3) it "kept in check independent m inded iron workers";
and, m ost im portantly, (4) it "guaranteed union m ills a supply of
scarce puddlers an d rollers" (Brody I960, p. 50).
Yet, a s steel production intensified, the p o stu re of capital toward
labor became decidedly anti-union. A situation h a d emerged w here
mills w est of th e Alleghenies were generally unionized and th o se east
were more resistan t to unions. Partially, this is because w hen firms
previously engaged in iron production were shifting to steel p ro d u c
tion, unions were generally accepted in the new steel m aking depart
m ents of the mills. B u t the steel mills were less likely to be open to
union organization. For example, one of Carnegie's biggest com peti
tors, the Cam bria Steel Company of Johnstow n, Pennsylvania, h ad
successfully resisted the organization of its works an d had ru n n o n 
union since th e early 1870s. The Cam bria Com pany had also entered
steel-m aking earlier through its incorporation of th e G autier Steel
Com pany as a distinct subsidiary. As a result, th e facilities of th e
G autier Com pany were moved from Jersey City, New Jersey, to J o h n s
town. By 1881 G autier Steel becam e the complete property of Cam-
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bria. T hrough this acquisition and its resistance to unionization,
Cambria becam e an im portant force in th e production of steel.18
C am bria's success in the area of labor control w as no sm all p a rt
of its established leadership in iron an d steel production. The com 
pany, free of the com petition of other iron and steelm aklng facilities
in the region, was in essence able to hold its mill a n d mine workforces
as som ething of a "captive population" by dominating as It did th e
landscape a n d daily lives of its workers. It controlled stores, high
ways, schools, housing, a n d even paid its workers' wages in com pany
issued currency. Described by G utm an (1976, p. 327) as "a kind of
industrial feudalism," w orkers could, for example, b e evicted from
their hom es w ith as little a s ten days' notice, and "the discharged
worker w as listed publicly a s 'not employable' by th e Cambria Iron
Works" (G utm an 1976, p. 334) for falling to fulfill th e term s of the
labor co n tract as set down by the com pany. G utm an (1976, p. 331)
offers th e following w hich exemplifies th e company’s power:
Jo h n Tomlinson, th e deputy com m issioner of th e Pennsylvania
B ureau of Labor Statistics, concluded th at th e "state of tilings"
was "a very great anom aly in th e m idst of a free country." He
declared th at th e operators h ad created "absolute personal
governm ent in th e m id st of a republic."
18 In the imm ediate post-Civil War y ears, the Cam bria Iron Works w as
a leader of th e nation in production. Q uoting the New York Times of
1874, G u tm an (1976, pp. 320-321) s ta te s th a t they were "'the finest
works in th e country an d one of the glories of Pennsylvania'." A
national lead er in the production of w rought iron rails in 1871,
Cambria w as also one of th e first B essem er steelm aklng facilities in the
country. H ogan (1971, p. 93) comments.
In th e m id-1870’s th e plant [Cambria], was one of the largest, if
not th e largest iron a n d steel mill in the country. In 1876, it set
a record for rail production w ith 103,743 n e t to n s of rails.
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Furtherm ore, the labor contract of 1874 for the Cam bria Iron Works Is
quoted as stating:
...Any person...know n to belong to any secret association or open
com bination w hose aim is to control wages or stop th e works, or
any p a rt thereof, sh a ll be prom ptly an d finally discharged....
Persons quitting work, or inducing or attem pting to induce
others to quit w ork...shall forfeit w hatever wages m ay be due...to
such persons absolutely.
Against th is background of intolerance for labor organization,
an d the situ atio n of dependency w hich characterized th e relationship
of worker to company, Cam bria w as successfully able to suppress union
activity. W ith the coming of the D epression of 1873 an d the su b se
quent deterioration of th e rail m arket, the Cam bria Company,
...adjusted to the situation by lowering costs, cutting production,
and laying off w orkers. Wages dropped. At first, they were cu t
10 percent, and th e n in mid-November a fu rth er c u t of 21 p er
cent w as announced. The sliding scale of the coal m iners w as
revised downward. Finally, the com pany paid the entire new
wage in store goods and credit ra th e r th a n in cash. Company
officials advised dissatisfied m en to find other jobs, and told th e
rest to accept the new wage or face unem ploym ent. The Cam 
bria Iron Works th u s sought to w eather th e early m onths of the
depression (Gutm an 1976, pp. 331-332).
W hen w orkers responded to this situation with revitalized union
activity and strike th reats, the com pany w as able to finally defeat
unionization through a com bination of lockouts in 1873-1874 and the
procurem ent of raw m aterials from outside sources. The Cam bria Iron
Company h a d w hat Carnegie did not—n o t only th e b est an d m ost
organizationally integrated facilities, b u t a completely non-union
workforce. T he Carnegie Company an d the other basic iron and steel
producers w ould not have both of these things for an o th er eighteen
years.
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In the Pittsburgh district mills, th e Amalgamated Association
successfully organized Carnegie's Homestead mills a s well as th e mills
of J o n e s and Laughlin. By 1889 there were seven lodges active in the
H om estead w orks (Brooks 1940, p. 23), and Hom estead h ad become
the strong center of the Amalgamated Association a t th a t time. As
Stone (1974, p. 121) com m ents, "...it is no w onder th a t the battle
betw een capital an d labor w ould shape u p there." The strike of 1892
would be, in effect, the "last stand" of th e Amalgamated in the basic
steel industry.
Carnegie’s stated attitu d e towards th e union h ad begun to
change, reflecting changing conditions in the steel industry. At first.
Carnegie com plained th a t since the u n io n had failed to organize the
whole industry, th e Homestead mills w ere a t a d istin ct competitive
disadvantage (Brooks 1940, p. 25). Contrary to th e 1886 statem en t of
its key founder, th e Carnegie Steel Com pany began to p u rsu e a
program of anti-union actions. First, in 1885,
M achinery a t the Edgar Thomson W orks...displaced 57 of the 69
m en on th e heating furnaces, 51 of the 63 m en on th e rail-mill
train, and sim ilar n u m b ers elsewhere. The two lodges [of the
A.A.I.S.W.1 a t the p lan t dissolved a s a result, b u t the u n io n did not
com plain (Brody 1960, p. 51).
Secondly, in 1890, again, the year th a t the U.S. industry s u r
passed G reat B ritain in o u tp u t and export of steel, th e Carnegie Com
pany successfully prevented unionization of the D uquesne w orks by
bringing in inexperienced help. The sim ilarities betw een th e se two
cases (the Edgar Thomson a n d D uquesne Works) a n d the situation th at
developed in Wheeling in 1885-1886 are strikingly apparent. It
seem s th a t capital had settled on a new labor relations strategy. The
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essence of this strategy, based on the increase of steel production, and
therefore m echanization of production, is captured in the following
statem ent from C harles Schwab of U.S. Steel Corporation, in looking
back a t th is period:
In 1901, Charles Schwab observed th a t the relation of skills to
u n io n strength had been greatly exaggerated. He could tak e a
green h and—say an Intelligent farmworker—an d m ake a m elter
of him in six or eight weeks. Strike tactics therefore changed
from quiescence to im porting strikebreakers (Brody 1960, p.
58).
By all estim ations, in 1892, the industry w as probably only about half
unionized.
It is after the union left th e Edgar Thomson w orks and before
the events a t the D uquesne w orks th at the conflict th a t would lead to
the Homestead Strike of 1892 really began. In May of 1889, Carnegie
and his Steel Company openly declared a n antiunion policy. In the
sam e year, the com pany proposed these term s to th e new labor agree
m ent (Brooks 1940, p. 25). F irs t, the com pany called for wage red u c
tion for skilled workers. Secondly, the com pany proposed th a t th e
contract be term inated in Jan u ary . Contracts usually came up for
renegotiation in Ju n e . The significance of th is is th a t the union w as in
a better bargaining position in th e sum m er w hen production levels
were higher. Thirdly, contracts were to be negotiated and signed by
th e Individual w orkers. This final proposal would give the com pany
leeway to bypass th e union completely in th e negotiation process.
The union refused to accept such term s and on J u ly 1, 1889,
w ent out on strike. There was a great deal of sym pathy for the strike
in all of Carnegie's establishm ents, including support from railroad
w orkers an d those in the coking facilities. The strike could have
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closed Carnegie down completely. At Homestead, the strike ended in
a som ewhat em barassing way for the company. It is described by
Brody (1960, p. 58) as follows:
The com pany sen t one h u n d red deputy sheriffs to take
possession of the works. The strikers, no less astute, disarm ed
them , and shipped them back to P ittsburgh m inus coats and
caps. No violence accompanied th is tentative effort, an d the
com pany retreated.
Carnegie Steel abandoned its dem ands, and the strike ended in
a victory for the union. B ut there is some doubt over w hether or not it
was a decisive union victory. Brooks (1940, p. 26) calls th e strike "a
clear victory for th e union." Stone (1974, p. 118) states, "At
Carnegie's Homestead mill, a contract w as won in 1889 th a t gave
w orkers authority over every asp ect of production there."
Brody (1960, p. 52) argues th a t while the strike w as a victory for
the u n io n -a fte r all they did w in a contract—it could not stop or
reverse the process of concession-taking th a t h ad been going on for
some tim e. In fact, in th e resolution of th e strike of 1889, th e union
gave u p some im portant rights. W hat had the union lost by th e n and in
1889?
• The Amalgamated Association gave u p attem pts to negotiate standard
wage scales. Union lodges negotiated with p articular mills.
• ’T he Association accepted th e principle th a t increased o u tp u t
through m echanical advance necessitated rate adjustm ents." In
essence, for a union whose traditional basis of influence had been
control of skill, th e Amalgamated Association agreed to th e conditions
of its own demise.
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• Following the 1889 conflict the union gave up responsibility for
hiring an d paying unskilled helpers to th e m anagem ent of the mills,
and, along with th is, gave u p its right to determ ine hours.
• Finally, because of increased m echanization in steel p lan ts, the union
lost a n y influence in setting o u tp u t lim itations. In this, an d in the loss
over influence in decisions concerning deployment of unskilled labor
especially, one m u st question Stone's assertion th at th e union had
achieved "authority over every aspect of production." In fact, it seem s
th a t th e union, an d therefore the skilled w orkers, were losing
authority.
A nother factor which Brody discusses, one th a t Brooks and
Stone seem to neglect in discussing the strike of 1889, is th e steadily
deteriorating position of the union even during the strike. Other firms
in th e industry w ithheld the signing of contracts for th e duration of
the strike. Also, after the strike, wage cu ts throughout th e industry
generally m atched those established a t the Carnegie mills. This is a
p attern th a t would be repeated after 1892. Brody (1960, p. 57)
observes th a t during the 1889 strike a t Homestead,
A Jo n es and Laughlin official stated: "This com pany will make no
term s with its m en until there is a settlem ent a t Homestead." It
could not pay higher wages th a n its chief rival.
So. w hile the union h ad lost its ability to influence the establishm ent
of stan d ard , industryw ide wage scales, mill operators gained the ability
to depress wages on a n industrywide basis.
W hat was won in the strike was the survival of the union, and, in
the w ake of the strike's success, "membership increased by half...and
the balan ce in the treasu ry rose to $146,000" (Brody 1960, p. 54).
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Also w on w as a three-year contract, due to ru n out on J u n e 30, 1892.
The stage was se t for the strike of th a t year.
Between 1889 and 1892, the situation in Carnegie's Pittsburgh
district h ad changed in an Im portant way. Keeping the u n io n out of
the D uquesne works (1890) and the breakdow n of the u n io n a t the
Edgar Thom son w orks combined to give th e Steel Company,
T he special advantage of a m ulti-plant operation w hich w as only
partly unionized; Carnegie could count on some production no
m atter w h at happened a t H om estead (Brody 1960, p . 59).
The Carnegie Company had been able to create som ething which in
the m odem period h a s come to be called "parallel production."19
B luestone and H arrison (1982, p. 166) say ab o u t parallel production:
"A strik e or other form of disruption a t the original shop can be m et by
redirecting more production to the non-union facility...and it also
strengthens the h an d of m anagem ent back in the union shop." Because
it could potentially move production betw een sites, th e political
position of the com pany h ad been strengthened. Hogan (1971, p.
248) indicates in the following statem ent th a t su ch a strategy was
effective. "Despite th e duration of the strike and its costs, the
Carnegie Steel Company m ade a substantial n e t profit of ab o u t $4
million during the year." With th is the com pany became m ore
intolerant of the union. J.H . Bridge in h is History of the Carnegie Steel
C orporation sum s u p the attitude of the com pany toward th e union in
this statem ent; "Every detail of the great p lan t was subject to the
19 Adam (1975, p. 94) describes th is as "multi-sourcing." B arn et and
Muller (1974, p. 309) also discuss the political im pacts of "multiple
sourcing" upon labor w hich allows corporations to protect themselves
from strik es as a m easure of independence from any one p la n t's labor
force is achieved.
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Interference of some busybody representing th e Amalgamated
Association" (1903, pp. 201-202).20
In 1892 America led Britain, steel production led iro n produc
tion nationally, and Carnegie's com pany led th e steel industry. At
Homestead th e contract w ith the Am algam ated A ssociation was due to
expire on J u n e 30 of th a t year. On th e eve of th e coming conflict,
Carnegie left for a trip to Scotland, an d his chairm an, H enry Clay
Frick, was to deal with th e union. Before leaving, Carnegie gave in
structions to Frick to "roll u p a large lot of plates ahead, w hich can be
finished, should the w orks be stopped for a time" (Brody 1960, p. 55).
In essence, the te rm s offered by the com pany to th e Amalga
m ated Association in th a t year were n o t different from th o se offered in
1889. The com pany called for wage reductions for 325 skilled w ork
ers, and delivered its term s to the u n io n as a n ultim atum . The union
h a d to accept th e com pany's terms b y Ju n e 24 or else th e company
w ould begin to write individual co n tracts (Brody 1960, p. 53; Brooks
1940, p. 27; an d Hogan 1971, p. 231). The u n io n was willing to m ake
wage concessions, b u t agreem ent could not be reached over the level
of cu ts th a t were necessary. However, it should be pointed out th at
w hile the conflict between th e union a n d the com pany w as stated to
be over wages, from the point of view of the com pany, "the real point
a t issue in the 1892 d ispute was the very life of th e Amalgamated
Association an d of unionism in general" (Hogan 1971, p. 231). W here
once the union had been seen (e.g., b y Carnegie) a s a stabilizing force

20 Quoted also in Stone (1974, pp. 118-119).
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In production, it w as now seen as a n obstacle. Brody (1960, pp. 5253) com m ents:
In th e course of its experience in the puddling mills, the Amal
gam ated Association had accum ulated a n extensive stock of rules
to protect its m em bers. The regulations were carried over into
th e steel plants. The M emorandum of Agreement for the
Hom estead works, for instance, contained fifty-eight pages of
"footnotes" defining and limiting the ru les of work of
Amalgamated m en.21
The com pany w anted nothing to do with the union any longer since
the existence of th e Amalgamated Association in the steel mills
im peded the reduction of labor costs m ade possible by advancing
m echanization of steel production. Carnegie saw the destruction of
the union as th e "'chance to reorganize th e whole affair'" (Brody,
1960, p. 53). In the P ittsburgh P ost. Ju ly 8, 1892, Frick w as a little
more b lu n t in his sum m ary of the com pany's intentions. He stated
them in these term s (Hogan 1971, p. 231):
I can say w ith the greatest em phasis th a t u n d er no circum 
stances will we have any further dealings with th e Amalgamated
Association as an organization. This is final.
T hroughout the steel industry a t the time, the Carnegie Com
pany w as viewed a s fighting the good fight against th e Amalgamated
Association. For example,
D uring the Homestead Strike, Jo h n Gates [American Steel an d
Wire] h ad assured th e Carnegie Company of his willingness to
postpone th e fulfillment of its contract u n til after the struggle
w ith the Amalgamated: "Fight them to a finish with h ard gloves,
an d give them no q u arter after you get them in a com er an d we
will take the rods in 1894 if necessary" (Brody 1960, p. 57,
quoting G ates's com m unication to J.C . Fleming, A ugust 9, 1892).

21 See also Stone (1974) for the attitu d e of mill operators toward these
rules.
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The strike was apparently consolidating capitalists a s they rallied
around Carnegie.
The Amalgamated Association's refusal to accept th e com pany's
term s preceded its defeat a t Hom estead in 1892 and th e
"dislodgement" of th e Amalgamated from th e rest of th e basic steel
industry proceeded rapidly.22 Also, the union failed in its subsequent
battle w ith the com pany in th e courts. By November 20, 1892, the
union w as banished from Homestead and th e Amalgamated Association
w as driven from basic steel production.
After the Carnegie Com pany's victory a t Homestead, other
com panies followed th e lead. For example, after Homestead,
The superintendent a t th e Joliet steel mill [of Jo n e s and
Laughlin] handed the m en a n ultim atum : unless they took a oneth ird slice, h e would s ta rt u p nonunion. The Association
accepted...."The steel mills are getting away from us," lam ented
President (of th e A.A.I.S.W.) Shaffer....By 1910, th e Association
22 The events of th e strike shaped u p as follows (Brooks 1940, pp. 2728; and Brody 1960, p. 58):
As th e expiration date of the contract approached, th e com pany
announced th a t it would have n o further dealings with th e union
beginning on the first of July. Frick ordered th e construction of a
fence topped with barbed wire aro u n d the whole of th e Homestead
works an d on 30 J u n e , the mill's workforce w as locked o u t of the
plant. Frick planned to reopen the plant on 6 Ju ly w ith nonunion
workers so, three hundred Pinkerton guards were brought in and
landed by river barge a t Homestead (F^ick h ad contacted the Pinker
ton agency on 24 Ju n e). The strikers had heard of Frick's plans, and,
determ ined to keep th e plant closed to strikebreakers, awaited th e
arrival of the barges carrying th e Pinkertons who were being brought
In a t night. Armed hostilities broke o u t betw een the strik ers and th e
hired guards, leaving seven strik ers and th ree Pinkertons dead w ith
m any other casualitles on both sides. The Pinkertons w ere forced to
abandon Homestead.
The defeat of th e Pinkertons, however, prom pted th e
deployment of the Pennsylvania state militia. With this, th e
Homestead works were reopened and started u p with a nonunion
workforce. The strike, for all practiced purposes, was over.
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listed b u t one sm all open-hearth p lan t u n d er co n tract (Brody
1960, pp. 57 an d 60).
The union would continue in th e organization of mills producing
certain finished steel products w here skill still rem ained a n im portant
factor, especially in th e production of sh e e t and tin plate. The union,
in fact, retreated to th ese mills, and, a s de-unionization of basic steel
continued through th e 1890s, the Amalgamated Association urged
displaced skilled w orkers to seek em ploym ent in th ese other in d u s
tries.23 At the opening of the tw entieth century, the union had organ
ized three-fourths of th e sheet mills a n d all tin plate mills except one,
and it becam e officially th e Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel,
and Tin W orkers (Brody 1960, p. 60).
The R epercussions of th e Homestead Strike of 1892. In the afterm ath
of th e 1892 strike, severe cuts in wages were announced in the
Carnegie Company. In 1893, an official of the com pany stated (quoted
in Brody 1960, p. 42; an d Brecher 1972, p. 63):
With th is new [wage] scale in force the firm will be in a position
to compete m ore successfully th a n ever before, an d will probably
have a m aterial advantage over m any of its com petitors in cost
sheets.
This is representative of a general tren d in th e industry. For
example, a t th e time th is new wage scale w as announced in the
Carnegie Company, others responded to Carnegie's bid to out-compete
other producers and b reak out of the pack. At Cambria,
23 The Amagamated Association would effectively be banished from
these facilities as well w ith the form ation of tru sts an d entrenchm ent
of th eir Industrial position. For example, Garraty (1960, p. 8) states
th a t during the years 1900 to 1901, American Sheet Steel Company
sh u t down nine o u t its tw enty union m ills while "all seven of the
com pany's non-union mills were operating full tilt."
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Powell Stackhouse [of C am bria's management}...recalled, "We
were looking everywhere to reduce our costs, an d labor got its
sh a re of it....We got them down low. We h ad to" (Brody 1960, p.
42).
In 1893, wages fell an average of 25% throughout the industry.
Also, betw een 1890 an d 1910, labor costs as an asp ect of total
m anufacturing costs fell from 22.5% a t the sam e tim e th a t productivity
doubled in steel p lan ts and increased three tim es in th e blast furnaces.
As Hogan (1971, p. 233) observes:
The low-cost attitu d e of the com panies n atu rally affected th e
steelworkers, for they too represented an item of cost. Every
attem p t w as m ade to m ultiply th eir productivity in relation to
th e ir income.
Labor h ad gone in tw enty years from scarce resource to a mere factor
in production.
All of this took place before th e backdrop of actu al and th re a t
ened closure of facilities. A pool of strikebreakers w as created in one
sense through th e closure of iron facilities and puddling furnaces. The
threatened p lan t closure came into its own during th is period as a
political tool in the discipline of labor forces. This is illustrated in the
following quote from a correspondence between William E denhom to
Jo h n Lam bert of Consolidated Steel an d Wire Company, 19 February,
1897 (Brody 1960, p. 42):
The American Wire Company ab o u t two weeks ago laid before its
w ire draw ers th e ultim atum of a ten percent reduction or a n
indefinite shut-dow n of its w orks. The m en took th e reduction
an d the works are running.
This strategy of control would continue into the tw entieth century. In
1913, J o h n Topping of Republic Steel said: "When you s h u t down an d
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they get hungry, they are anxious to take any terms" (Brody 1960, p.
41).
Sum m ary and Conclusions
In this ch ap ter I have presented a framework for discussing the
development of the steel in d u stry in th e United S tate s during th e
second half of the nineteenth century. The im portance of the link
between th e conditions of capitalist com petition on th e one h an d and
the conditions of capitalist production, i.e., of labor control, on th e
other h an d is em phasized. This framework is useful in discussing the
particu lar development of th e steel in d u stry against th e historical
conditions of capitalist industrialization globally, as well as in th e
domestic arena, and in Illuminating the significance of the m ajor labor
struggles in the Industry during these th ree decades.
Three Contexts of C apitalist Competition
The American steel in d u stry arose within th ree realm s of cap i
talist competition. First, in general, th e rise of the steel industry can
be explained as a n outcome of the successful assertion of the in terests
of N orthern in d u strial capital over those of Southern agricultural capi
tal, w ith the latter linked to the interests of British in d u strial capital.
This competition, the historical expression of which culm inated in the
Civil War, w as between factions of the domestic owning class, rep re
senting different forms of capital ow nership over rig h ts to m ake
dem ands on the sta te to protect and advance those in terests.24
24 In th is way, the Civil War was the end resu lt of the process of capi
ta list nation-building. W allerstein (1976, p. 33) defines a nation-state
as "a territorial u n it whose rulers seek...to make it a national society."
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Secondly, N orthern victory in the w ar created th e political
conditions (e.g., the establishm ent of protectionist m easures) for th e
advancem ent of U nited States in d u strial capital since th e state could
be called u p o n more easily to su p p o rt its in terests over th o se of any
other national capitalism, particularly those of the capitalist class of
G reat B ritain. The preservation o f th e Union a n d the establishm ent of
protectionist barriers m eant the security of th e domestic m arket for
American industrial capitalists from threats to its position from both
inside and outside of th is market.
Thirdly, in th e domestic sphere, the protection of th e American
m arket from foreign capital led to a ru sh on th e part of American
producers to gain control over th e domestic m arket. For example, th e
revised Morrill Tariff in 1871 preceded a rap id growth in the
domestic production of steel rails w hich previously had b een virtually
nonexistent. Domestic m anufacturers vied w ith each o th er to meet
th e dem ands of the m arket for steel products. In an atm osphere of
intense com petition between Individual firms, iron-m aking facilities
were being s h u t down and investm ent was shifted tow ards the
production of steel. The creation of the United States a s a n industrial
capitalist nation, and th e security of its m arket from B ritish designs on
it, left Am erican capitalists, particularly those invested in steel, to
fight it o u t w ith each other at hom e.
W hen it becam e ap p aren t to the "southern slave owning oligarchy" (cf.
B aran and Sweezy 1966, p. 252 above) th a t th e y could no longer
depend on th e existing state to secu re them w ithin the dom estic
order, they attem pted to withdraw an d form a new national society th e
political stru c tu re of w hich would be more single-m lndedly dedicated
to the preservation of th e plantation system.
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C apitalist Competition and Labor Control: "Partners-A like In
Prosperity and Adversity" to "Busyfaodies Representing the
Amalgamated Association"
The m ajor m eans by which individual capitals secure th eir com
petitive position is through the successful and progressive devaluation
of labor through m echanization and centralization of processes (cf.
Castells 1980, p. 18, above). Capital seeks n o t only to achieve undis
puted control over m arkets, b u t u n disputed control over th e condi
tions of production. At th is particular time, su c h control necessitated
the underm ining of the im portance of craft labor. The ability to
control m arkets is, in fact, inextricably tied to th e ability to control
production, w hich in tu rn rests on th e control of labor.
It is in relation to th e highly competitive situation In American
capitalism and particularly in steel production th a t the m ajor labor
struggles of the nineteenth century beginning w ith the "Great Up
heaval" m u st be understood, and w ith them, b oth the Wheeling Strike
of 1885-1886 an d the Homestead Strike of 1892. In his assessm en t
of the H om estead Strike of 1892, B recher (1972, p. 62) states:
In the final analysis, th e strikers were defeated by the new
technology of the steel industry. In the earlier days, it h ad been
impossible to ru n the mills w ithout the skilled men of th e
Amalgamated, and so all th at w as necessary to defeat a n employ
er w as "to withhold o u r skills from them u n til such tim e a s they
agree." B u t with the increasing m echanization of the mills
[made possible in the first place b y the n a tu re of steel produc
tion against th a t of Iron], employers could s ta rt u p w ith new men
an d only a nucleus of experienced workers. The new giant cor
porations w ith m any plants could easily shift work from a struck
p lan t to an u n stru ck one and th u s be relatively unscathed by the
strike.
A sim ilar process was seen to operate a t Wheeling six years earlier.
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W hen viewed in this light, th e events a t Wheeling and Home
stead rep resen t the culm ination of the process in w hich capital
wrested political control over production from labor an d the resis
tance of labor to its subsum ption under capital. In h is definition of
alienated labor, Edw ards (1979, p. 147) sta te s th at lab o r alienation, in
one im p o rtan t sense, is the process u n d er which "workers are forced
to work according to capitalist criteria." If craft an d skill rep resen t
political control over production by laborers—i.e., th e extent to w hich
production is carried out according to "criteria" set b y w orkers—th e n
the break-up of the Amalgamated Association, an association of craft
workers, represented the loss by labor of th e ability to make any su ch
claims.
In th e steel Industry in 1892 labor w as finally transform ed from
scarce a n d valuable skill to replaceable commodity an d object of
control.

Steel m a sters went from being concerned w ith preserving

and securing their source of valuable labor to being concerned w ith
controlling it. Labor power in th e form of craft In general, and iron
puddling in particular, lost its character a s th e "carrier of skills and
experience, developed through time" (Shaw 1978, p. 16).
It w as during th e 1880s, th e time of conflict betw een capital and
craft labor, th a t Frederick Winslow Taylor began his "experiments" in
scientific m anagem ent a t the Midvale Steel Company. In 1898, Taylor
w as hired by Bethlehem Steel to organize th e com pany's facilities
according to the principles of scientific m anagem ent (Hessen 1972,
pp. 343-346). A lthough strict application of scientific m anagem ent
m et w ith little success in the steel industry, interest In them by B eth
lehem an d other producers in th e age of craft destruction indicates
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the desire on the p art of steel m anufacturing Interests to dictate every
aspect of production to its labor force.25 According to Shefter (1986,
p. 273),
Employers chafed u n d e r the restrictions th a t un io n s placed
upon th eir ability to control and deploy their labor force and
m any so u g h t to overcome these restrictions by adopting the
changes in organization of production advocated b y Frederick W.
Taylor....
The Wheeling and Hom estead S trikes dem onstrate th e capacity
gained by capital to underm ine the political influence of labor over the
production process in the transition of iron to steel production, and
th is w as facilitated by th e disinvestm ent of iron and investm ent in
steel production. With th e defeat of the Amalgamated Association in
basic steel production, "labor conditions w ere dictated in great p art by
m inim um cost requirem ents" (Hogan 1971, p. 233). By extending
control over the production process through the disorganization of
labor, the conditions for th e intensified organization of rap ita l were

25 In fact, one of the problem s of scientific m anagem ent, a t least with
respect to th e Bethlehem case, was th a t Taylor was too successful.
H essen (1972, pp. 343-344) states:
Taylor first applied h is tim e-and-m otion study m ethods to the
handling of raw m aterials in the Bethlehem yards; h e devised
procedures whereby only 140 m en would be needed to do work
w hich previously required more th a n 400. However, Bethle
hem 's owners were displeased w ith Taylor's new system . "They
did not w ish me, a s they said, to depopulate S outh Bethlehem,"
Taylor later wrote. "They owned all th e houses in S outh Bethle
hem an d th e company stores, and w hen they saw th a t we [Taylor
and his assistants] were cutting the labor force down to about
one-fourth, they did n o t w ant it."
In this case the company's desire to dictate every aspect of w orkers’
lives inside th e factory clashed with th eir equally im portant and
profitable desire to dictate w orkers' lives outside the factory as well.
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created. The foundation was laid for the great m ergers of th e 1890s,
and w ith them the centralization an d concentration of capital in th e
steel in d u stry leading to the form ation of the U nited S tates Steel
Corporation in 1901.

CHAPTER IV:
STEEL AND MONOPOLY I: TRUST FORMATION, CENTRALIZATION,
FACTORY CLOSURES, AND THE "LONG MARCH" TO 71 BROADWAY
In troduction
The original form ation of the steel ln d u stiy from 1865 to about
1892 w as accompanied by th e dissolution of America's iron industry.
The next phase of this development, th e phase of monopoly formation
in steel, from the 1870s to its culm ination in the formation of the
United S tates Steel Corporation would be accom panied by th e con
tinuing closure n o t only of iron facilities b u t of steel m aking facilities
also.
This ch ap ter is a discussion of th e development of th e steel in 
d u stry in the post-H om estead period, from the 1890s to the formation
of U nited S tates Steel Corporation in 1901, em phasizing th e historical
relationship betw een the formation of th e great tru s ts in the steel
industry and factory closures. The abandonm ent, dism antling, and
relocation of plan ts in th is period of rap id and m assive industrializa
tion are placed in the forefront through a survey of th e dom inant
tru s ts w hich were eventually brought together to form U nited States
Steel Corporation including th e Carnegie Steel Com pany an d th e com
panies of th e Moore and Morgan G roups. Carnegie Steel, M organ's
Federal Steel, an d Moore's National Steel were th e largest a n d m ost
integrated of the basic steel producers. G ates's American Steel and
Wire Company and Shelby Steel Tube Company, leading steel fabrica
tion concerns incorporated into U.S. Steel, are also discussed along
138
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with American Bridge Company an d National Tube Company of the
Morgan Group and Moore's American Tin Plate Company, American
Steel Hoop Company, and American Steel Plate Company.
The building of the American steel in d u stry was accom panied
both by factory closures in the United States a s firms centralized
production an d m arkets, and by th e dism antling of steel m aking facili
ties in England especially steel fabricating facilities like those for
m aking tin plate w hich were shipped to this country. Therefore, the
central focus of th is chapter is the extent to w hich the transform ation
of the in d u stry involved a process sim ilar both "mechanically" and in
the logic of its development to w hat is now called deindustrialization.
The developments taking place during the late nineteenth and
early tw entieth centuries in world, an d particularly, American capital
ism have been described as comprising a capitalist revolution. The
m ost im portant aspects of th is revolution are identified a s the in
creasing ability of capitalist firms to concentrate control over in d u s
trial production and distribution (cf. Berle 1954, p. 25, and Bar an and
Sweezy 1966, p. 34). Thus, th is capitalist revolution was also neces
sarily a corporate revolution as com panies centralized organizational
com m and and integrated production a t an unprecented level and rate
(Bryant and DethlofF 1983, p. 169, an d Hacker 1968, p. 438). The
events leading u p to the formation of the United States Steel Corpora
tion and its role in the subsequent development of the steel industry
and capitalism in the United States w as p art of th is dual revolution. In
tu rn , factory closures are p art of the formation of United S tates Steel.
Therefore, exam ination of this late nineteenth century example can
dem onstrate the im portance of factory closures in the process of in-
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d u stiial and corporate growth domestically ju s t a s sociological writings
focusing on th e p o st-1945 period reveal their im portance in domestic
industrial decline.
In th is chapter, th en , we consider the role of the factory closure
in th e extension and intensification of control over production through
th e process of monopolization, I.e., a s firms develop along th e dimen
sions of horizontal, vertical, and spatial integration. Historically, this
occurred, as in the case of the steel industry, th ro u g h th e develop
m en t of organizational form s culm inating in the rise of th e holding
com pany as a tactic of control. This facilitated th e com m and of single
corporate adm inistrations over larger geographically defined m arkets,
coordination of production from raw m aterial processing to distribu
tion of finished goods, an d brought together previously com peting
firm s engaged in sim ilar processes.
The term s horizontal, vertical, an d spatial, applied in th is
context refer to the points a t which capitalist firm s compete with one
an o th er while th e term integration is synonom ous with control. Thus,
for example, we may sp eak of independent firms engaged in competi
tion horizontally, vertically, and spatially versus th e ir integration at
th e se points w here previously com peting firms lose independent
identity or are transform ed into subcom panies or divisions of single
corporations through m ergers. The history of th e development of th e
steel industry in th e United States dem onstrates a n essential contra
diction concerning the n a tu re of m ark et relations u n d er capitalism ,
th e contradiction between com petition and control.
Capitalist com petition takes place horizontally across products,
vertically through stages of production processes, an d spatially over
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geographically defined m arkets. In other words, com petition between
capitalist enterprises occurs between firms producing an d selling
sim ilar commodities, firms which are engaged in processes located on
longer chains of production, and betw een firm s over rights to produce
and sell commodities w ithin given areas (cf. W allerstein 1983, p. 29).
However, while capitalism ever ten d s toward com petition between
individual capitals since interest is always defined particularistically in
term s of profit, the ability of any one capital (e.g., firm) to accum ulate
profit—to self-expand—circum vents th e ability of others to do the sam e
(Marx, 1967/1894, pp. 173-199; Foley 1986, p. 94; M andel 1968, pp.
162-166). Therefore, th e driving force in relationships between
capitalist firm s is not tow ard com petition b u t tow ard overcoming
com petition, toward control—horizontally over p roducts, vertically
over processes, and spatially over geographically defined m arkets.
Firm s, and, operating w ithin them , capitalists an d th eir represen
tatives. are suspended between the tendency tow ard com petition and
the necessity of establishing control.
This quest for integration—th a t is, control over production—is
carried o u t in a variety of social and organizational contexts. For ex
ample. a t the level of relations between capitalist national states, state
policies more or less represent the in terests of dom estic capitalist
classes, or a t least the m ost powerful or im portant factions thereof.1
1 I am speaking in very general term s here. However, I recognize th at
th e issue is m uch more complicated th a n I have presented it. There
is an ongoing debate in social science over the n atu re of th e state in
capitalist society (cf. Brown 1986; M iliband 1969; Poulantzas 1975;
O'Connor 1973; Szym anski 1978; Wolfe 1977; and others). Within
M arxism In particular, th ere is argum ent over th e degree of relative
autonom y between sta te processes an d those of class. Skocpol (1980,
pp. 161-178) explains th is debate betw een neo-M arxist theories of the
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Protectionist policies, as we have seen, contribute to th e security of
the dom estic m arket. The corollary of protectionism Is Imperialism
where sta te policies su p p o rt the q u est for control over production an d
m arkets outside of th e im m ediate dom estic context (Barone 1985, p.
state a s centered around th e works of Miliband and Poulantzas. Mili
band (1969), arguing ag ain st Mill's (1956) theory of th e power elite,
claims th a t the state is a n instrum ental extension of th e class interests
of the bourgeoisie operating as its political wing and recruiting its
functionaries from the capitalist class itself. Poulantzas (1975) argues
th a t th e state is more autonom ous th a n is claimed by Miliband and
functions to represent th e interests of th e entire capitalist class. It is
contained w ithin the larger context of capitalist society w hich deter
m ines the logic of its operation regardless of from w here its function
aries are recruited. My purpose here is n o t to resolve th is debate b u t
to em phasize w hat each side shares in common. For m y purposes, I
recognize, as does Brown (1986, pp. 95-96), th a t b oth M iliband's and
P oulantzas's ideas are variations on the them e expressed by Marx and
Engels (1848/1972, p. 33) th a t "The executive of th e m odem sta te is
b u t a com mittee for m anaging the com mon affairs of th e whole b o u r
geoisie." Where they differ is not on th e point th a t th is is so, b u t on
how it is so. Therbom (1978, p. 28) offers a definition of th e state
which is critically opposed to both M iliband's and Poulantzas's: "The
state should be regarded neither a specific institution n o r as an
instrum ent, b u t as a relation—a materialized concentration of the class
relations of a given society." This is to say, as does Oilm an (1976, pp.
212 an d 217), th a t the sta te is really a "facet of the class relation"
w hich "represents the dom ination of one class over another." The
state Is neith er in stru m en t nor institution separate b u t supportive of
class dom ination. But, sta te and class are Inseparable aspects of capi
talist society. The state is itself an expression of class, of "national
power of capital over labor" (Marx 1870/1935, p. 142) an d of national
capitalism s against each other. Also in opposition to Miliband an d
Poulantzas, Skocpol (1979, p. 29) defends a more W eberian or w hat
she calls "organizational” or "realist" view of the state w here she claim s
th a t while th e state exists in a larger institutional setting, p a rt of
which Includes class divided relations, th e state also h a s its own in 
terests w hich it seeks to advance against all others. In su c h a view,
the state is ultim ately autonom ous and develops ap art from or inci
dentally to class processes (cf. Skocpol 1979, p. 178). The basis of the
so-called "realist" perspective is the definitional separation of the pol
itical an d economic realm s and therefore it constitutes a denial of the
interrelationship between polity and economy which Block (1978, p.
3) asserts is implicit in th e development an d existence of capitalist
society.
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81). Policies of th e state also regulate th e capitalist struggle between
individual capitals w ithin the national context, as, for example, in th e
case of an ti-tru st an d other kinds of policies.
At the level of the firm, th e qu est for horizontal, vertical, and
spatial control over production tak es place through organizational
developm ents like those of interfirm relations from th e pool, to the
tru st, to the holding company. E ach of these progressively extends
and intensifies control over products, processes, and m arkets. In
sum , th is chapter is a consideration of th e role of the factory closure
in th is overall development. It Is against th is th a t the concept of
deindustrialization as it h as currently influenced sociological discus
sions m u st be reconsidered. My purpose is to highlight th e role of
p lan t closures in th e process of th e building of the steel in d u stry as
opposed to their role in its dism antling a s is em phasized in current
sociological treatm en ts of th e issue. I will do th is by placing the
factory closure w ithin the context of tru s t form ation an d monopoliza
tion in the domestic steel industry.
The Steel Industry in the Late Nineteenth Centurv:
C oncentration and Centralization of Production
The birth of th e steel in d u stry took place am idst th e abandon
m ent of Iron production and, w ith it, of ironm aking facilities. In the
last stage of its tran sitio n from iron to steel production, Hogan (1971,
p. 300) states:
The Directory to the Iron and Steel W orks of the United States
for 1896 Included th e following statem ent: The m o st notable
abandonm ent of [iron] puddling furnaces th a t h a s tak en place in
recent years h a s occurred a t the American Works of Jo n e s and
Laughlin, Ltd. In 1894, th is firm reported 92 single puddling
furnaces as still forming p a rt of its plant; in the p resen t edition
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only 15 single puddling furnaces are reported and o n F ebruary 8
the la st of these furnaces w as dism antled.
As seen in th e previous chapter, th is course of disinvestm ent of iron
production an d shutdow n of iron m aking facilities w as p a rt of a larger,
industryw ide tren d of th e sim ultaneous m ovem ent away from craft
based labor accom panied by the destruction of Ironmaking facilities
an d th e movement of capital into steel production.
On the world and national economic stages, the close of the
nineteenth century was a tim e of unprecedented capital centralization.
In relations betw een capitalist states, im perialism and protectionism
w ere aspects of this as two expressions of the sam e process through
w hich world m arkets become divided am ong capitalist pow ers (Lenin
1917/1975, p. 105). The drive toward consolidation in th e steel
in d u stry was, of course, p a rt of a general trend toward monopolization
taking place in the national economy, an d across other core econo
m ies a t the sam e time as "rivalry between the g reat national capital
ism s hardened" (Beaud 1983, p. 131) an d the "Age of Finance Capital"
began, i.e., th e progressive merging of Industrial capital w ith an d
thro u g h banking capital (Lenin 1917/1975, p. 105). Within nations,
large scale industrial an d financial com binations were formed and
corporations w ere ever becom ing world actors even as their nations
were becoming Im perialist powers.
The G erm an economy w as dom inated by th e likes of th e Krupps
in steel, AEG an d Siemens in the electrical industry, and th e
D eutsche, D resdner, and Diskonto B anks in finance (Beaud 1983, pp.
136-137, and National Industrial Conference B oard 1931, p p . 79-105).
In Britain, typical of th e period from 1880-1918, 655 independent
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industrial firms were merged into 74 corporations. Also in Britain
from 1880-1913, 250 private ban k s w ere consolidated into 48 and
120 jo in t stock b an k s into 43. In th e "brave new world" of monopoly
capitalism , whole branches of American industry were dom inated by
tru sts, for example: 50 percent of textile production, 54 percent of
glass-m aking, 60 percent of paper an d book production, 62 percent of
food, an d 72 percent of liquor, 77 percent of nonferrous m etals, and
81 percent of chem ical production. Similar developm ents occurred in
iron an d steel w here 84 percent of all production, including basic and
fabricated steel production w as controlled and organized by tru sts
(Beaud 1983, pp. 136-137). By 1901, 6 0 percent of all iron an d steel
production would be accounted for by th e United S tates Steel
Corporation alone. In the first decades of the tw entieth century, the
United S tates became the leader am ong capitalist nations in all
aspects of steel production. As a nation, the steel o u tp u t of the United
S tates reached 31,300,874 tons, more th a n the com bined o u tp u ts of
G reat B ritain and Germany, an d by themselves, th e mills of Pittsburgh
accounted for one q u arter of the world's total o u tp u t of steel (Cotter
1916, p. 8). As G reer (1979, p. 51) states, "massive industrialization
w as the order of the day."
The dom ination of the American economy b y tru sts reflects the
situation described by Mandel (1968, p. 403):
The num ber of tru sts, which w as only 23 in 1890 and 38 in
1896, reached 257 in 1904, the an n u al capitalization of m er
gers, which h ad never exceeded 2 4 0 million dollars, reached
710 million in 1898, an d 2,244 million in 1899. O ut of 339
m ergers w hich took place in th is period, 156 gave rise to
definite degree of monopoly power.
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The consolidation of th e steel in d u stry in America had been
taking place since the end of th e Civil War. Two significant events in
the late 1880s an d early 1890s were the formation of the Illinois Steel
Com pany in 1889, followed three years later by the reorganization of
Carnegie Steel as Carnegie Steel Company, Ltd., a holding com pany
w hich controlled n atu ra l gas wells, coal lan d s and coke processing
facilities, iron ore lands, b la st furnaces, steel mills, railroads, steam 
ship an d barge lines, ore docks, and m erchandising stores. Firm s
were widening an d deepening their control over all aspects of steel
production. Integration of production necessitated organizational
integration, and a s a consequence, in the steel in d u stry as in other
industries, the independent firm was being obliterated by m onop
olization and giving way to th e tru s t and holding company.
D uring th is period, the rate of tr u s t formation in the steel
in d u stry was intense. In a m ere three years from 1898 to 1900, th e
vast m ajority of America's steel making an d finishing capacity cam e
u n d er th e control of tru sts. In 1898, allied holding com panies of the
Morgan Group, w hose Federal Steel Com pany itself incorporated
Illinois Steel, were formed, American Bridge Company and National
Tube Com pany also came u n d er control of Morgan interests. National
Steel, Am erican Hoop Steel, American Tin Plate, an d American Sheet
Steel of the Moore Group of allied holding com panies all came on to
the scene between 1898 and 1899 (Temin 1964, p. 191). Also In
1899, J o h n W. G ates established the A merican Steel an d Wire
Company, and in 1900 Shelby Steel Tube Company underw ent a m ajor
reorganization w hich gave it is final form a s an independent com pany
before its merger into United S tates Steel. When th e d u st h ad settled
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after th is first wave of consolidation, more th a n half of th e total steel
m aking capacity of th e nation cam e u n d er th e direction of th is handful
of com panies (Cotter 1916, pp. 21-28; Hogan2 1971, p. 464; and
H acker 1968, pp. 436-437). This process of intense industrialization,
corporate growth, expansion, an d capital form ation was accom panied
by a parallel process involving factoiy shutdow ns, abandonm ent,
dism antled facilities, and disinvestm ent.3
Capitalist Competition and Combination
The m ajor developments taking place in the iron an d steel
in d u stry of the late nineteenth century were th e centralization and
consolidation of control over production and m arkets by fewer and
fewer com panies. The oligopolization of the industry also b ro u g h t with
it territorial concentration. W here the in d u stry w as once scattered
an d decentralized, it was becoming more concentrated in steel

2 Hogan cites Report of the Com missioner of Corporations o n th e Steel
Industry. P art I. 1911. United States D epartm ent of Commerce and
Labor, Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office. See also Ger
tru d e G. Schroeder (1953, pp. 36-38).
3 "Machinery, comparatively new, w as scrapped to make room for
m ore m odem equipment" (Cotter 1916, p. 7). Similar steel Industry
developm ents were occurring elsewhere In th e m ajor cap italist coun
tries as well. For example, the German steel industry w as undergoing
a sim ilar centralization of steel production involving developm ent
tow ard m ass production of steel accompanied by scrapping of plants
(cf. National Industrial Conference Board 1931, p. 82). See also Walk
er's (1906, pp. 353-398) tum -of-the-century account of th e German
Steel Syndicate, a state-recognized monopoly. This study com pares
concentration of G erm an steel production to th e development of the
United S tates Steel Corporation. In 1926, th e Verelntigte S tah lw erker. A.G. (United Steelworks Corporation) w as formed in Germany
through a com bination of the largest steel m anufacturing a n d mining
tru s ts of Germ any (National Industrial Conference Board 1931, p. 82).
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producing districts in and around Pittsburgh, Chicago, Cleveland, and
Youngstown.
In the 1880s the iron an d steel industry w as com prised of many
sm all com panies w ith production capacities of 3,000-15,000 n e t tons
of iron an d steel products. There were also ab o u t a dozen or so
m edium sized com panies w ith capacities of from 15,000-75,000 net
tons along with a handful of large com panies w ith capacities of more
th a n 75,000 n et to n s (Hogan 1971, p. 235).4 From 1880-1890 there
were still several hundred sm all companies, an d before th e tu rn of
the tw entieth century, the Am erican steel in d u stry w as m ade u p of
about 500 separate and competing firms (Schroeder 1953, p. 36). But
by 1892, "Large com panies h ad grown considerably a s several had ex
panded their capacity beyond 250,000 n et tons an d two, Carnegie
Steel an d Illinois Steel, boasted 1 million to n s of steelm aking capacity"
(Hogan 1971, p. 235; see also Schroeder 1953, p. 36). The larger size
of com panies and th e vast increases in production capacity of inde
p en d e n t producers characteristic of the post-H om estead period both
reflected and necessitated concentration of m arkets, centralization of

4 These large com panies were located both e a st an d w est of th e Alle
gheny M ountains (four east, five w est with two of these in th e Chicago
area). O f steel com panies w ith over 100,000 to n s of capacity, those
east of th e Allegheny M ountains included; (1) Albany R enselaer Iron
and Steel, 180,000 to n s capacity; (2) Lackawana Iron and Steel Com
pany, 168,000 tons; (3) Bethlehem Steel Company, 135,000 tons; and
(4) Pennsylvania Steel Company, 250,000 tons. Those w est of the
Allegheny M ountains were: (1) Cam bria Steel Company, 200,000 tons;
(2) E dgar Thom son Steel Works, 450,000 tons; (3) Cleveland Rolling
Mill Company, 110,000 tons; (4) Joliet Steel Works, 150,000 tons;
and, (5) North Chicago Rolling Mill Company, 200,000 tons.
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capital u n d e r p articular firms, an d w ith these, th e proliferation and
refinem ent of corporate organizational stru ctu re .5
Domestically, th e drive tow ard consolidation can be accounted
for w ith reference to two im m ediate and interrelated conditions, each
having a bearing, as recognized b y Hogan (1971, p. 236), on the
process of monopoly formation in th e steel industry. F irst is the
"oversupply problem," definitive of the in tra-in d u stry competitive
situation w ithin the domestic economy, and in th e steel industry
resulting in a period of low dem and through th e decade from 18901899 (Temin 1964, p. 188). T hus, consolidation as a broad strategy of
m arket control and corporate com bination as a tactic to achieve it
were responses rooted in a "desire b y m any com panies to fortify
them selves against th e instability of the market" (Hogan 1971, p. 236).
In the iron and steel industry th is oversupply/under-dem and problem
reflected th e situation were Am erican furnaces were increasing in
capacity an d outstripping the ability of existing m arkets to absorb
surplus. Such a problem resulted from intense com petition between
small firm s trying to b reak free of th e constraints of local m arkets, so
com bination was p u rsu ed by m any firm s as a way to stabilize produc
tion and m arketing an d end "ruinous competition" (Bryant and Dethloff 1983, p. 169, an d Heilbroner a n d Singer 1984, pp. 200-2046).
5 Along th e se lines, C handler (1962, p. 14, and 1977, p. 451) dis
cusses th e need of establishing corporate organizations m ore capable
of coordinating activities, for example by replacing single, general
adm inistrative offices w ith subdivisions coordinated by a central office.
As firms increase geographic scope an d command over production,
they develop wider an d deeper organizational stru ctu res.
6 Heilbroner and Singer (1984, p. 200) refer to th is statem en t by J.P .
Morgan which, as they say, captures th e "spirit of the age," "I like a
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Even though th e ten ets of Social Darwinism were extolled as the
highest virtues, competition was viewed by th e capitalists of the
"Gilded Age" a s destructive.
Secondly, th e oversupply problem w as com pounded by fluctua
tions in th e economy, especially regarding in ter-in d u stry relations.
Specifically w ith regard to the domestic steel industry, th e fortunes of
steel producers were closely tied to conditions in the railroad Industry
a n d especially in fluctuations in the m arket for rails. For example,
...when poor harvests in 1881 reduced th e prosperity of the rail
roads, th e iron a n d steel industry w as so adversely affected by
the decline in rail p u rch ases th a t Bessem er rail prices declined
from $ 6 0 to $50 during th e first few m onths of the next year
(Hogan 1971, p. 236).
Basically, th e drive tow ard centralization an d concentration in Ameri
can industry in general, and in th e iron and steel in d u stry in p articu 
lar, was tied to the im portance of com bination as a "buffer" against
com petition an d fluctuations in prices created by restricted m arkets
(Hogan 1971, p. 237). The im portance of com bination in the steel
industry as a solution to m arket "vagaries" is further illustrated by the
fact th a t rail prices from the late nineteenth through th e opening of
th e tw entieth century fluctuated wildy. From 1880 to 1901, the
m onthly average price for rails could vary anyw here from between
little competition, b u t I like com bination better." Cotter (1916, p. 10)
com m ents th a t,
The frequent an d prolonged periods of depression h ad forced
upon steel m akers the conviction th a t some way of combining to
prevent th eir recurrence w as desirable, even necessary, if the
United S tates w as to keep an d increase its lead in the m anufac
ture of th e m etal m o st needed by the age. Between the years
1890 an d 1900 com binations in the in d u stry were a s thick as
the leaves of Vallambrosa.
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$16.50 to $ 8 5 per ton. It w as n o t until the formation of the United
S tates Steel Corporation in 1901 th a t rail prices were held steady
staying aro u n d $28 p e r ton until ab o u t 1916 (Heilbroner and Singer
1984, p. 204 and Terain 1964, p. 192).
T hus, th e n atu re and conditions of capitalist competition and
th e resu ltan t state of m arkets in th e last decades of the 1800s
provided th e Im petus to the consolidation an d th e rise of big b u sin ess
since restricted profits m ade expansion necessaiy. "Production w as
forced to a new and w ider scale...the time w as ripe for consolidation"
(Edwards 1979, p. 42) as firms so u g h t organizational solutions to the
problem s of accum ulation th at th ey faced.
T actics of Com bination in the Late N ineteenth Century; Vertical an d
Horizontal Integration a s Organizational Solutions to "Ruinous
Com petition"
B ecause of the volatile n a tu re of competition, capitalists form
monopolies to protect them selves. E rnest M andel (1968, p. 401)
h a s noted, "In order to protect, m aintain or increase th e ir rate of
profit, capitalist enterprises arrive a t understandings or enter into
agreem ents to collaborate which ta k e a great variety of forms."
Hogan (1971, pp. 237-238), am ong other com m entators, Identifies
th ree basic forms of com bination in to which firm s entered in the late
n in eteen th century a n d which w ere m ost im p o rtan t in th e specific
case of the formation of the American steel in d u stry prior to the es
tablishm ent of the U nited States Steel Corporation in 1901. These
were the pool, the tr u s t, and the holding com pany. M andel (1968, p.
401) draws a distinction between pools and so-called gentlem en's
agreem ents. According to his typology, gentlem en's agreem ents are
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voluntary in n atu re an d refer to agreem ents between producers "not to
sell below certain prices or in certain areas." The sam e is tru e of
pools, y et they are distinguishable from gentlem en's agreem ents
insofar as m arket sh arin g between producers is m ore specifically
defined. T hat is, "They envisage...a definite division of the m arket"
(Mandel 1968, pp. 401-402), for example, the rail pool allotted
definite control over percentage sh a re s of the m arket to firms based
on capacity (Warren 1972, p. 99, and cf. Berglund 1907, pp. 34-35).
It m u st be understood th a t while th e difference between the pool
and the tru st, for example, is definitely one of kind, th a t between the
pool an d the gentlem en’s agreem ent is only of degree, each describing
a fairly informal com m unity of in terest between separate producers.7
In th e 1870s, th e "pool" or "gentleman's agreement" w as a n
im portant way of establishing m inim um prices, dividing m arkets, and
coordinating production. Pools were easy to establish and provided
checks on competition a t the sam e tim e th a t b u sin esses could be
m anaged independently. These were widely used during the period
when in d u stry w as m o st decentralized. In steel, th ere were pools for
producers of every kind of steel product, e.g., th e rail pool, wire pool,
nail pool, plate pool, etc. (Ripley 1916, pp. xiii-xvi; Cotter 1916, p. 5;
Temin 1964, p. 175; Hogan 1971, pp. 237-238; an d Heilbroner an d
Singer 1984, pp. 196-197).

7 See Jo n e s's (1926, pp. 7-8) work on the natu re of tr u s t formation in
the early tw entieth century. Jo n es m akes even m ore refined distinc
tions betw een "the gentlem en's agreem ent; ...the speculative pool;
...the regulation of o u tp u t pool; ...the division of the field pool; ...the
selling agency; ...and th e p atent pool."
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Pools were usually established during periods of crisis b u t fell
a p a rt w hen conditions would improve—they were Informal and so n o t
very reliable.8 D uring tim es w hen price agreem ent w as m ost neces
sary, su ch as during periods of low dem and, nothing prevented
individual parties to su ch agreem ents from trying to break o u t If they
could achieve some advantage th a t could be tran slated into profitability
(cf. D urand 1920, p. 13, and Ripley 1916, pp. v-xxxlli). In fact It a p 
peared th a t parties to these agreem ents would look for the right time
to leave them and in th is way attem pt to su rp ass th eir competition.
For example, Carnegie pulled his com pany out of th e rail pool follow
ing th e Homestead Strike after achieving an advantage of labor control,
a relatively lower wage bill, and economy of production through m ech
anization, and with these, the opportunity to lower the price of rails by
$5 per ton (Brody 1960, pp. 6 an d 51, and Hacker p. 345). Pools
variably increased coordination between com panies, and since they
were formed around single products they describe a type of horizontal
relationship between firms, b u t n o t integration.
In the 1880s, th e tru s t form emerged w ith th e "invention" of the
S tan d ard Oil Company in the 1870s. The replacem ent of pools by
tru s ts represented a shift to direct control of production and m arkets
8 C otter (1916, pp. 5-6), for example, relates th e following:
According to th e statem ents of m en who them selves took p a rt in
pools, it w as no uncom m on th in g for a m anufacturer to station a
salesm an outside the building w here a pool conference was
being held and, a s soon as a price settlem ent w as reached, to
stroll casually over to a window and by prearranged signal indi
cate to him the level agreed on, w hereupon th e salesm an would
proceed to u n d ercu t the price w hich his em ployer was even
th e n pledging him self to m aintain.
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by firms as com petitors were brought u n d e r the com m and of single
com panies. T ru sts were formed when stockholders of com peting
com panies tu rn ed over voting stock to tru ste e s in exchange for certif
icates w hich entitled them to receive in te re st b u t not to vote (Hogan
1971, p. 238; Jo n e s 1926, p. 20; and Heilbroner and Singer 1984, p.
199).
In 1890, th e an ti-tru st anim us of the working an d middle class
reform movement led to the passage of th e Sherm an A nti-Trust Act9
w hich prohibited consolidation of com panies "in restrain t of trade."
The law was variably enforced and ignored owing to the am biguity of

9 Edw ards (1979, pp. 65-66) argues th a t th e a n ti-tru st reform move
m ent in th e la tte r p art of th e 1800s and early 1900s h a d its origin in
th e n atu re of class relations a t th e time. Middle-class reform ers and
certain factions of the working-class, su ch a s those represented by
conservative labor unions, sought through th e an ti-tru st movement to
challenge the power of the biggest capitalists and largest consolida
tions. There is another side to the class ch aracter of a n ti-tru st policy
Illustrated by the fact th at th e Pullman Strike was broken in 1894
through the th re a t of the u se of state m ilitary force and th e enforce
m ent of the Sherm an A nti-Trust Act (Brecher 1972, p. 66; and Beaud
1983, p. 128). "Forty five strike leaders were indicted in Federal
C ourt for violating the S herm an Anti-Trust Act" (Brecher 1972, p.
66), the union an d the strike found to be in restraint of trade. On
another occassion, the Suprem e Court in 1908 found th e D anbury
H atters to be in violation of th e Sherm an A nti-Trust Act for organizing
a boycott which they concluded was in re stra in t of trade. With refer
ence to the sam e case, lower courts found th a t any national union, to
th e extent th a t it represented all workers, constituted a monopoly and
w as therefore illegal (Hays 1957, p. 67). A nti-trust policy w as there
fore sim ultaneously an outcom e of resistance to the power of big capi
tal and used ag ain st those challenging th is power. Wolff (1965, p. 4)
notes th a t u n d er capitalism th ere are two contradictory sets of ethics.
One states a belief in the "combination of capital...as in accordance
w ith n atu ral law" and the other views "combination of lab o r as a con
spiracy." The u se of such laws as the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act against
labor unions m akes this contradiction salient. See also Gregory's
(1946, pp. 200-222) discussion concerning th e u se of federal
authority to lim it union power.
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its language concerning w hat actually constitutes restrain t of trade.
This w as com pounded by the fact th a t th e Suprem e C ourt n o t only
obligated itself to prove "monopolistic in ten t or attainm ent," b u t also
the more difficult legal ta sk of interpreting su c h in ten t as constituting
'good' or 'bad' restrain t (Ripley 1916, p. 495, an d cf. Gregory 1946, p.
201). B ut it w as not ju s t problems of interpretation of th e law th a t led
to th e variability of its application, an d these legal difficulties need to
be placed in political context. Edw ards (1979, p. 65) addresses this
issue in his account:
The an ti-tru st campaign would n o t have been possible if it had
not reflected the needs of a broad m ulticlass opposition to the
corporations. Enforcem ent required mobilizing the powers of
government against the biggest capitalists. Yet the sta te is
merely a n aren a in w hich class relations take a n explicitly
"political" form, and it would certainly be wrong to suggest th a t
the sta te during the transition period w as n o t dom inated by the
capitalist class. Nonetheless, conflict w ithin the capitalist class
created a situation in w hich the state ap p aratu s gained a relative
degree of autonomy, an d other groups (professionals and
intellectuals, for example) were able to play a greater role in
determ ining sta te policies.
The establishm ent of a n ti-tru st policy w as th u s an outcome of Interan d intra-class political dynam ics. Here, Edw ards asserts th a t its
enforcem ent, or lack of enforcem ent, w as an outcome of th e general
defense of th e interests of big capital. This Is further supported by the
fact th a t laws like the Sherm an Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton AntiT ru s t Act, w hich prohibited interlocking directorates, did little to
stem the tide of corporate consolidation an d the m erger movement
(Edwards 1979, p. 66; and B ryant and Dethloff 1983, p. 169). As
noted by Beard an d Beard (1960, p. 311), the S herm an A nti-Trust Act
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of 1890 "was neith er imposing n o r effective. For a long tim e presi
den ts allowed it to sleep on th e books."
However ineffective a n ti-tru st legislation w as in curbing the
appetite of g ian t enterprises, Edw ards (1979, p. 66) also observes th a t
su c h policies of the state a t least added "an element of uncertainty to
th e operations of big corporations" Insofar a s their directors, a t least
for a time, h a d to consider w hether or n o t certain corporate m erger
activities would bring them u n d er the scru tin y of th e sta te and the
pu b lic.10 B ryant and Dethloff (1983, pp. 169-170) note th a t this
situation led to a search for a more legally acceptable way of building
corporations.
The solution was to move away from th e traditional tru s t form of
com bination to th a t of the holding com pany form in th e p o st-1890
period w here a single firm held a controlling sh are of th e securities of
subordinate firms. B ryant and Dethloff (1983, p. 169) describe the
holding company, to w hich the word tr u s t cam e to be generically ap 
plied, as an especially im portant concentration strategy after the New
Je rse y le g isla tu re passed an incorporation act favoring it In 1889.

10 Edw ards (1979, pp. 67-68) notes th a t World War I gave corporate
capitalists "a context in which public su p p o rt and th e power of the
sta te could be sw ung decisively on their side." To th e extent th a t any
an ti-tru st actions were taken ag ain st corporations, th ese happened
before the war. After th e war, no dissolutions were h anded down by
U.S. courts especially since the needs of w ar mobilization provided a n
ideological atm osphere w herein monopoly size, by virtue of com m and
over production th a t th is implied, came to be associated w ith national
security. In 1920, even though th e m arket share of th e U.S. Steel
Corporation h ad a t one point reached 80 percent, th e Suprem e C ourt
refused to dissolve it. "The Court decided th a t m ere size did not
violate the Sherm an an d Clayton Anti-Trust Acts" (Bryant an d Dethloff
1983, p. 170).

157

New Je rse y law provided legal support for the direct merger of com
panies since it allowed one corporation to itself own th e stock of
another—a practice previously not allowed during th e age of the trad i
tional tr u s t (Hlelbroner and Singer 1984, p. 200). As a consequence,
it w as u n d er the laws of this state th a t m any of the mergers of the
1890s took place. By 1904, 170 of the 318 largest com binations were
incorporated in New Jersey, w hich collected im portant revenue
throug h incorporation fees, and required a m inim al connection with
the chartering firm su ch as rental of desk space in th e state, display of
a corporate sign, and subm ission of a pro forma an n u al report. Soon
after this, New Yorfc, Delaware, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maine,
North Dakota, and Nevada established sim ilar incorporation laws in
order to reap the benefits of being w hat Ripley called a "charter-barter
state" (1916, pp. xvii-xx; see also Moody 1904, pp. 453-467, and
H acker 1968, p. 425).
From 1897 to 1903, the Interval covering the form ation of the
United S tates Steel Corporation, Hogan (1971, pp. 238-239) states:
In th is six-year period, the num ber of com binations rose from
12 to 305 with a n increase in aggregate capital from u n d er $1
billion to nearly $7 billion. By 1904, these firms controlled
nearly two fifths of the capital invested In m anufacturing in the
United States.
Between 1898 and 1900, 11 large m ergers in the steel in d u stry in 
volving nearly 200 previously independent com panies took place.
Financial backing for m ost of these w as provided by th ree great tru sts
headed by Andrew Carnegie, J.P . Morgan and W.H. Moore. Mergers,
besides m aking for greater opportunities to accum ulate profits, facil
itated com bination vertically and horizontally since corporations could
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directly own competing com panies and the com panies of suppliers,
finishers, an d distributors, therefore integrating product lines, coor
dinating processes, an d securing m arkets. The transition from the
pool to th e holding company, from tem porary tru ce s in tim es of
trouble to m ergers, represented th e passage from price com petition
to com petition between capitals over direct control of all aspects of
production—th a t is, from price com petition to com petition over
control of capital. Monopolization is not a process which elim inates
com petition b u t it is one wherein firms attem pt to elim inate com peti
tors. Again w ith reference to the year 1904, the 318 com binations
centralized control over 5,288 sep arate factories (Brody 1980, p. 8).
The history of the steel industry provides an exam ple of the central
role played by abandonm ent, dism antling, and shutdow n of factories as
an aspect of th is extensive control in the processes of monopolization
and industrialization.
Factory Closures an d the Rise of the
Steel Industry: Competition and Control
This section begins a discussion of the form ation of the great
steel tru s ts which, separately, dom inated steel production in th e
United S tates until th eir merger into the United S tates Steel Corpo
ration in 1901. The Steel Corporation and its co n stitu en t tru s ts were
them selves products of a great deal of merger activity (Herman 1981,
p. 83), and, it is understood, were b o m of the M erger Movement
which lasted from the 1890s to th e tu rn of the century and beyond.
The focus h ere is on th e development of the dom estic steel in d u stry
prior to th e form ation of United S tates Steel Corporation and th e
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integral role of factory closures in this development. In th e areas of
basic and fabricated steel production, total an d partial, tem porary and
perm anent abandonm ent, dism antling, and closure of factories can be
situ ated in th e process w hereby firms so u g h t to overcome competition
by extending horizontally an d vertically th ro u g h m ergers th eir control
over products, processes, and m arkets.
In the process of steel in d u stry formation, and as firm s extended
th e ir control over production an d struggled over control of m arkets-locally, interregionally, and internationally—p lan ts were left idle.
Several examples stan d out a n d these will be em phasized. The estab
lishm ent of Carnegie Steel Com pany's com m and over steel production
in Pittsburgh involved the idling of the Hom estead Works in 1883 and
th e Edgar Thom son Works in 1884. S ubseq u en t com petition between
Carnegie Steel an d the Illinois Steel Com pany for control of w estern
steel production an d resources led at one tim e to the idling of m ost of
th e steel p lan ts in the Chicago area, until Illinois Steel w as merged
into Morgan's Federal Steel Company. Internationally, American tin
plate production provides a n example of a n Industry w hich rose to
pre-em inence in a climate of protectionism an d w here in d u s
trialization in th e domestic context was accom panied by "runaway
shops" and capital flight from G reat Britain. In th is period of rapid
an d massive industrialization culm inating in the formation of the
U nited States Steel Corporation, Moore's American Tin Plate Company
cam e to dom inate th is area of steel fabrication by buying and sh u ttin g
down the p lan ts of competitors. Similarly, Shelby Seam less Steel
Tube Company, a tru s t which eventually cam e to control nearly ninety
percent of all tu b e production in the United S tates, established its
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position in p a rt by buying and th e n shutting down or dism antling the
plants of competing m anufacturers. Also, in th e quest to b reak its
dependence on basic steel producers, American Steel an d Wire
Company, w hich controlled seventy-five percent of the n atio n 's wire
m aking capacity, a t one time closed one-third of its plants.
In these and other instances, idled capacity, dism antled
facilities, abandoned p lan ts and shutdow ns en ter into th e process of
capitalist competition horizontally, vertically, an d spatially. If factory
closures have played a role in the building of th e steel industry, i.e., in
industrialization, in the domestic context, th en the way su c h events
are currently conceptualized in sociology m u st be questioned. In
beginning th is re-evaluation we tu rn to the history of factory closure In
the form ation of the United States steel industry.
Carnegie Acquires the Homestead Works: Idled Plants
and the Labor Issue within Capitalis t Competition
The favored position of the Carnegie Steel Company, anchored as
it was around the Edgar Thomson Works, at Braddock, Pennsylvania,
w as accom plished during the 1880s and 1890s through rap id hori
zontal an d vertical growth. Horizontally, Carnegie was able to acquire
the steel mills of com petitors in th e Pittsburgh area. The two m ost
im portant acquisitions were those of the Homestead Works in 1883
and th e D uquesne W orks in 1889. Vertically, Carnegie established
control over sources of raw m aterials and transportation facilities.
The Steel Company's m ost im portant link w as th a t established
with H.C. Frick and Company in 1882 (Hacker 1968, p. 346, and
Hogan 1971, pp. 243-244). Through the com pany’s ties w ith Frick,
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Carnegie Company h ad virtual command over the Connellsville coal
fields, coke processing, and tran sp o rtatio n .11 For a time, the link
between Frick and Company an d the E dgar Thomson Works m ade the
Carnegie Company th e u n d isputed leader in the Pittsburgh steel
district.
Carnegie Company's control over steel production in Pittsburgh
began w ith the acquisition of th e plants of com petitors in the area,
first w ith th e acquisition of the Homestead Works in 1883 and the
D uquesne Works in 1889. In 1879, a group of Pittsburgh industrial
ists—combining the independent mill com panies of Park B rothers and
Company; Hussey, Wills and Company; Singer Nimich an d Company;
C resent Steel Works; Solar Iron and Steel Works; an d Superior Mill,
all of w hich were located in P ittsburgh—organized th e Pittsburgh
Bessem er Steel Company, Ltd. a t Homestead, Pennsylvania, for th e
production of rails an d stru ctu ra l shapes. The Pittsburgh Bessem er
Steel Company, concerned w ith the production of finished steel
products, h ad no capacity for m aking basic steel and depended largely
upon Carnegie's E dgar Thomson Works for its steel input. Since th e
Edgar Thom son w orks were closely allied w ith and a m ajor supplier of
11 In 1871, Frick an d Company of Connellsville, Pennsylvania, owned
300 acres of coal lan d s in Connellsville, a n area known for the high
quality of its coal an d its suitability for m aking pig iron used in steel
production. Frick also held fifty of the four hundred total coking ovens
in the Connellsville area and, in addition, becam e heavily involved in
the M ount Pleasant an d Broad Fork Railroad. By 1872, Frick owned
200 coke ovens (Hogan 1971, p 243) and so had become established
a s a leader in the mining, processing, an d tran sp o rtatio n of coke. In
1882, th e Carnegie Com pany acquired a m inority in te re st in th e Frick
Company, which by th a t time owned 3,000 acres of coal lan d s (Hacker
p u ts the num ber a t 5,000 acres) and 1,026 ovens producing 6,000
to n s of coke per day (Hogan 1971, p. 244; an d H acker 1968, p. 346).
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rails to Pennsylvania Railroad, Pittsburgh Bessem er's orders for steel
were cu t off and the new com pany set o u t to break its dependence on
Carnegie once an d for all by moving into basic steel production Itself
(Hogan 1971, p. 244; Temin 1964, pp. 179-180; Brooks 1940, p. 23;
a n d Bridge 1903, p. 151).
In 1880, Andrew Kloman of Superior Mill began construction of
a basic steel producing facility a t Homestead. At th e sam e time the
P ittsburgh Bessem er Steel Company began construction of a plant
adjacent to Kloman's which w as completed In 1881 (Hogan 1971, p.
244). Upon his death, the Kloman works were immediately bought
and subsequently p u t into operation by Pittsburgh Bessem er (Bridge
1903, p. 152). It w as these facilities a t Homestead w hich were later
to fall into Carnegie's hands.
Soon, the p lan t a t Homestead would prove a competitive th reat
to th e Edgar Thom son Works (Hogan 1971, p. 245, an d Temin 1964,
p. 180). Bridge (1903, p. 245) com m ented that.
Councils of w ar were held once more on Braddock's Field;12 for
it looked a s if th e prosperity which h ad hung so lovingly over the
Edgar Thom pson works h ad now crossed the river and alighted
upon the rival enterprise a t Homestead.
B ut, perhaps fortunately for Carnegie, Pittsburgh Bessem er's opera
tions a t Homestead were, in Hogan's (1971, p. 245) term s, "beset with
labor troubles," w hich in the end contributed to the passage of the
H om estead W orks to Carnegie.

12 The reference, apparently, is to G eneral Braddock's defeat in th e
first battle of the F rench and Indian W ar In 1755. The w ilderness
conflict w as fought in w h at was th e n Pennsylvania's w estern frontier.
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It is generally recognized, w ith varying degrees of em phasis on
the Issue, th a t th e failure of th e Homestead W orks under th e com
m and of Pittsburgh Bessem er an d its eventual acquisition by Carnegie
Company w as an outcome of th e sta te of labor relations w hich
predom inated at th e plant. It Is held th a t th e downfall of Pittsburgh
Bessem er coincided w ith a strike against the ow nership of th e com
pany u p o n the opening of the Homestead Works in 1882 over th e issue
of unionization (Temin 1964, pp. 180-181; Hogan 1971, p. 245;
Bridge 1903, p. 153-154; Fitch 1911, pp. 108-109; C asson 1907, p.
I l l ; an d Hendrick 1932, p. 301).
The accounts of the acquisition of the Hom estead W orks by
Carnegie Company suggest th a t th e issue of labor relations between a
firm an d workforce en ters into th e process of capitalist competition.
Temin (1964, p. 180-181) correctly places labor difficulties a t Home
stead along with the relation of Pittsburgh B essem er to other steel
producers in explaining the failure of the company. First, Pittsburgh
Bessem er w as excluded from participation in th e Bessem er Associa
tion, a n affiliation of rail producing com panies w hich consciously
attem pted to restrict th e growth of com petitors (Temin 1964, p.
179). Carnegie's refusal to fill th e orders of P ittsburgh Bessem er from
the Edgar Thomson W orks was a n aspect of th is relationship.
Secondly, the antagonistic relationship betw een Pittsburgh
Bessem er an d the Bessem er Association made it difficult for th e new
company to acquire p aten ts and so w as forced into using a less effi
cient and costlier steel making process which placed it a t a disadvan
tage in relation to Its competitors. Temin (1964, p. 181) arg u es th a t
these factors, the exclusion of Pittsburgh B essem er from th e Associa
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tion an d p aten t restrictions acco u n t m ost strongly for the downfall of
the com pany. He therefore de-em phasizes th e im portance of labor
relations an d em phasizes instead factors associated with capitalist
com petition. Hogan (1971, p. 245), relying o n Bridge's (1903) ac
count, attrib u tes th e failure of Pittsburgh B essem er alm ost exclusively
to the volatile n atu re of the relationship betw een th e com pany and its
workforce. However, relations betw een labor a n d capital an d capital
ists w ith each other can n o t properly be considered two sep arate areas
of concern. If the labor situation a t Homestead in 1882 is considered
in relation to th a t a t Carnegie's Edgar Thom son Works and Carnegie's
own reflections on th e labor issu e in the years before the Homestead
Strike of 1892, th en it is apparent th a t the issu e of labor relations it
self en ters into the cycle of capitalist com petition as does, therefore,
the issu e of idled p lan ts. When one firm h as established an d m ain
tained stab le labor relations relative to other firm s, then th e first is in
a competitively advantageous position. In th is process, factory closure
is an asp ect of labor control.
Of greatest consideration h ere are the openly anti-union policies
of P ittsburgh Bessem er Steel Com pany which Bridge (1903, p. 153)
describes a s "unreasonable and arbitrary" and "ever tending to open
conflict w ith the w orkm en.” Upon opening th e Homestead Works,
P ittsburgh Bessem er ordered its w orkers to sign contracts w herein
they w ould agree to have no associations with labor organizations
(Hogan 1971, p. 245; an d Pitch 1911, p. 109). According to Bridge's
(1903, p. 154) account:
M ost of the m en were m em bers of the Amalgamated Association
of Iron and Steel Workers; an d on the 1st of Jan u ary , 1882,
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these refused to sign the agreement, and were locked out. After
the w orks had been Idle a week, th e company gave notice th a t
the m en could not re tu rn to work, even if they signed the
agreem ent, unless they would accept a reduction of wages. This
intensified the bitterness of the workmen; and th e Amalgamated
Association took cognizance of the d isp u te.13
Nearby stood the Edgar Thomson W orks which w as started u p
non-union in 1875. However, in 1882, unionization becam e a n issue
there as well b u t Carnegie offered no resistance to th e establishm ent
of Amalgamated Association lodges in th e se works, referring to the
Union as a "fair and reasonable body," an d "union activity in Braddock
...was never of a sort to alarm employers" (Fitch 1911, pp. 88-89 and
111). At th e Homestead W orks of Pittsburgh Bessemer, th e lockout,
along with w ork stoppages orchestrated by th e union, an d other
m anifestations of labor-m anagem ent conflict interrupted production
through Jan u ary , February, and m ost of M arch of th a t year (Fitch 1911,
p. 109, and Bridge 1903, p. 154). In a climate of falling prices and
profits in steel production, th e stockholders of P ittsburgh Bessem er
Steel w anted o u t of Homestead.
Carnegie seized the opportunity to acquire a m odem plant a t low
cost and a t th e sam e time eliminate an im portant rival from the field.
In 1883, the Pittsburgh B essem er Steel Com pany w as consolidated
w ith the Carnegie Company an d its Homestead works tak en over in
th e process (Hogan 1971, p. 245; Hacker 1968, p. 346; an d Fitch
1911, p. 88-89). "The price paid was th e cost of th e p lan t, with
reasonable allowance for increased land values" (Bridge 1903, p. 159).
13 Because Pittsburgh B essem er could n o t economize technically, as an
outcom e of its p aten t problem s and its relation to the B essem er Asso
ciation, the staunchly anti-union stance of the firm an d its attem pt to
economize on wages logically follows.
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When Carnegie took control of th e plant, It w as tak en o u t of rail pro
duction, converted to th e production of stru ctu ra l shapes, and reno
vated to include those things th a t p aten t restrictions had prevented
Pittsburgh Bessem er from building into the plant. In th e process, the
H om estead works were idled by Carnegie Company for several years
until th e se changes w ere completed (Temin 1964, p. 181; and Wolff
1965, p. 58).
T his history of labor conflict a t Homestead, w hich led u p to Car
negie’s tak in g control of the Homestead works, clarifies Carnegie’s
favorable, pre-1892 view of labor an d the right of w orkers to organize
to which we alluded in the previous chapter. In his F orum article of
1886, Carnegie states, "A strike or a lockout is, in itself, a ridiculous
affair" (Carnegie 1886, p. 115) and th a t the right to organize is a basic
right w hich employers m u st concede to employees, b u t, for labor’s
part.
It is n o t the intelligent workm an, who knows th a t labor w ithout
h is b rother capital is helpless, b u t the b la tan t ignorant m an, who
regards capital a s the n atu ral enemy of labor, who does so m uch
to em bitter the relations betw een employer an d employed; and
th e power of th is ignorant demagogue arises chiefly from lack of
p ro p er organization among th e m en through w hich their real
voice can be expressed (Carnegie 1886, p. 119).
For Carnegie, this "real voice” is th a t of a labor force organized in a
climate w here employers recognize w orkers' rights to organize. It is a
voice of reason, where th e laborer "will be found m u ch readier to
accept red u ced com pensation w hen b u sin ess is depressed" (Carnegie
1886, p. 119).
As long as the rivals of the Steel Company were "beset with labor
difficulties," Carnegie’s stated philosophy would be one of enlightened
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partnership w ith regard to labor relations. B ut, as w as seen in the
discussion of the Hom estead Strikes of 1888 an d 1892, w hen com
petitors were sufficiently absorbed by the Steel Company to perm it
m ulti-plant operations w ith advancing m echanization of production
underm ining the political influence of craft-based labor power,
Carnegie tu rn ed from su ch lofty ideas. This is app aren t in the Steel
Com pany's clearly anti-union position of the late nineteenth century.
In fact, unionization a t the Edgar Thom son Works w as quite
short lived and in 1884, it w as announced th a t the works would be
closed indefinitely while new m achinery was being installed in the
factory a t Braddock. This would p u t 1,600 w orkers out of work until
the mill reopened and perm anently do away w ith 300 jo b s (Fitch
1911, pp. 112-113; and Brody 1960, p. 51). Concerning these events,
Fitch (1911, p. 113) observed:
The com pany seemed to be in no h u rry to sta rt the mill.
Andrew Carnegie, in a n interview, said th a t the w orkm en were
to blam e for the suspension. "They allow other Bessem er mills
to work a t less wages th a n we pay." He referred to a mill In
H arrisburg which w as selling rails a t $27. "We cannot do it, and
m u st close rath er th a n sell rails a t less th a n cost....I do not know
w hen they (Braddock and Homestead] will be started, b u t not
un til th e rail m arket improves an d we ca n sell at a profit, or
until the Amalgamated Association gains control of th e other
mills in th e country an d m akes better w ages in those
establishm ents."
Fearing discharge, m any of the w orkers left th e Amalgamated Associa
tion an d w hen th e Edgar Thomson W orks were finally reopened in
1885, th e y ear before Carnegie's article appeared in F orum , it started
up w ith reduced labor force, a t up to fifty percent reduction in wages,
and w ith its two lodges of th e Amalgamated Association disbanded
(Fitch 1911, pp. 113-114).
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T hreatened and ac tu al closure of factories places w orkers In
com petition w ith each other and w ith workers a t other locations over
w ages and jo b s. This situation can be ideologically deflected against
dem ands im posed by th e cu rren t conditions of com petition between
capitalists (cf. Slaughter 1983, p. 41).

The shutdow n of th e Edgar

Thom son W orks is an example of th e place of factory closures within
th e process of job destruction and its im pact on the political standing
of labor unions.
In 1886, the sam e group of investors w hich organized Pittsburgh
Bessem er also organized the D uquesne Steel Company, since by then
th e patents w hich they h ad originally been denied, had ru n o u t (Temin
1964, p. 182). This company, later known as Allegheny Bessem er
Steel, was organized for reasons sim ilar to th o se w hich lead to the
original form ation of Pittsburgh Bessemer. This time, the com pany
w as excluded from m em bership in th e rail pool, th e first one of which
w as established in 1887 and of which Carnegie Company w as a leading
m em ber (Warren 1973, p. 96). Allegheny B essem er also failed and
eventually would be purchased by Carnegie Com pany for sim ilar
reason s (Bridge 1903, p. 175).
When Allegheny B essem er Steel w ent into operation in 1889, it
posed an im m ediate th re a t to the competitive position of th e Carnegie
Steel Company and the Edgar Thomson Works because of its Innova
tive rail-m aking process w ith which it could undersell the w orks at
Braddock (Wolff 1965, pp. 58-59). It is described by Hogan (1971, pp.
246):
In place of reducing the steel ingot to a bloom and th e n reheat
ing it before it w as rolled down to rail, th e new com pany rolled
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rails directly from ingot w ithout th e Interm ediate process
employed by Carnegie an d other rail m akers...and as a conse
quence, rails could b e sold cheaper th an th o se made by th e
conventional method.
In response, Carnegie issued statem ents to railroad com panies voicing
concern over th e dangers of w h at he called the "direct rolling
process," claim ing th a t it produced inferior rails a n d would lead to a
greater num ber of train derailm ents. Railroads were fairly successfully
persuaded against the p u rchase of D uquesne rails (Hogan 1971, p.
246; Hacker 1968, p. 350; Temin 1964, p. 182; Wolff 1965, p. 58;
and Bridge 1903, pp. 176-177).14
Poor sales combined w ith labor difficulties for th e m anagem ent
of th e D uquesne works eventually led to the sale of th e com pany to
Carnegie Steel for a very favorable price. When Carnegie acquired
D uquesne Steel, direct rolling was adopted In all of h is rail producing
facilities—th a t is, Carnegie adopted w hat he had publlcally objected to
before the acquisition of the D uquesne works. Eventually, direct roll
ing becam e a n Industrywide practice (Bridge 1903, p. 176). The p u r
chase of D uquesne In 1890 left the Carnegie Steel Com pany w ithout a
rail com petitor in its territory, and the D uquesne W orks were r u n by
Carnegie w ith great success (Hogan 1971, p. 247; a n d Bridge 1903, p.
179).
The D uquesne Works w ere bought th e year following the first
round of labor disputes at Homestead In 1889. It rem ained a non14 Cotter (1916, p. 6) noted, w ith the nostalgia one feels for the days of
piracy on th e high seas, "In th e fierce a n d bitter struggle th a t w as the
steel trade, only the m ost daring or the m ost un scru p u lo u s m an u 
facturer could survive...." T his episode also calls into question Tem ln’s
(1964, p. 182) conclusion th a t the story of Pittsburgh Bessem er
dem onstrates th e Importance of "exclusive patent ownership."
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union shop and Its addition gave th e Carnegie Com pany a m ulti-plant
organization large enough to contribute to th e resolution of the Home
stead Strike of 1892 in its favor an d w hich banished organized labor
from basic steel production.
Carnegie Steel Company. Illinois Steel, and M organ's Federal
Steel Company: Idled P lants and Interregional Com petition
The first large consolidation in th e steel in d u stry took place in
May of 1889 with th e formation of th e Illinois Steel Company. Illinois
Steel w as a merger of Chicago area steel com panies formed in re 
sponse to Carnegie's integrated operation and monopolistic domi
nance of Pittsburgh w hich was seen as powerful enough to potentially
"disrupt th e m arket th ro u g h independent action" (Temin 1964, p.
191). This holding com pany consolidated North Chicago Rolling Mill
Company, Union Steel Company, an d Joliet Steel Com pany (Temin
1964, p. 191; and Hogan 1971, pp. 239-240). The consolidation of
these three previously Independent an d com peting concerns gave
Illinois Steel an im portant m easure of horizontal control over basic
steel production, access to the expanding w estern m arket, and w ith
its vertical command over coal and coke lands th e com pany dom inated
the steel industry in th e Chicago area. The Illinois Steel Company
coordinated the operation of five p lan ts (Hogan 1971, p. 240)
Including:
• North W orks a t Chicago (established 1857);
• South W orks at Chicago (established 1880);
• Milwaukee Works a t Milwaukee (established 1868);
• Joliet W orks a t Joliet, Illinois (established 1868); and
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• Union W orks a t Chicago (established 1863).
The size of th e firm Is indicated by th e combined properties of th e se
plants, w hich included 14 blast furnaces, one iron rolling mill, four
Bessemer steel plants a n d mills w hich produced rails, beams, m er
chant iron an d steel, n ails and iron rods. This gave th e Illinois Steel
Company a capacity of 975,000 tons a n d it employed 10,000 w orkers,
putting th e firm, in term s of size and capacity, on a n equal footing
with Carnegie Company.
In 1892, the Illinois Steel Com pany underw ent a massive "mod
ernization" of its plant, including the addition of plate and stru ctu ra l
steel mill capacity. On th e first of J u ly of the sam e y ear—the day th e
Homestead Strike began—Carnegie Steel Company underw ent a m ajor
reorganization and w as transform ed in to a holding company. Carnegie
Steel Company, Ltd., w hich consolidated all of the Carnegie in terests
under one centralized organizational framework. Bridge (1903, p.
254), w ith o u t clarification, notes as "som ething m ore th a n a coinci
dence" th a t th is reorganization went in to effect on th e first day of th e
strike. However, it is ap p aren t th a t th e reorganization of the firm an d
the conversion of the workforce from a craft based to a n industrial one
were com plem entary a sp e c ts of the p ro cess in w hich Carnegie Com
pany w as expanding th e scale of its production, and, a s stated by one
of Carnegie's partners, "The Amalgamated placed a ta x on improve
ments. therefore the Amalgamated h a d to go (Brody 1960, p. 54; Wolff
1965, p. 82; Brecher 1972, p. 54; an d cf. Brody 1980, pp. 7-9).
Having established control over steel production in Pittsburgh,
Carnegie w as preparing to take Horace Greely's advice an d "Go West!,"
thereby challenging Illinois Steel's com m and of Chicago.
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Carnegie's challenge to th e w est began in 1893, a y ear of
depression in the steel industry. Carnegie Com pany w as n o t affected,
however, to th e extent th a t other producers were. Nationally, rail
production w as down 26.7 percent. Carnegie's Edgar Thom son Works
suffered only a 20.3 percent decline, b u t in Illinois, o u tp u t w as down
48.3 percent and,
...there were tim es w hen every mill in th e Chicago a re a was idle.
Union rail mill did n o t work a t all th a t year. North W orks was
laid off during the la st half, Jo liet ran for only six w eeks, and the
S outh Chicago W orks...operated for only eight and a h alf m onths
(W arren 1972, pp. 96-97).
Throughout the m id-1890s, th is situation continued for Illinois Steel
an d the w ith it, the Chicago m arket w as open to Carnegie Steel
Company.
Having achieved production co st lower th a n any o th er producer
could m atch, Carnegie left the rail pool and it subsequently collapsed
(Jones 1926, p. 9; Brody 1960, p. 6; C arr and Taplin 1962, p. 171;
and W arren 1972, p. 96).15 From 1892 to ab o u t 1896, Carnegie Com
pany w as engaged in an acquisition drive directed a t improving its
level of vertical com m and over processes and expanding Its sphere of
influence into w estern m arkets. Carnegie acquired railroads, steam 
ship lines, an d five-sixths of the stock of Oliver Mining Company
which gave him access to G reat Lakes Iron ore fields and tran sp o rta
tion (Hacker 1968, p. 351; and Hogan 1971, pp. 248-249), directly
challenging access of w estern producers to th ese resources.

15 Although the rail pool w as re-established before the end of 1893, it
w as never again effective (Warren 1972, p. 97).
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The Carnegie Company's m ost im portant association w as estab 
lished in 1896 when the firm entered a lease agreem ent w ith Lake
Superior Consolidated Iron Mines (LSCIM), a n iron ore m ining and
tran sp o rtatio n concern owned prim arily by Rockefeller S tandard Oil
interests. The agreem ent w as Im portant to b o th Carnegie and
Rockefeller concerns, b u t especially gave the form er access to vital
supplies of high grade Lake Superior iron ore. since in addition to its
ore docks a t A shtabula, Ohio, LSCIM held in terests in eleven mining
com panies in th e Mesabe region of Lake Superior. Through the verti
cal merger of ore and coal mining an d processing concerns, direct
control over tran sp o rtatio n concerns, and the association w ith Rocke
feller, Carnegie Company becam e th e largest single u n it in the steel
Industry (Hogan 1971, pp. 253-254) and could compete directly w ith
w estern m anufacturers over inputs necessary for steel production
(Warren 1971, p. 104). i 6
In spite of an agreem ent between Carnegie Company and Illinois
Steel to the effect th a t Carnegie would limit itself to its eastern
m arket, com petition was carried into th e territory of Chicago mills
(Brody 1960, p. 7; and W arren 1972, p. 99). A price w ar ensued In
earnest. W arren (1972, pp. 99-100) describes events of 1897:
Illinois rail production was 40.1 per cent u p on 1896 b u t th a t of
Allegheny County [Pennsylvania, where Carnegie's mills were
located] w ent up by 76.3 per cent. Connecting through to the
16 Carnegie Company's advantage in th is area w as such th a t freight
costs of ore an d coke to P ittsburgh am ounted to $3.65 p er ton of pig
iron, while shipm ent of th ese things to Chicago am ounted to $3.79
p er ton of pig iron. Contributing to Carnegie's favorable position was
the relationship w ith H.C. Frick Coke Company w hich allowed the
Steel Company to circum vent the open m arket (Warren 1972, p. 104).
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lakes by th e B essem er and Lake Erie Railroad, Carnegie could
deliver cheaply in the north-w est w hen th e Great Lakes naviga
tion w as open, an d in the south-w est w hen the Ohio w as high.
However, it sold m ostly east of Indiana. Illinois Steel a t this
tim e m arketed 95 p er cent or more of its product w est of this
Une, according to a later estim ate of E.H. Gary. He also reck
oned th a t it could n o t compete with Carnegie more th a n 100
miles east of its mills, if as far as that. Some Carnegie rails were
sold in Chicago for $18 a ton, below th e price w hich Illinois
Steel could m eet if proper accounting practices w ere followed,
while Carnegie claimed th a t it m ade a profit a t $16 a ton. Gary
reckoned th a t if th ese conditions had continued Illinois would
have been driven o u t of business, and recalled th a t only very
narrow ly did it escape receivership, th e papers indeed having
been draw n up.
The response to Carnegie's incursion into th e rail m arket of Chicago
w as the formation, w ith th e financial backing of J.P . Morgan, of the
Federal Steel Company In 1898 (Warren 1972, p. 106).
Federal Steel w as one of the allied holding com panies of the
Morgan group which in addition to Federal included Am erican Bridge
Company an d National Tube Company. Federal Steel was a m erger of
six com panies, the m ost im portant of which w as the Illinois Steel
Com pany (Hacker 1968, p. 396). E lbert Gary viewed the m erger as
necessary In order to Improve the competitive position of Illinois Steel
in relation to Carnegie since it would allow m u ch more integrated
operation by combining basic steel production w ith control over
sources of raw m aterials. The formation of Federal Steel a n d Its
enhanced perform ance a s a n outcome of integrated operation led to
som ething of a "stalemate" in the w est. Although Federal Steel did not
outsell Carnegie Company, it did lead to an agreem ent where, "Federal
should have h alf the rail orders they [the two companies] w ere jointly
able to secure." The m ore equal competitive footing of Federal, by

175

virtue of its more integrated operation, led to the establishm ent of a
tem porary truce betw een the two steel tru sts.
Federal Steel w as sim ilar to Carnegie Steel since b oth were con
cerned w ith the production of basic steel goods for sale to producers
of finished products. Unlike Carnegie Com pany which h ad production
concentrated in Pittsburgh, Federal Steel’s facilities w ere more geo
graphically dispersed. Illinois Steel h ad operations in Chicago,
Milwaukee, and Joliet. Lorain Steel's plant was located a t Lorain, Ohio.
Jo h n so n Company's plant was a t Johnstow n, Pennsylvania. Besides
these producers of basic and semi-flnished products, Federal held iron
ore properties, railroads, and steam ship an d barge lines (Hogan 1971,
pp. 265-267; and C otter 1916, pp. 21-22). So, the com pany was, like
Carnegie Company, integrated vertically from raw m aterial acquisition,
processing, and transportation to basic steel production. The m ajor
difference between Carnegie Com pany and th e Morgan Group of steel
concerns w as th a t Morgan began to organize vertically beyond basic
steel, by establishing the American Bridge Company an d National Tube
Company. While Carnegie's organization relied on supplying steel
fabricators with basic and semi-flnished steel, these holding
com panies of the Morgan Group were directly involved in finished
steel production an d gave Morgan a more diversified operation.
Even though th is was the case, locational difficulties prevented
American Bridge an d National Tube, for th e time being, from direct
integration into the sam e company, and while these th ree companies
were affiliated through Morgan banking connections, th ey rem ained
nominally separate holding com panies. Federal Steel w as located
more w esterly and its p lan ts were som ew hat geographically scattered.
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m aking it difficult for the basic steel producer to supply its other
com panies. For example, th e plants of American Bridge Company
were located m ostly in th e e a st leaving it dependent on eastern
producers, forem ost among w hich was th e Carnegie Steel Company.
T he sam e w as tru e for N ational Tube Company, where th e location of
its mills m ade it difficult for the com pany to receive its supply from
Federal Steel.
In this case, though, th e response of th e com pany w as to begin
to bring National Tube into production of its own "skelp" or semi
finished steel u sed in tube making.

From the beginning, National

Tube had capacity a t m any of its facilities for full, vertically integrated
production, from ore processing to finished products.
The M organ syndicate b u ilt National Tube Company around th e
National Tube W orks Com pany which it merged with twelve of the
nation's other steel tube concerns. National Tube Works Company w as
itself established by Flagler B rothers Com pany of Boston, founded in
1869 for production of boiler tube. As the dem and for products to
supply the oil industry increased, the com pany decided in 1872 to
constru ct a new plant more centrally located in relation to iron ore,
coal, and oil districts. The National Tube Works Com pany was then
located at McKeesport, Pennsylvania. With the establishm ent of
National Tube Works, "the B oston plant continued to operate on a p a r
tial basis, b u t a s more sections of the new p lan t were opened equiva
le n t facilities a t Boston were closed" (Hogan 1971, p. 275). National
Tube Works of th e National Tube Company w as, therefore, originally
created through th e "systematic disinvestm ent"--to use Bluestone and
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H arrison's (1982, p. 6) terminology--and eventual shutdow n of th e
w orks of Flagler Brothers.
National Tube was one of the largest tube concerns In the entire
world, controlling 75 percent of the n atio n 's welded tu b e capacity. Its
organization of alm ost h alf of the nation's previously competing tu b e
co n c ern s,17 along with its integrated operations, denied Carnegie of an
im portant m arket in supplying this area of finished steel production
(Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 185; and Hogan 1971, pp . 272-279) even
though m ost of National T ube's facilities, including th e National Tube
W orks, were located in th e Pittsburgh d istrict (Cotter 1916, p. 24).
So, w hile Carnegie continued to have access to Chicago, Federal Steel,
like Illinois Steel, continued to face problem s supplying the eastern
m ark et and even many of its related steel fabrication concerns like
those of the American Bridge Company. However, th e Morgan Group
w as able to some extent lim it Carnegie Com pany's free rein in P itts
b u rg h by gaining control over a network of steel tu b e factories in th a t
area, through National Tube Company, w hich could provide their own
17 M ost of these com panies in 1889 were supplying S tandard Oil,
w hich w as the largest single purchaser of pipe and tu b e products.
W ith th e form ation of National Tube Company, M organ controlled m ost
of dom estic production and a large share of die foreign market.
W endt and Kogan (1948, p. 185) p u t N ational Tube's com m and over
production of "the country's iron piping an d tubing" a t 85 percent. In
any case, Hogan (1971 p. 279) states.
The new com pany...supplied pipe for th e oil fields of Russia,
Bulgaria, Java, and C anada; irrigation pipe for A ustralia and South
Africa; an d hydraulic equipm ent for m ines and industrial w orks
th roughout the world.
We ca n conclude th a t the com pany’s control over tu b e production w as
indeed significant. W hether it was seventy-five or eighty-five percent
is really not crucial.
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in p u t of basic steel. At le a st with regard to th e specific example of
N ational Tube Works, th e creation of a vertically integrated organiza
tion w as established th ro u g h a process synonym ous w ith deindustriali
zation. This w as also tru e, as will be seen in other, larger contexts
illustrated in th e late nineteenth an d early tw entieth century histories
of th e Moore G roup of steel com panies, American Steel a n d Wire
Company, and Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company.
Abandoned Plants. Dism antled Facilities, and Capital
Flight In International a n d Domestic Competition
W hat w as tru e of M organ's National Tube Company w as also in
dicative of general developmental tren d s in the American steel in d u s
try of the late nineteenth an d early tw entieth centuries. Specifically,
organization of production vertically, especially in the area of steel fab
rication, becam e a way for com panies to loosen dependence on other
steel producers. Also, the building of horizontal organization, through
acquisition an d a t times shutdow n of competing plants, established
com m and of firm s over specific areas of production. Not th e least
exem plaiy of th ese trends w as the history of th e third largest of the
nineteenth century corporate actors in the steel industry, namely, the
com bined concerns of th e Moore G roup of steel com panies.
The Moore steel concerns included, sim ilar to the M organ
Group, nom inally independent holding companies: American Tin
Plate Company, American Steel Hoop Company, American Sheet Steel
Company, and National Steel Company. All of th e se were incorporated
betw een 1898 an d 1899, a n d all incorporated previously competing
firm s in their respective a re a s of production In order to "limit bitter
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and destructive competition" (Hogan 1971, p. 292) a n d unstable
prices connected w ith su ch volatile competitive conditions. Unlike
M organ's Federal, National Steel Company, a producer of basic steel,
was th e la st of th e Moore concerns to be established, and Tin Plate,
Steel Hoop, and Sheet Steel com panies provided N ational with exclu
sive m arkets bringing basic steel production together with production
of finished goods. National Steel w as established for the purpose of
releasing all of th e Moore com panies from dependence on b oth
Carnegie and Federal for in p u ts of semi-flnished steel (Cotter 1916, p.
23; Knox 1944, p. 25; W endt an d Kogan 1948, p. 185; and Hogan
1971, pp. 287-89 an d 292}.
National Steel, in com parison to Carnegie Company and Federal
Steel, h a d a fairly geographically centralized position. Its 18 b la st fur
naces, six steel works, and rolling mills were located prim arily in Ohio
(Columbus, Youngstown, Bellalre, and Bridgeport) an d Pennsylvania,
w est of Pittsburgh (Sharon an d New Castle). While n o t as geographic
ally concentrated a s Carnegie Steel, N ational did n o t face the location
al difficulties of Federal Steel. In fact, th e com pany becam e less geo
graphically dispersed when its Zanesville, Ohio, b last furnace closed In
1900 an d as its Colum bus Works of Uniontown, Pennsylvania, w as
gradually dism antled from 1899 to 1901 an d p arts of the plant were
shipped to and used in other National Steel factories a t other locations
(Hogan 1971, pp. 287-88). This took place in a m an n er sim ilar to th at
of N ational Tube Works. Also, like Carnegie and Federal, National
Steel w as a well integrated basic steel producer w hich h ad am ong its
holdings complete an d partial interests in railroads, tran sp o rtatio n
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com panies, ore docks. Iron and coal mining concerns, an d coke
com panies (Cotter 1916, p. 23; an d Hogan 1971, pp. 288-289).
The organization of National Steel Company gave each of the
o th er Moore companies, all of w hich m ade finished steel products, a
secure source of semi-flnished steel free of outside control over its
in p u ts. However, each o f th e Moore com panies sh ared sim ilarities
w ith Morgan's National T ube Company Insofar a s each independently
h a d some control over all aspects of th eir respective areas of produc
tion. For example, typical of the Moore Group, American Steel Hoop
Com pany w as horizontally well integrated since th is holding company
b ro u g h t together nine previously com peting firm s and operated a total
of 15 plants. In addition, Steel Hoop established vertical control over
railroads, ore an d lim estone properties, and a dock company. It also
owned sh ares of five so u th e rn "ginneries" which were chief consum ers
of its cotton ties (Cotter 1916, p. 23; an d Hogan 1971, pp. 296-299).
Another holding com pany w ithin the Moore Group, American
S heet Steel, brought together 30 com panies an d operated 164 sheet
mills located primarily in Ohio and Pennsylvania w ithin reach of
National Steel. In addition, American Sheet Steel operated a handful
of basic steel m aking facilities and tw enty coal m ining properties.

It

also held all of the outstanding stock issu e of McKeesport Terminal
Railroad Company, Versailles Fuel G as Company (27 gas wells), and
Apollo Gas Com pany (110 gas wells). It also owned p art of th e stock of
M anufacturers' Gas and Oil Company (Indiana well sites and gas and oil
fields) in partnership w ith Republic Iro n and Steel Com pany an d Con
sum er's Paper Company (Cotter 1916, pp. 23-24; an d Hogan 1971, pp.
292-296). S h eet Steel com manded 7 0 percent of th e n atio n 's sheet
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steel capacity by 1900, and, like th ese other tru s ts , came to dom inate
its respective area of production w ithin the n ational arena (Hogan
1971, pp. 295-296 and p assim : Knox 1944, p. 22; Boore 1951, pp.
60-61; and Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 149).
But, th e m ost im portant of the Moore G roup of com panies w as
American Tin Plate, by virtue of its size as well as the developmental
processes illustrative of its growth. The rise of th e American tin plate
industry an d th a t of American Tin Plate Company in particular raises
issu es concerning the international an d domestic aspects of factory
closures. C urrent sociological treatm ents of factory closures w hich
discuss su ch events in term s of the deindustrialization process,
especially concerning th e United S tates, em phasize the dism antling of
industry as capital leaves th e country for foreign shores. In th e 1890s
and In the example of the American tin plate industry, we see how
industrial growth and monopolization in the United States w as accom
panied by a parallel decline In tin plate plate production in G reat
B ritain and the flight of capital from Wales to th is nation. The dein
dustrialization of Wales, w ith respect to its tin p late industry, w as a
precondition for the industrialization of the United States, w ith
respect to its tin plate industry. Yet, th e formation of the American
ind u stry w as itself accompanied by th e closure of American mills. This
illustrates th e proposition th a t factory closures are p a rt of th e cycle of
deindustrialization and of industrialization as well.
Tin plate production in America h ad been taking place since the
end of the 1850s. However, producers were u n ab le to m eet w ith
m uch success since tin plate production was a m u ch costlier en ter
prise th a n it w as In Wales. The industrialization of England prior to
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1875 produced a vast em pire and a n advanced technology. At th e
h eart of B ritish Industrial capitalism w as Wales, along with the o th er
regions of th e "Celtic fringe.” Wales w as known a s a coal, iron, an d ,
particularly, as a tin plate producing region after its progressive co n 
version to a n "industrial enclave" of th e British E m pire (Khleif 1975,
pp. 15 an d 23; Hechter 1975, pp. 143-150; and cf. Pounds 1959, p.
82 and Khleif 1980). Until about 1890, m ost tin p late was therefore
imported from Welsh factories w hich needed the U nited States
m arket for about 70 p ercen t of its total production (Knox 1944, p. 10;
and C arr an d Taplin 1962, p. 121). Prior to 1890, th ere were two
"waves" of American tin plate production. In 1872, tin plate w as first
produced In th e United S tates in com mercial q u an tities "in
anticipation of a tariff initiated in 1875" (Hogan 1971, p. 348).
By 1876, success of Welsh producers in lowering the price of tin
plate forced American tin plate factories to close. American p ro d u c
tion resum ed only after Welsh prices rose in the 1880s, b u t Am erican
factories w ere sh u t down shortly thereafter when W elsh prices fell
once again. The advantage of Welsh in d u stry rested n o t only on te c h 
nical econom y of B ritish industry established in th e mid-1800s b u t
also on th e low price a t w hich labor could be procured owing to its
colonial relationship w ith Great B ritain (cf. H echter 1975). With
Welsh access to the American m arket, American producers, in com 
petition w ith cheaper im ports, were su b je ct to periodic crises a n d
closure of factories. S u ch closures of American mills can be accounted
for with reference to th e sam e dynam ics which led to the closure o f
Chicago are a mills in th e face of "foreign competition" and cheaper
"foreign im ports" from Carnegie's Pittsburgh, discussed above. In th is
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way. international capitalist com petition is another form of in te r
regional capitalist competition b u t one w hich tak es place across
n ational boundaries, i.e., its extra-state expression (cf. Smith 1981, p.
229). Relevant to th is process of periodic plant closure, Mandel
(1972, p. 121) explained th a t th e dynam ics of capitalist com petition
lead to a "self-reproducing increase in capital being laid idle" a s th e
struggle for control over m ark ets lead to their relative contraction.
Also, Davis (1933, p. 115) observed th a t th is process implies th e
necessity of "periodic shut-dow ns during w hich a large p art of
accum ulated capital is w asted and rendered valueless."
One im portant lesson of th is period in the h isto ry of American
tin plate m anufacture is th a t "protectionism" m eans am ong other
th in g s not m erely protection from inexpensive foreign goods, b u t,
m ore fundam entally, protection of a faction of a dom estic capitalist
class from th a t of a foreign capitalist class which is in a position to
m ore easily exploit its labor. Again, referring to th e Carnegie example,
relation s between capital an d labor forces enters into th e cycle of
cap italist com petition. In 1890, the year th e McKinley Tariff w en t
into effect, this statem ent appeared in a n editorial of th e B ulletin of
th e American Iron an d Steel Association a s p art of th e campaign for
th e tariff. It is quoted in Hogan's (1971, p . 349) account.
...It is ag ain st the cheap h an d labor of Wales, therefore, as well as
against the cheap labor employed in producing iron and steel
sheets, th a t American capital and labor need to be protected if
we would build up an American tinplate industry. How cheaply
han d labor in Wales m ay be obtained can easily be inferred from
th e frank adm ission by th e London Iron and Steel Trades J o u r 
n al for April 12, 1880. T h at paper th e n said: 'T he great o b 
stacle to tin p late m aking on a large scale in th e S tates is th e
entire absence of CHEAP FEMALE LABOR, so necessary in th e
industry, a n d so ab u n d an t in Wales, b u t if the enorm ous d u ty of
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12s. a box [12s. per h u n d red pounds] Is adopted possibly the
labor difficulty m ay be got over."
In th is statem ent. American producers recognized the ability of
foreign capitalists to m ore effectively exploit labor, an d this, th ey
fu rth e r recognized, placed them a t a competitive disadvantage. The
implication here is th a t a tariff could counteract th e lack of American
producers of access to cheap, i.e., female and Welsh, labor. The state
stepped in, lending political support to the expansion of capital—as it
h ad in the post-Civil W ar establishm ent of th e Morrill Tariff w hich
aided producers of basic steel.
The establishm ent of the McKinley Tariff in 1890 brought
American m anufacturers back into tin plate production and created
severe com petition in th e domestic m arket since mills th a t h ad been
idled before th e institution of the tariff were brought b ack into
production an d new mills were being b u ilt.18 W ith passage of th e
McKinley Tariff in 1890,19
18 Knox (1944, p. 13) states:
It was w ith pride an d satisfaction th a t the com m unity of
Demmler, Pa., saw its mill, th e United S tates Iron & Tin Plate
M anufacturing Company, industriously s ta rt producing tin plate
in 1890, undoubtedly w ith som e of the equipm ent w hich it had
been forced to s h u t down 13 years before.
19 The protection of th e McKinley Tariff of 1890 w as a n im portant
factor in the development of the tin plate in d u stry in the United
States. It did little, however, to help th e basic steel industry since it
w as largely unnecessary. American factories, especially Carnegie's,
outproduced th e best B ritish mills an d a level of technical and labor
economy had been achieved w hich m ade it im possible for European,
especially B ritish, producers to com pete w ith cheap domestic rails.
By th is time, all the "protection" American steel m akers needed w as
the freight cost of im porting steel from Europe. Regarding th e rela
tionship between American and E uropean steel m akers. "Passage of
the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 w as like shooting a corpse" (Wolff
1965, pp. 60-61). On th is issue see also Pierce (1907, pp. 33-34).

185

Domestic tinplate m anufacture grew prolifically an d immediately
penetrated th e B ritish m arket here. B ritish im ports dropped
from 327,882 n e t tons in 1891 to 300,688 n et to n s In 1892,
an d each successive year saw a further decline. In 1896, for th e
first time. United States production (179,605 n e t tons) was
greater th a n B ritish im ports (133,471 n e t tons). By 1898, the
B ritish had been effectively severed from th eir Am erican m arket
(Hogan 1971, p. 351).20
When the McKinley Tariff w ent into effect in 1891, 20 p lan ts began
producing tin plate an d ten m ore tin plate factories were u n d er con
structio n (Knox 1944, p. 12). The world center of tin plate produc
tion was shifting from Wales to the United States.
For the first few years of th e 1890s, American production of tin
plate w as carried out using Welsh techniques and, m ore im portantly,
tin plate m ills dism antled and Imported from Wales. Also, owing to
the undiversified n atu re of the Welsh colonial economy an d its vulner
ability to changes in m arkets, a great m any Welsh laborers, with little
other choice, followed tin plate capital and em igrated to th e United
States in search of work (Hogan 1971, p. 351, and cf. H echter 1972,
p. 169; Khleif 1975, p. 23; and Cooke and Rees 1981, p. 285, on the
undiversifled n atu re of th e Welsh economy).21 Howard A. Knox's
(1944) book, Development of th e American Tin Plate In dustry, in 
cludes as its frontispiece an illustration showing the tradem ark of the
American Tin Plate Company of Elwood, Indiana, 1891—later incor
2° See also W arren (1972, p. 215) on the McKinley Tarriff an d the rise
of dom estic tin plate production.
21 Prior to 1850, the first wave of Welsh immigration cam e with agri
cultural dislocation w hich accom panied the industrialization of Wales
(Dinnerstein an d Reimers 1982, p. 16). In th e p o st-1890 period, the
imm igration of Welsh people accom panied in d u strial dislocation
created by th e loss of a significant portion of th e Welsh tin plate
industry.
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porated into Moore’s American Tin Plate Company. In a graphic
depiction of capital flight, the tradem ark shows th e British lion a s
helpless prey gripped in th e talons of the American eagle. Knox's
caption reads: "The American eagle carrying th e B ritish lion sym bol
izes the replacem ent of Welsh tin plate by the Am erican product."22
C arr an d Taplin’s (1962. p. 117) account on conditions in British
tin plate m anufacture for this period states;
In 1890 there were 519 mills operating, on a n average m ore
efficient and w ith higher capacity [in com parison to those of the
previous decade]. Many new mills had been built during the
decade. In the past--notably In 1880-81—capacity had tem po
rarily o utrun dem and, b u t th e level of trade had soon cau g h t up.
This tim e it w as different: th e American m arket, to w hich
everyone had looked for the next revival w hen times were bad,
w as fading away apparently for good....By m id-1896 th e num b er
of tinplate mills a t work in th e United Kingdom had fallen to
308 an d was still falling.
The tariff b arrier and th e resu ltan t revitalization of American tin plate
production led to a n e t loss of least 211 mills in W ales during th is sixy ear period. The B ritish were being separated from their Am erican
m arket by American capital. The rise of tin plate production in th e
United S tates brought w ith it dism antled Welsh m ills and th eir export
to and relocation in th e United S tates in a m an n er consistent w ith the
definition of the process of deindustrialization (cf. H arrison an d Bluestone 1982, p. 300). As the American m arket faded away, so did m uch
of the Welsh tin plate industry.

22 Development of the American Tin Plate Industry w as published by
United S tates Steel Corporation. Knox w as "A ssistant to M anager of
Sales" for th e tin plate division of Camegie-Illinois Steel Corporation at
th e time. The American Tin Plate Company of Elwood, Indiana, w as
th e com pany around w hich the American Tin Plate Company of New
Je rse y w as formed.
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The severing of the B ritish from th eir American m ark et w as fu r
th e r boosted b y th e establishm ent of th e Dingley Tariff in 1897 (Hogan
1971, p. 292; an d Pierce 1907, p. 35). T he protection of the Ameri
can m arket b ro u g h t severe com petition to th e domestic tin plate
in d u stiy w hich w as then dom inated by m an y small firm s originally
established to tak e advantage of the m ark et freed from B ritish
com petition.
In 1898, W.H. Moore, a prom oter of mergers, so u g h t to form a
large consolidation of the n atio n 's tin plate producers (Hacker 1968,
p. 425).23 In 1898, the Am erican Tin Plate Company w as Incorporated
u n d er the laws of the state of New Jersey a s a holding com pany for 38
subsidiary com panies com prising 39 p lan ts operating a total of 279 tin
plate producing mills.24 S u ch command of capital gave Moore's Amer
ican Tin Plate Company monopoly statu s by bringing n early all m anu
facturers of tin plate in th e U nited States u n d e r one organizational
stru ctu re . Hogan (1971, p. 290) com m ents th a t American Tin Plate
Com pany "achieved the m ain objective for w hich it w as formed, to
prevent harm ful price reductions by restricting severe competition."
One way th e company restricted com petition was, upon its
consolidation, to sh u t down an d dism antle several of th e p lan ts it h ad
23 Moore and h is brother J a m e s had already formed th e National
B iscuit Com pany and the Diam ond Match Company (Hacker 1968, p.
425; Wendt an d Kogan 1948, p. 185; Hogan 1971, p. 289). Moore's
desire to form a tin plate corporation m ay b e less th a n coincidental
w hen viewed ag ain st the fact th a t a t the tim e. National Biscuit
Com pany's p ro d u cts were packaged in containers m ade of tin plate.
24 Member com panies of A m erican Tin Plate were distributed in the
following m anner; Pennsylvania (18 companies), Ohio (9 companies),
Indiana (5 companies), M aryland (3 companies). West Virginia,
Illinois, and New York (1 each).
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ju s t acquired, shipping u sable equipm ent to other American Tin Plate
locations. The decline of British dom inance over th e American tin
plate m arket brought w ith it the dism antling an d dislocation of mills
in Wales, and, the dom ination of th e American Tin Plate Company over
the domestic m arket b ro u g h t with it dism antling an d closure of p lan ts
in th e United States. This Illustrates the point th a t factory closure is
an aspect of both the deterioration of the m arket position of firms and
of a firm 's establishing controlling position w ith respect to m arkets.
American Tinplate Company w as in th is respect sim ilar to other
tru s ts in steel formed in th e closing y ears of th e nineteenth century.
Like American Steel Hoop and American Sheet Steel Com panies of the
Moore Group, American Steel and Wire, and Shelby Seam less Steel
Tube, Tin Plate Com pany represented a horizontal m erger of pre
viously com peting firms concerned largely w ith production of a single
product and w as formed in order to avoid price fluctuations associated
w ith com petition between m any capitals. Like these other com panies,
factory closures were im portant in th e establishm ent of oligopolistic
control of production. American Tin Plate, for example, w as sim ilar to
American Sheet Steel Company, also of the Moore Group. American
S heet Steel, directly u p o n its consolidation in 1899, dism antled four
of its works in Pennsylvania and one In Ohio.25 The closure of factories
is seen to play a vital role in the establishm ent of control over produc
tion horizontally and vertically. This is som ething w hich is also ap p ar
25 These included its Laufm an Works, Paulton; Shousetow n Works,
Shousetown; Steel Plant Works, Leechburg; and B utler Ju n ctio n
Works, W estmoreland County, all in Pennsylvania. In Ohio, Sheet Steel
dism antled its Coshocton Works, Coshocton (Hogan 1971, pp. 295296).
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e n t In the histories of Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company, which
bought factories of com petitors in order to s h u t them down, and
American Steel and Wire Company where closed p lan ts accom panied
investm ents in other aspects of steel production.
In explaining th e reason for th e closure of American Tin Plate
factories, Hogan (1971, p. 292), accepting Knox's assessm ent, argues
th a t they w ere p art of a n overall p lan of consolidation to "insure effi
cient functioning" by freeing the com pany of "inefficient" an d "poorly
located" p la n ts in order to bring operations in to "closer coordination."
Knox (1944, p. 24) also argues th a t the plants were dism antled as
constitu en t com panies were brought into closer, more centralized
relation w ith com pany offices in Chicago and New York.
This raise s several im portant Issues concerning th e notion of
efficiency an d its relation to factory closures. In reality, th e issue of
w h at co nstitutes efficiency of technique, organization, a n d location
en ters the discussion as a n historical question since the level of
efficiency, th e degree of coordination, etc., are historically relative.
F or example, poor location is not an inherent quality of a factory. In
fact, Knox's assessm en t an d Hogan's acceptance of It im plies th a t th e
newly acquired factories of American Tin Plate Company were not
poorly located u n til they were brought within th e organizational
framework of Moore's tin plate monopoly, and th a t the continued
operation of th e plants posed difficulties of coordination in relation to
th e location of corporate offices.
This raise s yet an o th er issue. If the incorporation of the
factories would leave them in a position where it would be difficult to
coordinate th e activities of the p lan ts in relation to the location of

190

corporate offices, why were they purchased in th e first place? The
company, upon its formation, p u rsu ed a conscious policy of restricting
competition in th e tin plate trade. Part of th is policy w as a n attem pt
to gain control over the supply of m achinery for producing tin plate in
order to limit independent tin plate m ills (Hogan 1971, p. 291).
While th is aspect of the com pany's policy m et w ith little direct su c
cess, control over independent com panies could be achieved through
direct p u rch ase of factories. However, if they could not be ru n "effi
ciently," if their p u rch ase im posed a poor location upon them , they
were s h u t down since to leave them u n p u rch ased and therefore in
continued operation would leave independent com petitors in the field.
It is n o t enough sim ply to explain the closure of factories by stating
th a t they are no longer efficient, since efficiency m u st itself be
explained in relation to specific historical circum stances u n d e r which
factors of production become efficient or inefficient, poorly located, or
well coordinated. The closure of these factories of the American Tin
Plate Company, therefore, had less to do with the establishm ent of
efficient functioning an d more to do w ith the process through which
firms extend control over production an d m arkets. The histories of
Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company an d American Steel a n d Wire
Com pany also dem onstrate the essential role played by factory closures
in the process of capitalist com petition and the extension of control
over all aspects of production.
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Shelbv a n d American Steel an d Wire Companies: Factory Closures
in Horizontal and Vertical Competition in th e Domestic Arena
T he histoiy of Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Com pany offers a n
example of the role played by factory closures In the process of
monopoly formation and th eir im portance w ithin strategies of control
p u rsu ed by firms. Especially during the y ears 1897 u n til 1901, Shelby
rose to n e a r monopoly stature in seam less tu b e production. S h u t
downs a n d dism antling of w orks accom panied the expansion of the
com pany as It elim inated com petitors an d concentrated production in
and aro u n d Shelby a n d Toledo, Ohio.
The Shelby Steel Tube Company, located in Shelby, Ohio, w as
incorporated in 1890 under th e laws of th a t state, an d th e company
represented the first successful venture In th e commercial production
of seam less steel tu b e s in the United S tates (Boore 1951, p. 35: an d
Jon es 1926, p. 42).26 The dem and for seam less steel tu b e s was
sparked in the late nineteenth an d through the first decades of th e
tw entieth century b y several developments: (1) as sta te d above, a
growing oil industry which required seam less tubes for drilling equip
ment; (2) production of spindles and sh u ttles for the textile industry
w hich h a d been growing domestically since the end of th e Civil War;
(3) expanding m ilitary production leading u p to and following the
S panish American War; (4) growing production of statio n ary boilers
along w ith m arine boilers as p a r t of the naval expansion program
begun in 1897; (5) u s e of steel tu b e in production of automotive
26 The com pany w as originally know n as th e Lozier-Yost Seamless
Tubes W orks after its incorporation in December of 1890 when its
nam ed w as changed in Ja n u ary 1891 to Shelby Steel T ube Company
(Boore 1951, p. 35).
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fram es an d engine p arts; an d (6) increased requirem ents of steel
tubing in th e production of locomotives (Boore 1951, pp. 75-84; an d
W arren 1972, p. 174).27
Besides all of these areas of dem and, the seam less steel tube
industry in th e United S tates took off because of the enorm ous
dem and for bicycles. The "bicycle craze" in th e United S tates began
around 1895 an d was of great im portance to the in d u stry because steel
tubing for bicycles was produced under special p aten ts w hich cam e to
be controlled by bicycle m anufacturers (Boore 1951, p. 44; and Hogan
1971, p. 282). Shelby’s first m ajor acquisition w as th e Shelby Cycle
M anufacturing Company in 1893. By 1896, the Shelby Company led
the industry nationally in o u tp u t.28
On 28 October 1897, Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company w as
reorganized u n d er Pennsylvania law as a holding company. The new
company, w hich merged six former com petitors, h ad a combined
27 Seam less steel tubes were u sed in construction of naval vessels in
the British an d French navies since 1895 an d in the American navy
since ab o u t 1898, replacing copper and b rass as tubing m aterials.
Railroads were increasing th eir load capacities and building larger an d
m ore powerful locomotives. They adopted th e u se of superheated
steam engines requiring v ast lengths of steel boiler tubes. Super
heated steam power was utilized in newly constructed locomotives,
and railroads also undertook conversion of old locomotives (Boore
1951, pp. 75-84).
28 Of the seven largest producers of seam less steel tu b e in the nation,
Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company had a n an n u al o u tp u t of
18.000.000 feet. The Mansfield Machine Company produced
15.000.000 feet per year, followed by th e Ellwood W eldless Tube
Company an d th e Pope Tube Company of Hartford, Connecticut, m aker
of the Colum bia Bicycle, each w ith o u tp u ts of 12,000,000 feet per year.
New Castle Tube Company a n d Brewer Seam less Tube Com pany each
m ade 10,000,000 feet per year and the Ellwood Ivins Tube Company
had an a n n u a l output of 5,000,000 feet (Hogan 1971, p. 282).
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a n n u a l o u tp u t a t th e time of 57 million feet, w hich gave it a great deal
of control over the nation's seam less steel tu b e m aking capacity.
Eventually, Shelby would stan d in position to build a monopoly with
control of 90 percent of the n atio n 's seam less steel tube capacity, a t
le a st before th e formation of M organ's National Tube Com pany which
w as beginning to m ake Incursions into seam less tube production and
later, Shelby's acquisition by U.S. Steel (Ripley 1916, p. 174-175;
Jo n e s 1926, p. 195; and Hogan 1971, pp. 282-283),29
Besides the original p la n t a t Shelby, Ohio, designated ''Factory
A," th e merger involved: Ellwood Weldless Tube Company, Ellwood
City, Pennsylvania, or "Factory B"; Greenville Tube Company, Green
ville, Pennsylvania, "Factory C"; American Weldless Steel Tube Comp
any, Toledo, Ohio, "Factory D"; Brewer Seam less Tube Company,
Toledo, Ohio, "Factory F"; and A uburn Nut and Bolt Company, A uburn,
Pennsylvania, "Factory O" (Boore 1951, p. 60). From the tim e of this
m erger until its acquisition b y United States Steel Corporation in
1901, Shelby Com pany p u rsued a broad program of expansion,
centralization of production, an d elimination of com petitors (Hogan
1971, p. 283). This policy included the acquisition of th e p lan ts of
com petitors an d th eir su b seq u en t shutdow n, dism antling, an d transfer

29 Boore's (1951, pp. 60-61) account clarifies th e narrative.
Records seem to indicate th e existence a t th e tim e of twelve
additional operating mills...whose com bined capacity a t the time
w as certainly equal to or in excess of 50 million feet. Indications
are, however, th a t in m any instances, negotiations looking
towards th eir acquisition b y Shelby were well u n d er way and the
90 percent figure m ay have anticipated th a t eventuality.
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of facilities to Shelby's other p lan ts—especially to those In and around
Shelby and Toledo. Ohio.
About one year after th e merger, Shelby expanded by purchasing
Mansfield M anufacturing Com pany of Mansfield, Ohio; Hercules Seam 
less Tube Company of Garwood, New Jersey; and United States S tan d 
ard Drawn Steel Company of Cleveland, Ohio, including its Cuyahoga
Falls mill. Although receiving their designations as Shelby factories H,
I, and K, respectively, all of these newly purchased mills were
im m ediately closed (Boore 1951, p. 64; an d Hogan 1971, p. 283).
Boore's (1951, p. 62) account dem onstrates Shelby's approach to
centralization.
On J u ly 21, announcem ent was m ade th a t the Mansfield works
was s h u t down and all th e tube m aking equipm ent a s well as th e
in-process and finished stock moved to the plant a t Shelby,
Ohio....On August 2, Shelby announced the dism antling of the
Brewer p lan t [Factory F] a t Toledo, O., an d the moving of its 10
benches to the American Weldless p la n t [Factory D] in the sam e
city. These together w ith 21 more shipped in from other
dism antled plants gave th e American Weldless a total of 43 cold
draw benches.
Factory K a t Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio, was dism antled and its facilities
were moved to the Shelby p lan t an d to Factory C a t Greenville, Penn
sylvania, following the procurem ent by Shelby of a large order from th e
U.S Navy for projectiles. Factory I was dism antled an d its equipm ent
shipped to o th er plants (Boore 1951, pp. 65 an d 128-129).
In May of 1899, Pope Tube Company of Hartford, Connecticut,
and Albany M anufacturing Company of Albany, Indiana, were acquired
by Shelby a s Factories M an d N, increasing th e annual capacity of th e
concern to 100,000,000 feet (Boore 1951, pp. 65-66). In August of
th a t year, Shelby acquired th e facilities of th e U.S. Projectile Company
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of Brooklyn, New York. This company, with a n an n u al capacity of
6,000,000 feet, produced a full range of seam less tubing and w as a
m ajor supplier of steel tu b es used In m aking dynam ite guns used in
C uba d u ring the Spanish-Am erican War. Although U.S. Projectile
received th e designation of Factory E, its facilities were, upon th eir
purchase, immediately dism antled and shipped to other Shelby plants.
The dism antling of U.S. Projectile coincided w ith Shelby’s dism antling
in Ju ly 1899 of a large storage an d shipping stru ctu re a t Factory B in
Ellwood City, Ohio, a n d its relocation at Factory D in Toledo (Boore
1951, pp. 67 and 124-125).30
In 1900, Shelby w as reorganized u n d er th e laws of New Jersey,
b u t not before it had attained a n e a r monopoly in seam less steel tu b e
production with the p u rch ase of th e McCool Tube Company of Beaver
Falls, Pennsylvania, w hich became Factory L. This w as the last acquis
ition Shelby would m ak e before its merger into U.S. Steel. In A ugust
of 1900, Factory L b u rn e d down an d was never rebuilt (Boore 1951,
pp. 68-69; an d Hogan, 1971, p. 283).
In all, before Shelby Steel T ube Company becam e p a rt of United
S tates Steel in Ju n e of 1901, it h a d dism antled or perm anently s h u t
down these plants:
• Mansfield Machine Company, Mansfield, Ohio (Factory H);
• Albany M anufacturing Company, Albany Works, Albany, Indiana
(Factory N);

30 Factory D had already been th e recipient of the "usable pieces” of
th e Brewer Works of th e Brewer Seam less T ubing Com pany (Factory F)
previously dism antled b y Shelby w hich had acquired it in 1897 (Boore
1951, p. 125).
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• U.S. Projectile Company, Brooklyn Works, Brooklyn, New York
(Factory E):
• U.S. S tandard Drawn Steel Company, Cayahoga Works, Cayahoga Falls,
Ohio (Factory K);
• Hercules Seam less Drawn Tube Company, Garwood Works, Garwood,
New Je rs e y (Factory I);
• Brewer Seam less Tubing Company, Brewer Works, Toledo, Ohio
(Factory F);
• Pope T u b e Company, Hartford Works, Hartford, Connecticut (Factory
M); and,
• New C astle Tube Company, New Castle Works, New Castle,
Pennsylvania (Factory G) (cf. Hogan 1971, p. 284).
Following these shutdow ns and relocations of various facilities.
Shelby undertook a n im provem ents program ju s t prior to its acquisi
tion by U.S. Steel. Plans were m ade for th e addition of a new piercer
a t Factory A in Shelby. This piercer was to com plem ent facilities
which h a d been removed from th e A uburn factory a n d relocated there.
Most Importantly, p la n s were m ade for th e construction of a new b a r
mill a t th e Greenville plant. The immediate purpose of such actions
was, it seem s, to m ake Shelby attractive to th e Steel Corporation a s an
object of merger. Boore (1951, p. 72) com m ents,
All of these im provem ents were carried through to completion
b u t w ith the exception of the Greenville b ar mill were of q u e s
tionable m erit from the stan d p o in t of cost reduction or increase
of capacity. A contem porary suggests th a t they w ere for th e
m o st p a rt window dressing to make th e com pany attractive to
th e Steel Corporation. In support of th is point of view the new
h o t mill at Shelby, Ohio, produced only a few th o u san d tons of
tu b e s in its en tire existence.
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Hogan (1971, p. 284), w ith reference to th is asp ect of Boore's n arra
tive, agrees th a t these actions were indeed "window dressing"—a n
asp ect of Shelby's "desire...to enter th e United S tates Steel organi
zation."
The history of the Shelby Seam less Steel T ube Company su p 
ports two points. First, th e pattern of its factory closures resem bles a
sim ilar p attern described in current analyses of deindustrialization. In
th is way, the closure of Shelby plants from 1897 to 1901, in th e
process of eliminating competitors, w as p art of a "method for shifting
capital [involvingl physically relocating... equipm ent from one facility to
another" (Bluestone and H arrison 1982. p. 7), an d shifting Investm ent
in th e form of a n improvem ents program .
Secondly, the example of the Mansfield W orks shutdow n partic
ularly calls into question explanations of the factory closure a s repre
senting the purging of obsolete facilities and m ethods from industries
an d economies through a process of "creative destruction" (cf.
McKenzie, 1984, p. 85; an d Thurow 1980, p. 77). Boore (1951, p. 62)
points out th a t a t the time of its closure.
One of th e m en who assisted in th e inspection of the tubing
from th is mill, as well as from others which were taken into the
com bination, stated th a t the tubing from th e Mansfield mill was
the m ost accurately draw n of an y he had inspected.
Here, the case of the Mansfield Works, Factory H, am ong others in
Shelby's history a s an independent corporation, Indicates the prob
lem atic natu re of such corporate actions, i.e., they can n o t sim ply be
explained by exam ining them through th e lenses of "efficiency" and
"obsolescence." Such term s are treated as, b u t in reality are not,
"natural" categories. Rather, efficiency an d obsolescence are, in a very
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im portan t sense, socially created conditions im posed u p o n commod
ities a n d processes produced w ithin a social order w herein su ch
things a s "usefulness" and "need" a re of little o r no consequence in
economic life (Brown 1986, p. 46). Indeed, in th e Shelby case,
shutdow ns, dism antled factories, an d relocation of facilities took place
with regard not to technical considerations of tu b e production b u t
with regard rather to th e extension of control over production, the
elim ination of com petitors, and building the bargaining position of the
firm by m aking the com pany attractive as an object of m erger through
"window dressing."
M aking the com pany attractive for m erger w as im portant
because while enjoying a great deal of horizontal control in seam less
steel tu b e production, Shelby lacked control over any basic steel pro
ducing capacity an d depended on other producers for its in p u t of raw
m aterials. U.S. Steel Corporation controlled th e v ast m ajority of basic
steel production, an d a s a fully Integrated firm, held National Tube
Company as a tube-m aking subsidiary. Shelby could at le ast enter the
corporation on its ow n terms. By th e close of 1901, U.S. Steel held
both National Tube an d Shelby Steel Tube as wholly owned subsidiary
com panies. Eventually, the plants of the Shelby Company would come
to be operated by N ational Tube Company.
The cases of th e American Tin Plate Com pany and, especially,
Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company dem onstrate a m an n er In which
factory closures and relocations are p a rt of a process w herein com
m and over capital is established. Factory closures represent direct
elim ination of com petitors in the process of monopoly building and
with it, extension of adm inistrative control over production a s more
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and more of the nation's capacity to produce comes u n d er the direc
tion of fewer and fewer firms. In th is process, considerations of su ch
things as efficiency, however it is defined, and obsolescence, etc., are
of secondary im portance to considerations having to do w ith control.
Such is also th e case of th e American Steel and Wire Com pany prior to
its incorporation into United S tates Steel. However, w hereas the
Shelby case exemplifies th e closure of p la n ts in the process of building
horizontal control over production, the case of the American Steel and
Wire Company, already com manding m ost of the nation's wire and nail
capacity, illustrates the role of closures in building vertical control
over production. In this case, factories becam e like paw ns in capitalist
com petition an d th e shutdow n of its p lan ts were n o t to eliminate
horizontal com petitors, b u t to release it from vertical dependence on
basic steel producers.
American Steel and Wire had developed originally from a p a rt
nership between Jo h n W. G ates and Elbert Gary, who together had
formed the Consolidated Steel and Wire Com pany in 1892. As W endt
and Kogan (1948, p. 146), G ates's biographers, p u t it, "keeping with
the McKinley era of laissez falre.’1Gates an d Gary sought to consolidate
the wire in d u stry still fu rther in order to
P ut a n end to ruinous price cutting an d take advantage of econo
m ics of scale to reduce high production costs w hich were being
incurred by m any of the companies in th e wire in d u stry a t th a t
tim e (Hogan 1971, p. 258).
Gates and Gary sought J.P. Morgan's financial backing, b u t Morgan w as
p u t off the idea w hen the United States entered war w ith Spain in
1898. G ates and Gary, deciding to go ahead w ith their p lan for a wire
and nail tru st, formed the American Steel an d Wire Com pany of Illinois
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in M arch of 1898. This holding company w as formed in order to tak e
over, in addition to several other properties, those of Consolidated
Steel and Wire Company. The new tru st held 14 plants an d controlled
75 percent of th e nation's wire producing capacity (Wendt and Kogan
1948, p. 149; and Hogan 1971, p. 258).
It w as here th a t the partnership between Gates an d Gary ended.
G ary and Morgan cooperated in th e formation of Federal Steel. With
the financial backing of J & S Seligman banking house, G ates, in J a n u 
ary 1899, w ent on to form the American Steel an d Wire Com pany of
New Jersey w hich held 36 of the nation's larg est wire producers and
several sm aller ones. Gates became chairm an of the board of directors
and appointed Jo h n Lambert president of th e new com bination which
attained a "virtual monopoly" over th e nation's wire, nail, a n d fence
m aterial b u sin ess (Hogan 1971, pp. 260-261).31
From April of 1900 to the incorporation of United S tate s Steel a
year later, Gates engineered a strategy designed to expand control of
American Steel and Wire in relation to other producers a n d release it
from dependence on com panies producing b asic steel by building a
m ore vertically integrated operation. This program involved the
shutdow n of p lan ts—at one point, one-third of th e constituent plants of
A m erican Steel and Wire were closed.
Early In 1900, Jo h n Gates announced to th e steel in d u stiy th a t
American Steel and Wire Company w as in good financial condition and
31 According to Harvey O'Connor (1935, p. 39), w hen G ates w as p u t
ting American Steel an d Wire together, "He b o u g h t mills sig h t unseen
for $1,000,000 apiece." This along w ith his rep u tatio n a s a stock
m arket speculator and a pen ch an t for gambling earned G ates the
nicknam e of "Bet a Million!" (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 176).
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com m ented w ith optimism on the sta te of the industry. However, on
16 April 1900, Gates, w ithout warning, announced the shutdow n of
twelve of Steel an d Wire Company's p lan ts.32 In a complete
tu rn aro u n d from his statem ent m ade less th a n two m onths earlier,
G ates told reporter Robert Arm strong of the Chicago Record, w hen
asked to explain the closings,
It all am o u n ts to th is...th at th e steel and wire b u siness is in
bad shape. It h as been getting worse constantly and th e mills
of every so rt have been running on orders th a t they obtained
six or m ore m onths ago. The dem and today in our line, a t
least, a n d I th in k proportionately in the other departm ents
of the steel trade is only about 30 per cen t of the volume it
should be. For instance, we have been m aking 5,000 an d 6,000
tons of finished p roducts in th e justified expectation of selling
about 6,000. We have, in fact, been selling only 2,000 or 3,000
tons. T h at illustrates the situation (Wendt an d Kogan, 1948, p.
162).
From various q u arters of the steel industry came statem en ts
from industry officials, M organ and Gary among them , denying th a t
there was any b asis for G ates's pessim istic assessm en t of th e industry.
W hen pressed to explain how the Industry could possibly have deteri
orated so m uch in a m onth and a half, Lambert, asserting the '"divine
right'" of capital, stated forthrightly th a t,’"Our com pany is ru n n in g this
b u sin ess w ithout any need of explaining! We s h u t down and open our
mills w hen we see fit!"’ (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 162-163). This
w as followed by a statem ent from Lam bert on 19 April th a t four of the

32 'T hree of th o se sh u t were wire-nail p lan ts In Joliet; in addition he
also closed a w ire-rod mill in W aukegan, an o th er in Newcastle, P enn
sylvania, a wire mill in Anderson, Indiana, the Ellwood p lan t in De
Kalb, the Allegheny Furnace Company, another p lan t in Cleveland and
three wire mills in Pittsburgh" (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 162).
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closed p lan ts would be reopen In a week (Wendt an d Kogan 1971, p.
164).
The announcem ent th a t these p lan ts of American Steel and Wire
Com pany were to be closed triggered a panic on Wall Street w hich
sen t steel stock prices in general and those of Steel an d Wire Com
pany in particular plummeting. Two days before the announcem ent.
Gates, through his confidential secretary O.A. Owen gave word to his
Chicago brokers to sell a large block of h is stock In American Steel
and Wire Company. It w as estim ated th a t he sold 50,000 sh ares of
com mon and 20,000 sh ares of preferred stock, an d w hen the panic
h it the stock m arket he merely began to b uy the stock back a t a m uch
lower price (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 164 an d 174; and O'Connor
1935, p. 40).33
Since we tend to m aintain and romanticize an image of the
reckless and adventurous entrepreneur, it is tem pting to call G ates's
behavior nothing more th a n a superior example of "stock Jobbing."
B ut there appears to be more to the stoiy th a n th at. Certainly, one
would not w ant to deny the influence of a personal profit motive in the
entire episode, for, after all, accum ulation of personal wealth is the
"name of the game" under capitalism. However, th is affair of using
p lan t shutdow ns as a springboard for w h at am ounted to stock
m anipulation m ight be best understood by examining the position of
American Steel and Wire Company Ju st prior to its absorption into the
33 Shortly after the episode. Gates resigned his se at on the Board of
D irectors of American Steel and Wire b u t did not lose influence within
the company. It is estim ated th a t w hen all is said an d done. G ates
walked away from th is affair with $1,000,000 to $1,620,000 (Wendt
and Kogan 1948, pp. 174-175; and Hogan 1971, p. 262).
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United S tates Steel Corporation. G ates's was not Ju st a case of "grab
the m oney and run" b u t his actions sire also Intelligible w ithin the
context of the dynam ics of capitalist competition an d th eir relation
ship to corporate control because it w as a t th is tim e th a t G ates began a
program designed to break the dependence of A merican Steel and
Wire on th e Carnegie Company. As Shelby Company h ad prepared
for m erger by "window dressing." American Steel an d Wire Company
w as also consolidating its position w ith respect to other steel
producers.
It w as common knowledge in 1900 th a t a m erger of huge pro
portions in the steel industry w as in th e making. Carnegie h a d already
had several offers an d had been nam ing prices.34 In fact, Carnegie had
already been involved in discussions concerning possible m ergers with
both th e Moores and w ith Rockefeller (Wendt an d Kogan 1948, p.
186; an d Hacker 1968, p. 186). Since the Carnegie Company was
setting th e pace in th e industry, other producers of both basic steel
and finished goods were trying to improve their positions in relation
to Carnegie.
American Steel an d Wire Com pany sought to extend its vertical
control by increasing its supplies of raw m aterials and acquiring
facilities to fill its own needs for basic steel. O ther firms su ch as
National Tube and th e Moore Com panies were following suit. Between
the tim e of the shutdow n of these twelve plants an d the incorporation
of United S tates Steel, Gates announced th a t he w as negotiating for
34 According to Je n n in g s (1926, p. 634), Carnegie first received from
and considered an offer of $250,000,000 m ade by an English
syndicate for the properties of Carnegie Steel Company.
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the p u rch ase of additional coal m ines in West Virginia and for ad d i
tional steel plants in Milwaukee in o rd er to lessen dependence of the
com pany on Carnegie.35 As part of th is program, in the last y ea r of its
existence as an independent corporation, Gates engineered th e p u r
chase of four ships to tran sp o rt iron ore from th e Mesabi range on the
G reat Lakes (Wendt a n d Kogan 1948, p. 188; and Hogan 1971, p.
263).36 At nearly th e sam e time, American Steel a n d Wire Com pany
perm anently closed an d dism antled its Duncansville Works in P en n 
sylvania, its Crown Point Works b la st furnaces in New York, an d its
Findlay Works and C incinnatti Works, both in Ohio (Hogan 1971, pp.
264-265).
In relation to th e Carnegie Steel Company a n d the central role
th a t G ates and others in th e steel in d u stry knew it would play in a n
upcom ing merger, Am erican Steel a n d Wire Com pany was able to
press a two-pronged a tta c k in improving its position in relation to
other steel producers. First, vertical integration lessened dependency
on basic an d sem i-flnished steel producers--in p articu lar Carnegie
Com pany w hich was m o st im portant am ong these. Hogan (1971, p.
263) concludes th a t increased vertical control accom plished by
American Steel and Wire along w ith o th er producers of finished an d
35 A m erican Steel and Wire had also shifted its ord ers from the
Carnegie Company to Federal Steel (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 188).
36 One of the ships w as nam ed the J.W . G ates. The other three w ere
nam ed for close associates of Gates: th e Jam es J . Hill for one of
Morgan's railroad lieutenants through whom Gates u su ally dealt w ith
Morgan, th e I.L. Ellwood who stood w ith Gates th ro u g h the p lan t
closing fiasco and who resigned with him , and the William E denbom
who took Ellwood's position on the b o ard of directors (Wendt a n d
Kogan 1948, pp. 174 a n d 188).
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basic steel "placed Carnegie on th e defensive." Secondly, w hen
American Steel and Wire sh u t down twelve of its p lan ts on 16 April
1900, it n o t only created panic in th e stock m ark et b u t threatened to
remove from the basic steel producers a n im p o rtan t m arket supplying
sem i-finished goods for wire production. The shutdow ns w ere con
sidered im portant enough for representatives of Federal Steel, among
whom w as Elbert Gary, to attend the board m eeting of American Steel
and Wire because "they w anted...assurances th a t American Steel and
Wire would n o t back o u t on its order for 50,000 to n s of steel billets
from Federal Steel" (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 165).37 While Ameri
can Steel an d Wire eventually shifted is orders to Federal, the wire
tr u s t successfully dealt Carnegie o u t of the wire m arket. Furtherm ore,
against th e backdrop of th e closed plants. G ates delivered th e follow
ing statem en t to reporters a t the conclusion of th e board m eeting
(quoted in W endt and Kogan 1948, p. 165):
The board of directors...discussed the general business situation
and unanim ously decided th a t until the overproduction of m ate
rials h a s been disposed of, the executive com m ittee m ay m ake
su ch reduction in prices as they m ay find necessary to accom 
plish th is and resum e operation of the idle plants.
While producers of finished steel goods were moving into basic
steel production and limiting access to m arkets, Carnegie Com pany
developed a program in response an d threatened to counter su c h
moves by Itself moving into wire and tube making. Plans were
announced by the Steel Company in 1900 and early 1901 to begin
construction of a huge steel tube w orks in response to National Tube's
37 A billet is a semi-flnished steel product used in steel wire an d steel
tube production.
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operation of blast furnaces a t its newly formed subsidiary, Tube Steel
Company a t Benwood, W est Virginia, in 1899 (Hacker 1968, p. 465).
"Carnegie saw in th is a loss of m arket for he supplied the National
Tube Company w ith m uch of its raw steel" (Hogan 1971, p. 465).
Despite Carnegie’s w ish "to co-operate in every w ay with...fellow
m anufacturers," it would be necessary to enter th e new field in "selfdefence" (Bridge 1903, pp. 360-361, quoting th e Iron T rade Jo u rn al
for 17 Ja n u ary , 1901). Also in response to Morgan, who w as heavily
interested in the Pennsylvania Railroad and who h ad control over
about h alf the country's railroads, Carnegie Com pany proposed to build
its own rail Une, w hich would parallel Pennsylvania Railroad, to bring
steel to the coast from Pittsburgh and, in basic steel, to invade the
w estern territory of Federal's Illinois Steel Com pany (Cotter 1916, p.
14). Further, 'To fight Gates, a huge wiremaking plant...w ould be
constructed n ear Pittsburgh" (Wendt an d Kogan 1948, p. 189; and
Hacker 1968, p. 399). In 1900, then, Carnegie announced th a t the
Steel Com pany would enter wiremaking. T hreatened by a renewed
and higher level of "destructive and ruinous competition," a
destructive industrial war, with all capitals in steel poised a n d a t the
ready, the United S tates Steel Com pany was finally formed in 1901
(Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 189-192; Bridge 1903, pp. 358-362; and
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Hogan 1971, pp. 263 and 46S-468).38 The com panies, like Hobbesian
m en who establish the Commonwealth out of fear of dying violent
deaths a t the h a n d s of their fellows, established th e Corporation as a
solution to the possibilities, and to avoid the dangers, of m u tu al
annihilation.
Conclusions
The United S tates Steel Corporation, chartered in New Jersey as
a holding company, brought together th e properties of w h at were th en
the largest of b oth basic steel an d fabricated steel producers including
the Carnegie Company, the com panies of the Morgan and Moore
Groups of allied holding companies, American Steel and Wire Com

38 W endt and Kogan (1948, pp. 189-190) com m ent further o n this:
As he anticipated, Carnegie's enemies w ere throw n into turm oil
by these announcem ents. Carnegie was in a n excellent position
to fight and win an industrial w ar...and he knew it. His railroad
venture could wreck Morgan's growing rail empire, h is tube
com pany m ight sm ash M organ's...National Tube. If Carnegie
m ade wire from his trem endous steel resources, he could
engage in a n unconscionable price-cutting campaign, one th a t
could ruin Gates.
In a related line of com m entary Bridge (1903, p. 361) states:
In th e conversion of the heathen, m issionaries have found it
useful to describe th e condition of the dam ned before present
ing a picture of the joys of the blessed. It w as on some su ch
principle th a t the th rea t of industrial war w as th u s m ade by the
Cam egies before th e blessings of co-operation and consolidation
were set o u t before th e vision of the alarm ed financiers of the
country.
Carnegie's proposal to build a tu b e works, railroad, and wiremaking
plant were followed by "a bankers' dinner, at w hich were preached th e
Joys of in d u strial peace" (Bridge 1903, p. 361).
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pany, and Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company.39 In addition, it also
incorporated Rockefeller's Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines.
With the inclusion of Carnegie Steel Company, th e financial backing of
Morgan, and th e incorporation of Rockefeller interests, th e formation
of United S tates Steel Corporation represented th e unification around
steel production of the in terests of th ree of th e United S tates's m ost
powerful and influential capitalists.
As the first billion-dollar corporation, United S tates Steel w as
the largest single consolidation yet formed, and its control over
n a tu ra l resources and com m and over all aspects of steel production is
indicated by H acker (1968, p. 437), who states:
A royal dom ain was included In th e assets of the corporation.
These were made u p of 78 b last furnaces an d 150 steelworks
and rolling mills; ore lands whose reserves a t the tim e were
calculated to be three-quarters of a billion to n s of iron ore:
70.000 acres of coal lands as well a s lim estone deposits; alm ost
half of th e coke ovens of the United States (about 20,000 o u t of
47,000), w hich produced more th a n one-half of the country’s
coke; 112 steam ships and a th o u san d miles of railroad. The
an n u al productive capacity of the United S tates Steel Corpora
tion furnaces and p la n ts was 7,400,000 tons of pig iron,
9.400.000 tons of steel ingots, an d 7,900,000 tons of finished
steel. Its pig-iron production represented one h alf of th e total
o u tp u t of th e United States; its steel-rail production represented
about 68 p er cent: its stru ctu ral steel, 60 p er cent; a s m uch if
not more, of the m anufacture of steel plates, sheets, bars, wire
and wire rods, hoops an d cotton ties; nearly th e entire m anufac
ture of tin plates, tubes, wire nails, barbed wire, and woven-wire
fence; an d from 85 to 90 per cen t of all the bridges in the
country.

39 United S tates Steel received its ch arter in April of 1901. Shelby was
actually not brought into th e corporation un til J u n e of th a t year. Also
brought in a t th a t time w as Rockefeller's Bessem er Steam ship
Company.
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W ith th e formation of th e United S tates Steel Corporation, not only
w as th e United S tates assum ing Its. leading place in world production
of steel, b u t it was becom ing overall leader among capitalist n ations as
well.

The formation of U.S. Steel w as p a rt and parcel of the capitalist

revolution of the late nineteenth an d early tw entieth centuries—one of
its creations and one of its makers.
The capitalist revolution w as also a corporate revolution w here
unprecedented concentration, and w ith it control over production,
w as achieved through centralized organizational com m and. Such
com m and over production was established in the progressively cen 
tralizing transform ation of organizational forms from th e pool to th e
highest form of m erger of the time, th e holding com pany. This tr a n s 
form ation brought w ith it the passage from industrial control of th e
independently owned firm to the oligopolistic tru st. These organiza
tional solutions to problem s of accum ulation faced b y firms were p u r 
sued in order to provide a buffer ag ain st "ruinous competition" an d the
inadequacy of m arkets to absorb surpluses.
In th is chapter, w e see the im p o rtan t role of factory closures in
th is development, i.e., th e ir im portance in the process through w hich
a capitalist nation constructed its basic capacity to produce. This is
contrary to the contem porary view in w hich factory closures are
synonym ous with the dism antling of b asic industry. Historically, in the
context of American capitalist development, w hat we have seen an d
w hat we will continue to see in this w ork is th a t th e role of factory
closures in post-Civil W ar industrial expansion in th e United S tates is
com parable to th a t of th e factory closure In the post-W orld War II, or,
more particularly, post-VIet Nam in d u strial decline of th e 1970s.
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In Bluestone and H arrison's (1982, pp. 123-124) view, factory
closures are fundam entally related to the p o st-1945 corporate con
glom eration movement brought on by diversification of firms from
single an d related endeavors into totally unrelated fields. This
resulted in the unique pattern of factory closing described by th e term
deindustrialization. Factory closures are recognized as a m echanism
through which the conglomerate a s organizational firm type, form of
capital concentration, and model of capitalist com petition w as created.
The history of steel industry development u p to 1901 su p p o rts the
claim th a t factory closures were a s crucial to th e creation of horizontal
and vertical mergers as ways of organizing firms, concentrating capital
and com peting w ith other firms a s they are to conglomeration. F u r
therm ore, as in th e contem porary process of conglomeration, factory
closures in the late nineteenth an d early tw entieth centuries were not
merely outcom es of business failures or of th e operation of blind
m arket m echanism s b u t were outcom es of decisions m ade and
definite actions taken by real h u m a n actors, w ithin given historically
created circum stances, i.e., in th e process of th e social construction of
capitalist society (cf. Perlman 1977, p. 65, an d Schw eikart 1984, p.
33). Factory closures were conscious aspects of corporate policies
actively p u rsu ed by firms in the process of competition and as
individual capitalists took each other into account.
Overall, th is exam ination of steel industry development around
th e tu r n of the century supports Mandel’s (1968, p. 434) point th at,
"trusts and monopolies do not su p p ress capitalist competition; they
merely reproduce it on a higher scale and in m ore acute form."
Factory closures were involved in th is reproduction process. The
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characteristic feature of the pre-1901 steel In dustry w as th a t
previously com peting Independent steel com panies were brought
together as a buffer to destructive competition an d price fluctuations
Into groups of competing tru s ts . In turn, th e p o st-1901 steel industry
b ro u g h t these previously com peting Independent tru sts together in
th e form of th e United States Steel Corporation threatened competi
tively as they w ere by the possibilities of each other’s vertical integra
tion. The next ch ap ter will cover the period of steel in d u stry devel
opm ent in w hich other dom estic corporations rose to challenge the
dom inance of U.S. Steel and th e response of th e Corporation within
th is new climate of competition.
An analysis of the form ation of the steel industry in th e late
nineteenth an d early twentieth centuries ra ise s im portant issu es
concerning how we currently th in k about deindustrialization. As
sta te d in chapter 2, current discussions of th e deindustrialization
issu e are limited in historical scope. Rather th a n approaching
deindustrialization as an historical question, it is framed as a spatial,
geographic, or regional issue b y com m entators from a variety of theor
etical perspectives. Examples Include those analyses w hich debate the
issu e of deindustrialization in te rm s of the flight of capital from urban
cen ters to su b u rb s in local contexts, "Frostbelt" to "Sunbelt" in the
context of the U nited States, a n d North to S o u th or First World to
T hird World in th e global context. The factory closure in th e history
of steel Industry development will form an im p o rtan t focus of the
ch a p ter to follow w here attention will be paid to the role of shutdow ns
in th e formation o f the m anufacturing belt of th e United S tates. This
ch a p ter covered th e formation of th e great ste el tru sts w hich were
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eventually consolidated into th e United S tates Steel Corporation in
1901. The Steel Corporation and its co n stitu en t tru sts, it is u n d er
stood, were b o m of the "great merger movement" which lasted from
the 1890s to th e tu rn of th e century a n d beyond.

CHAPTER V
STEEL AND MONOPOLY II: CENTRALIZATION, FACTORY
CLOSURES, AND THE RISE OF THE MANUFACTURING BELT
Introduction
The outcom e of th e corporate revolution w as the reproduction of
capitalist competition on a higher scale. The basic u n it of capitalist
com petition w as no longer the independent firm b u t the corporation,
a unity of firm s previously in competition w ith each other. The corpo
rate development of th e steel in d u stry in the years since th e tu rn of
th e century represented the continuation of tren d s established in the
late nineteenth century, namely vertical, horizontal, and spatial in te
gration b u t a t a higher velocity, which, in th is development, accom
panied a m ore intense level of factory closure as firms sought control
over raw m aterials and control over m arkets for finished products,
acquisitions of other steel producers, diversification into endeavors
not directly associated w ith steel production, and geographic concen
tration of production. E ach phase of corporate expansion, acquisition,
and investm ent was accompanied by factory closures. This section
covers the association between Investm ent an d disinvestm ent—
between growth, expansion, reorganization, an d factory closures—from
1901 to 1929. This will provide th e basis upon which local effects of
factory closures and industrialization can be discussed.
The specific em phasis of th is chapter is the issue of factory
closures in th e dom estic context, th eir role in industrial development,
and the issue of effects of this course of industrialization on the local
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level. This will be accom plished by presenting a n overview of th e ex
tent of factory closures in the th irty years su b seq u en t to th e formation
of th e U nited S tates Steel Corporation, th eir relationship to th e proc
ess of investm ent, i.e., entry into other aspects of steel production and
other m arkets. Especially im portant here are developments w ithin
the U nited States Steel Corporation since the tu rn of the cen tu ry and
the relationship of th ese to development of the steel towns, b o th those
experiencing shutdow ns and those w hich becam e centers of steel
production.
The substantive referent of th is chapter is th e tendency within
c u rren t deindustrialization literature to em phasize the role of the
factory closure as a spatial issue. For example, factory closures are
discussed within the process of capital flight from cities to su b u rb s (cf.
Dowd 1977, pp. 226-265, and A shton 1984, p. 63),1 and from com
m unities in one region to com m unities in more favored regions, e.g.,
from "Frostbelt" or "Rustbelt" to "Sunbelt."2 In th is way, deindustriali
zation is viewed a s the "'shake-out' of entire sectors of US m anufactur
ing industry, such a s steel...giving rise to w hat Is called the 'decline' of
the traditional m anufacturing belt In the N ortheast and the 'rise' of the
1 A shton (1984, pp. 63-74) describes the process of capital flight from
the cities in the post-World War II period, its relocation and th a t of
labor in su b u rb an areas, and the development of a n u rb an fiscal crisis
and deterioration of u rb a n services.
2 Peet (1987, pp. 53-54) comments: "The term s popularly used to
rationalize the relocation of United S tates m anufacturing in d u stry as a
move from the Frostbelt to the S unbelt (implying locational determ in
ation by n atu ra l relations of production) represent a n ideological
diversion from a m ore essential tru th . N atural resources are u sed , and
space arranged an d rearranged, u n d er the control of the social rela
tions of production.”
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so-called 'Sunbelt' in the S outh and West" (Agnew 1987, p. 19). The
re su lt in the post-W orld W ar II period is the deterioration of cities and
th e abandonm ent and destruction of local com m unities.
To B luestone and H arrison (1980, p. 103, an d 1982, pp. 82107) there is an o th er side to this kind of development—the social
costs of deindustrialization bring w ith them costs of reindustrialization. Block (1987, p. 128) refers to th is sam e process as the "myth of
reindustrlallzation," the sim ultaneous destruction a n d revitalization of
a nation's industries. It is n o t only th e com m unities th a t lose factories
th a t suffer the social costs of economic dislocation a n d unem ploym ent,
b u t the com m unities where plants are built, w here investm ents end
up, th a t suffer th e downside of development—th e "boomtown syn
drome," "the often destructive consequences of unplan n ed rapid
development" (Bluestone and H arrison 1982, p. 86). The boomtown
syndrom e is characterized by a cluster of "symptoms" described by
B luestone and H arrison (1982, p. 91) in these term s:
The unrealized b u rd en of boomtown expansion goes beyond th a t
which is easily m easured. Paradoxically, b oth th e physical an d
emotional h ealth consequences of boomtown developm ents tu rn
o u t to be sim ilar to those found in com m unities like Youngstown
and Akron th a t experience acute capital loss. El Dean V. Kohrs,
for example, finds th a t unplanned expansions, "always seem to
leave in th e ir wake grim statistics of m ental depression, family
disorganization, em otional change, alcoholism, delinquency, and
dissipation. These boomtown crises are not new ...but th e social
consequences are becoming clearer today, an d they are being
felt in m ore p arts of the country...." A growing segm ent of the
population in the S unbelt now recognizes th e imm ense social
costs th a t accom pany unplanned and anarchic hyper-lnvestm ent.
To this, Feagan (1984, p. 124), com menting on H ouston, adds,
[FJrom th e working-class point of view, the sh in in g buckle of the
Sunbelt h a s its tarnished side, w ith its alr-pollution, congestion,
lack of housing, poor m ass transit, and nonunionized, low-wage
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jobs. H ouston is indeed a tran sp a re n t window th ro u g h which
one can look to see th e details of u rb a n growth an d development
in th is era of late capitalism . In H ouston this era is character
ized n o t so m uch by Big Government a s by Big B usiness, which
takes th e form of large-scale developm ent projects an d expand
ing industrial and commercial operations. And it is th e centrif
ugal an d centripetal effects of th is large-scale development th a t
ordinary H oustonians m u st bear, as th eir job opportunities,
tran sp o rtatio n system s, working conditions, and residential
choices are limited significantly by th e prior decisions of
industrial development and finance capital.
For the proponents of th e deindustrialization thesis, it is th e "ghost
town" accom panied by the "boomtown" th a t forms the kernel of criti
cism of the neoclassical "creative destruction" th esis—destruction
accom panied not by rational creation b u t by disorganized an d destruc
tive p attern s of growth (Bluestone and H arrison 1982, p. 82).
B ut th e problem s associated with hyper-investm ent are prob
lem s currently discussed largely with respect to post-Second World
W ar conglomeration carried o u t by cash hungry corporations which
close factories as they shift investm ents to m ore profitable regions and
endeavors (Bluestone, Harrison, and B aker 1981, p. 14). D eindustri
alization and disinvestm ent are equated w ith conglomeration (Houston
1984, p. 258). However, two things m u st be kept in m ind. Late
capitalism Is capitalism all the same, and to th e extent th a t we can call
a society capitalist, we u n d erstan d th a t it develops according to cer
tain characteristic dynamics. In a related sense, conglomerate merger
is a p attern of capital investm ent, corporate organization, an d capital
ist competition like horizontal and vertical merger. They also can be
expected to sh are sim ilar p attern s in the dynam ics of th e ir operation
and consequences. Therefore, factory closures b ear th e sam e rela
tionship to th e period of corporate development dom inated by hori
zontal and vertical m erger as they do to th e cu rren t period of con-
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glomeration. My b asic thesis, th en , is this: while cu rren t accounts
concerned with dom estic economic developm ent since th e Second
World W ar em phasize the Im portance and im pacts of factoxy closures
in the deindustrialization process, th e rise of suburbanization, an d the
deterioration of cities along with th e rise of th e Sunbelt, attention to
th e issu e of factory closures in th e historical development of the steel
in d u stry indicates th a t they were similarly im portant, w ith sim ilarly
disorganizing im pacts in the processes of urbanization,
industrialization, an d the rise of th e "m anufacturing belt."
Steel Corporations: Investm ent and
Factory Closures. 1901-1929
C entral to th e cu rren t theory of deindustrialization is this
observation sum m arized by Newman (1985, pp. 7-8), w ho states:
Corporations b e n t on cost cutting pulled out of th e traditional
centers of heavy industry, leaving a trail of destruction behind.
Cities such as Detroit, Gary, Youngstown, and Philadelphia w it
nessed severe Increases in unem ploym ent, followed by plum 
m eting tax revenues, cu ts in city services, and in some instances
by h um an flight, as some w orkers un ab le to m ake a living moved
out. The growth areas of th e m anufacturing economy, by con
tra s t, are the a re a s traditionally hostile to unionization, w here
average wages are low, public services meagre an d where, in
general, w orkers enjoy a m u ch lower stan d ard of living.
With reference to th is fundam ental concern of deindustrialization .
theory, th e purpose of this chapter is to identify and d iscu ss the role
of factory closures in th e process through w hich the very cities
m entioned by Newman historically became th e growth areas of th e
m anufacturing economy in the first half of th e tw entieth century.
Let u s briefly recall from ch ap ter 2 th e influence of the Youngs
town example on c u rre n t work on th e issue of deindustrialization. In
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1977 th e Lykes Corporation, owner of Youngstown Sheet an d Tube
Corporation, announced the closure of the Campbell Works. And in
1980, Jo n e s and Laughlin, w hich had acquired th e Campbell Works,
closed the Brier Hill Works, also formerly a property of Youngstown
Sheet an d Tube (Buss and R edbum 1983, p. 23). These events
contributed to m aking Youngstown a n example or a "microcosm" of
the destructive im pact of disinvestm ent upon com m unities (Logue
1985, p. 75).
Factory closures have contributed to the contem porary d estru c
tion of Youngstown. But a brief look a t the history of Youngstown
Sheet an d Tube Company reveals th a t th e construction of the com m u
nity's m anufacturing base from 1900 to 1929 w as also an outcom e of
capital flight--of disinvestm ent in the form of factory closures and
reinvestm ent or relocation of capital in Youngstown itself.
Youngstown Sheet an d Tube Company w as organized in 1900 for
the production of w rought iron sheet and tubing. In 1901, the com
pany bought 117 acres of land in Youngstown, a location w hich p u t it
within easy reach of river transportation along th e M ahoning River and
on the Baltimore an d Ohio an d Pittsburgh and Lake Erie railroads.
From 1901 to 1902, the com pany's Campbell Works, consisting of
fifteen puddling furnaces, an d b a r and skelp mills for rolling tubes,
were b uilt. The com pany's first acquisition was th e Ohio Galvanizing
Com pany of Niles, Ohio, th e facilities of which Sheet and Tube bought
expressly for th e purpose of moving to its Youngstown plant
(Schroeder 1953, pp. 62 and 66, and Hogan 1971, pp. 628-630).
After adding to its properties those of Little Alice Furnace,
Sharpsville, Pennsylvania an d iron ore properties of Pitt Mining Com
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pany and Crete Mining Company. Youngstown Sheet an d Tube shifted
to the production of steel goods. For th is purpose, it p urchased Bes
sem er steel on the open m ark et until its own B essem er steel p lan t
w as completed in 1906. With these facilities, Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Company p assed from being solely a buyer of raw m aterials to a
seller of raw m aterials, and in 1908, th e com pany pu rch ased th e plant
of Morgan Spring Company of S truthers, Ohio--a subsidiary com pany of
U.S. Steel's American Sheet an d Tinplate Company, w hich h ad been a
m ajor p u rch aser of raw m aterials from Youngstown Sheet and Tube
(Hogan 1971, pp. 631-637).
Following th is acquisition, Youngstown Sheet an d Tube Company
began to diversify. The Alice b la st furnace w as sold an d additional
blast furnace capacity added a t Youngstown. Electrical conduit w as
added to its line of products. To carry th is out, the p lan t of th e Harvey
M anufacturing Company of Harvey, Illinois, including its galvanizing
m achinery, was purchased, dism antled, an d moved to Sheet and
Tube's recently acquired facilities a t S tru th ers, Ohio. Youngstown
Sheet an d Tube th en organized th e W estern Conduit Company as a
subsidiary which it eventually transform ed into a corporate d ep art
m ent (Hogan 1971, pp. 637-639).
After sh u ttin g down and scrapping a $2.5 million mill for rolling
steel plate, Youngstown Sheet a n d Tube Company constructed a new
plate m aking facility and electrified its sh e e t mills a t Campbell Works
a t Youngstown in 1922 (Hogan 1971, pp. 642 and 983). The following
year, Youngstown S heet and Tube made its two m ost im portant
acquisitions, those of the Brier Hill Steel Company of Youngstown and
th e Steel an d Tube Company of America located in Chicago (Schroeder
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1953, p. 66). These p urchases gave the com pany n atu ral resource
reserves in b oth th e G reat Lakes region and in an d around Youngs
town. th e Redstone C entral Railroad, steel processing facilities, addi
tional capacity for m aking conduit, pum p p arts, engines, an d other
finishing facilities. M ost im portantly, access w as gained to m arkets of
the middle w est (Hogan 1971, pp. 983-985).
In 1924, the Youngstown Company disposed of several of its
properties a t Niles and Zanesville, Ohio, as a prelude to an expansion
program w hich lasted from 1925 to 1929. This included (Hogan
1971, pp. 986-988):
• A $7,763,562 expenditure on im provem ents a n d new construction
including new b last furnaces and tin plate mills a t the com pany's
Indiana H arbor Works and addition of new seam less tube mills a t the
Campbell Works, all in 1925.
• In 1928, $14 million w as spent on th e completion of the electrifi
cation of th e Campbell Works and th e building of new coke ovens in
South Chicago.
Accompanying th ese im provem ents, the com pany disposed of
properties in its Brier Hill Works an d its works of the old Steel and
Tube Com pany of Chicago. These properties included a plant a t
Zanesville, Ohio, and coke ovens a t Mayville, W isconsin. The latter
were abandoned by Youngstown Sheet and Tube an d the former were
dism antled and its p arts used in other of the com pany's p lan ts (Hogan
1971, pp. 987-988). Besides Youngstown Sheet an d Tube C orpora
tion, other steel producers were locating operations in Youngstown.
For example, United S tates Steel Corporation invested $11 million In
its McDonald Works a t Youngstown from 1924 to 1929 a s p a rt of its
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"Bar Mill Program." This m eant th a t b ar mill facilities In Pittsburgh
were being replaced b y those in th e new location (Hogan 1971, pp.
881-882).

All in all, the veiy forces which contributed to the decline

of the Youngstown S h eet and Tube Company, an d w ith it, th e com m u
nity of Youngstown itself, also contributed to rise of th a t m anufacturing
com m unity in the first place.
Sim ilar developm ents were taking place w ithin other steel
com panies and w ithin other com m unities during th is period. Armco
Steel Corporation, for example, one of the leading independent steel
concerns, m aintained facilities for m aking ingots of basic steel at
Middletown, Ohio, in order to supply its steel sh e et rolling mills in
Cincinnati. In 1900, these rolling mills were dism antled and moved
to Middletown in order to combine both operations a t one location.
The corporation w as further induced by an offer of $75,000 an d land
m ade by the city of Middletown to Armco for th e purpose of develop
ing steel production th ere (Schroeder 1953, pp. 69-70). This w as
followed in 1901 by a merger betw een Armco an d M uskingum Valley
Steel Company. By 1910, Middletown plant capacity was doubled as
the corporation began to produce its first automobile body sheets. In
1927, Armco Steel b o u g h t Forged Steel Wheel Corporation w hich had
plants in Butler, Pennsylvania, an d Elyria, Ohio. The Butler plan t w as
not yet completed an d Armco reorganized it a t th e sam e tim e th a t op
erations a t Elyria w ere stopped (Hogan 1971, pp. 616-623 an d 978).
The dism antling of facilities played an im p o rtan t p a rt In the
diversification of Bethlehem Steel an d its movement away from military to commercial steel production. Bethlehem Steel was originally
established in 1886 as a producer of iron and steel products. From
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the outset, Bethlehem w as a specialist in production of steel for th e
military, centering its activities on production of arm or plate and
shipbuilding (Hogan 1971, pp. 537-538). Although a t one time the
Morgan syndicate held all of th e stock of Bethlehem Steel Company,
its entren ch m en t in m ilitary production, its eastern seaboard location,
and its freedom from reliance on G reat Lakes ore, w ith its control over
Cuban an d Chilean sources, k ep t Bethlehem o u t of reach of United
States Steel (Ripley 1916, p. 104, and Davis 1933, pp. 176-179 and
214).
In 1904, Bethlehem Steel Company w as reorganized as Bethle
hem Steel Corporation, a holding company of nine subsidiary firms
(Hogan 1971, pp. 539-540):
• Bethlehem Steel Company, w ith its p lan t in South Bethlehem, Penn
sylvania, w as prim arily a producer of arm or plate and m unitions as well
as holder of stock control of th e Ju rag o a Iron Company w hich oper
ated iron ore mines in Cuba;
• The shipbuilding and railroad car building facilities of H arlan and
Hollingsworth Company of Delaware;
• Shipbuilding facilities, m achine shop, and foundries of th e Union
Iron W orks a t San Francisco;
• Marine repair facilities and foundries of Sam uel L. Moore and Sons a t
Elizabeth Port, New Jersey;
• C arteret Improvement Com pany, owner of unim proved real estate in
C arteret, New Jersey;
• E astern Shipbuilding Company of Groton, Connecticut:
• The shipbuilding p lan t of C resent Shipyard Corporation. Elizabeth
Port, New Jersey;
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• The shipbuilding p lan t of B ath Iron Works. B ath, Maine; and,
• Hvde W indlass Company, a m anufacturer of m arine equipment.
Upon its reorganization, Bethlehem undertook a program of
diversification aimed a t bringing it away from specialization in m ilitary
an d ship production an d into production of commercial steel. As a
prelude to th is program, Bethlehem sold both B ath Iron W orks and
th e Hyde W indlass Company and dism antled its facilities a t C resent
Shipyard—its property p u t u p for sale. Following these, Bethlehem 's
en try into commercial steel production began w ith th e p u rch ase of
250 acres of land adjacent to its Bethlehem p lan t where construction
began on b last furnaces, an open h earth steel plant, an d rolling mills
for th e production of rails and construction steel. Also, Bethlehem
b u ilt a new p lan t at Saucon, Pennsylvania, w here the new "Bethlehem
Section" w as to be produced. The Bethlehem Section w as a n innova
tive stru ctu ral beam rolled from one piece of steel b u t as effective as
th e riveted beam s in u se at th e tim e (Hogan 1971, pp. 540-541).3
Republic Steel w as engaged through the first thirty years of its
existence in wholesale restru ctu rin g of its organization carried o u t
through a program of factory closure accom panied by investm ents in
diversified steel activities. E ntering the steel gam e late, Republic w as
established a s a holding com pany in 1899 and reorganized a s Republic
Iron an d Steel Company, a rolling mill tru s t operating 36 previously
independent iron and steel making, m ining an d processing concerns

3 The Bethlehem Section was developed by Henry Grey. Grey offered it
to all of the im portant steel com panies producing stru ctu ra l steel.
Only Bethlehem Steel showed in terest an d bought th e p aten ts for its
production.
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located largely In central and so u th ern states (Wendt an d Kogan 1948,
p, 256, an d Hogan 1971, p. 558). The m ost Im portant problem facing
Republic w as its transition from a com pany engaged prim arily in
ironm aking to a diversified and integrated steel producer. According
to Schroeder (1953, p. 52), the policies of th e company,
...Involved consolidation of th e com pany's scattered properties
and conversion of the com pany from a m ere collection of rolling
mills with no steel m aking capacity to a fully integrated and
cohesive basic steel company.
This tran sitio n involved the entire replacem ent of its rolling mill
equipm ent and improvement of b la st furnaces and raw m aterial
processing facilities a s well as the dism antling and relocation of steel
m aking facilities, a total of 24 in its first ten years of operation (Hogan
1971, pp. 569-574).
The first step in its transition to a steel producing concern w as
a n im provem ents program initiated in 1900 a t the Brown Bonnell
p lan t of Republic Steel, located a t Youngstown, which h a d been
completely rebuilt an d converted to steel production by 1902. These
changes an d those th a t were to follow were to some extent p art of a
schem e engineered b y Jo h n Gates, who h ad bought heavily into th e
stock of Republic Steel and Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railway
Com pany (TCI)—both com petitors of each other in the S o u th —with
designs to create a "southern steel empire" capable of competing on
a n equal footing w ith United S tates Steel w hich lacked Influence in
th e southern states (Hogan 1971, p. 564; W endt and Kogan 1948, pp.
256, 262, an d 276; an d Cotter 1916, p. 69). The th rea t to United
S tates Steel Corporation w as th a t TCI enjoyed advantages of location
n e a r rich ore and coal reserves—minimizing its tran sp o rtatio n costs—
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an d open-hearth steel making, a process of m aking steel th a t w as less
expensive th a n the Bessem er process to which U.S.S. w as a t th a t tim e
committed. W hat TCI lacked w as rolling mills, an d w h at Republic
lacked w as steel m aking facilities. By 1905, G ates h ad control over
Republic stock an d a significant block of TCI. G ates m anaged to
reorganize the sales division of TCI by merging It w ith th a t of Republic
Steel and a t th e sam e tim e, the executive offices of Republic Steel,
w ere moved from Chicago to New York where th ey were combined
w ith those of TCI (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 271-272). On the
verge of a successful m erger of the two Southern steel concerns which
G ates proposed would m ake Birmingham, Alabama, the "steel capital of
the world," U nited States Steel through the Morgan b an k acquired TCI
itself in 1907 (Cotter 1916, pp. 61-70).
From 1901 until th e loss of TCI to United S tates Steel, Republic
partially or completely abandoned or dism antled th e following p lan ts
p la n ts (Hogan 1971, pp. 569-570):
• The Alabama Steel Works, Fort Payne, Alabama, w hich w as completed
in 1890 for open-hearth steel production and rolling were dism antled
in 1901.
•The Phoenix B last Furnace at Youngstown, Ohio, w as b u ilt in 1854 and
dism antled in 1901.
•The White River Works of Muncie, Indiana, completed in 1892 for
production of basic steel, were dism antled in 1901.
• The Peoria W orks a t Avery, Illinois, In operation since 1892 for
production of finished steel products, were dism antled in 1901.
• The Bessem er converters of th e Springfield W orks a t Springfield,
Illinois, in operation since 1887, w ere transferred to th e Brown
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Bonnell Works of Republic Steel Corporation a t Youngstown In 1900
an d its other facilities were dism antled in 1906. The Springfield
Works were established in 1872 prim arily as a producer of various iron
products.
• The open-hearth furnace of the Sylvan Works a t Moline, Illinois, built
in 1898, w as dism antled in 1901.
• The open-hearth steel operation of the M itchell-Tranter W orks a t
Covington, Kentucky, built in 1879, w as dism antled in 1904.
• The Cleveland Works a t Cleveland, Ohio, producer of railroad rolling
stock, w as dism antled in 1904.
• The New Albany Works a t New Albany, Indiana, built in 1869 with a
rolling mill added in 1887, was dism antled in 1904.
• The open-hearth operations of th e Springfield Works, b u ilt in 1879
were dism antled in 1904.
• The open-hearth operations of the M innesota Iron Works a t Colum
b u s Heights, M innesota, which h a d been m aking steel since 1899,
were dism antled in 1904.4
• The Terre H aute W orks of Terre H aute, Indiana, established in 1868
for production of iron products, w as dism antled in 1904.
• The Alexandria Works of Alexandria, Indiana, producing iron since
1895 w as dism antled between 1904 and 1905.
• The Indiana Works, of Muncie, Indiana, producer of iron an d steel
b a rs since 1892, w as dism antled in 1905.

4 M innesota Iron Works also had a rolling mill w hich w as completed in
1895. At th e time th a t its steel m aking facilities were dism antled, the
rolling mill w as not in operation.
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• The A tlantic Works a t New Castle, Pennsylvania, an Iron m aking
facility established In 1838, w as dism antled in 1905.
• The W etherald Works of Franklin, Indiana, built in 1893 for produc
tion of iron, were dism antled in 1905.
• The S haron Works a t Sharon. Pennsylvania, an Iron m aking facility
established in 1850. w as dism antled betw een 1904 and 1905.
• The A ndrew Works a t Niles, Ohio, in operation since 1872 for pro
duction of both iron and steel skelp, bars, an d bands, h ad been pre
viously removed to Haselton, Ohio, a su b u rb of Youngstown, between
1880 an d 1881. They were finally dism antled by Republic in 1905.
• At th e M itchell-Tranter Works, facilities for m aking finished iron
shapes, established in 1873, were dism antled In 1907.
After failing to acquire TCI, Republic initiated a program of
diversification in its transition to steel production and centralization of
operations especially in Ohio by improving an d expanding its existing
plant a t Youngstown and starting new operations there. The first step
in this diversification movement w as the organization by "Interests
friendly to Republic" of Haselton Steel Tube Company of Youngstown,
Ohio (Hogan 1971, p. 565).5 With the takeover of H aselton in 1911,
Republic rebuilt the b last furnace of the steel tube concern and added
5 According to Hogan (1971, p. 565):
In order to build th e tu b e works and for working capital, the
new com pany Issued $1.5 million of no tes secured by mortgages
on its properly owned an d to be acquired (by Republic]. These
w ere sold with th e guarantee by Republic a t 99.5%. According
ly, Republic obtained a n option to p u rch ase a t its convenience all
the stock of the tube com pany a t p ar an d 6% interest less any
dividend paid.
This is w h at Hogan m eans by "interests friendly to Republic."
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three m ore.6 Also, Republic moved its corporate h ead q u arters from
P ittsburgh to Youngstown (Hogan 1971, pp. 569 an d 571).
In 1909, Republic built a n u t and bolt works a t its Chicago p lan t
and m ost im portantly, began construction of a huge open-hearth steel
m aking complex a t Youngstown w hich w hen completed two years later
h ad eight 60-ton open h ea rth furnaces and capacity to produce 30,000
to n s of steel ingots and other forms of sem l-flnished steel per m onth
(Hogan 1971, p. 565). These additions did not tak e place, however,
before the com pany dism antled four additional properties. Forem ost
am ong these w as the M innesota Iron W orks of Colum bia Heights,
M innesota, in operation since 1895. This com pany h a d itself been a
producer of open-hearth steel in addition to finished steel products.
It w as dism antled In 1908 along with the following (Hogan 1971, p.
570):
• The Central W orks of Brazil, Indiana, established in 1895, produced
Iron.
• The M arion Works of Marion. Indiana, in operation since 1893,
produced a variety of steel goods.
• The W esterm an Works, also of Marion, Indiana, established in 1891,
produced iron.
These closures preceded Republic's fu rth er diversification of products
and concentration of production in and around Youngstown. F u rth er
additions were m ade to the the Brown Bonnell plant; the open-hearth
steel p lan t a t Youngstown w as expanded in 1913, 1915, and 1918; in
1913, Republic expanded its coke oven capacity a t Youngstown; and,
6 A fourth b last furnace w as added to the Haselton property In 1917.
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in 1919, the Bessem er Coal an d Coke Company and DeForest S heet
and Tinplate Company of Niles, Ohio, were acquired. In this expan
sion. Republic nearly doubled its basic an d finished steel making
capacity (Hogan 1971, p. 574).
It Is apparent from these changes w hich took place w ithin th e
Youngstown Sheet an d Tube Company, Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
and Republic Steel Corporation th a t in the first twenty years of th e
tw entieth century factory closures were essential to th e process
through w hich capital becam e concentrated in local areas. The flight
of capital from scattered areas an d its concentration In places like
Youngstown, Ohio, w as as im portant to the growth of th a t city as a
steel m anufacturing center as it w as a t a later time to its decline a s
such. T his suggests, historically, th e im portance of factory closures to
the general process of capital concentration an d urbanization. T his is
the focus of the next section, w here special attention will be paid to
changes taking place w ithin th e United S tates Steel Corporation,
especially the shift of steel production from Pittsburgh to Chicago,
Illinois an d Gary, Indiana, the corporation's role in th e building of
steel cities, and th e role of factory closures in th is development.
United S tates Steel Corporation. 1901-1929:
Factory Closures and U rbanization in th e Steel Republic
Several Im portant locational changes h ad been taking place in
American industry in general an d within the steel in d u stry in p articu 
la r in the last years of th e nineteenth century and the first decades of
the tw entieth. It is In relation to these changes a t both th e regional
and u rb a n level th a t th e development of the United S tates Steel
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Corporation can be considered. Regionally, the center of gravity of the
American economy w as shifting westward. In the steel industry, th is
shift w as represented by the decreasing Importance of Pittsburgh as
the steel producing center of th e nation an d the rise of rival centers,
especially in the G reat Lakes region. For example, Pennsylvania,
which accounted for ab o u t 45 percent of th e nation's em ployment in
steel, accounted for only 37 percent in 1929. At the sam e time th a t
Pennsylvania's share w as in decline there were parallel rises in those
of the C alum et—including Indiana--region, Youngstown, an d Michigan
(Davis 1933, p. 133).
At its formation. United S tates Steel Corporation h ad facilities
spread across three regional centers. These included eastern Ohio,
especially Youngstown where b oth th e Ohio Works an d McDonald
Works were located,7 and the Chicago area where the com panies of
Federal Steel were located. The m ost im portant center of U.S.S. w as
the Pittsburgh area w here it w as m ost heavily concentrated,8 Seven of
the firm’s co n stitu en t com panies w here located th ere—Carnegie Steel,
Am erican Steel Hoop, American Steel and Wire, American Tin Plate,
American Sheet Steel, American Bridge, and National Tube (Hogan
1971, p. 484).
The rise of P ittsburgh as a steel center in the late nineteenth
century is explainable in p art by th e im portance of Connelsville coke

7 In Ohio were also located m ost of the facilities of th e Shelby Seam 
less Steel Tube Company.
8 The "core" of United S tates Steel Corporation was Carnegie Steel
w hich w as located principally in an d around P ittsburgh (Davis 1933, p.
135).
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and G reat Lakes ore w hich replaced charcoal In Iron production and
w hich were particularly suitable for the Bessem er steel process (Davis
1933, p. 135). B ut the Pittsburgh district h ad been steadily declining
in im portance since th e late 1800s. Largely, th is can be related to the
relative distance of P ittsburgh to expanding w estern m arkets w hich
were served less expensively from places like Chicago a s "steel buyers
—the railroads, agricultural m achinery com panies, a n d construction
firm s—were moving westward w ith the population" (M arkusen 1985,
p. 78) .9 M arkusen (1985, p. 79) comments:
...Pittsburgh h ad lost its m agnetism as the center of a n agglomerative steel industry. Pittsburgh's location w as relatively poor
w ith respect to m arkets, and as coal m ining activity shifted to
the southw est down the A ppalachians and th e significance of
9 In response to th is situation. United S tates Steel Corporation, the
industry's leader, instituted the "Pittsburgh Plus" pricing system in the
early tw entieth century—a system w hich rem ained in practice until
ab o u t 1921. U nder th e Pittsburgh Plus system th e delivered price of
particu lar steel goods w as calculated on th e basis of freight rates from
Pittsburgh regardless of th e real proximity of a mill to a m arket
(United S tates Steel Corporation 1940, pp. 98-101). This system of
steel pricing "enabled a Pittsburgh mill, or any nearby producer, as In
the u p p er Ohio or th e Valleys, to offer equal com petition w ith a
producer anyw here in th e United S tates in term s of delivered price"
(Warren 1973, p. 197). Pittsburgh Plus w as essentially a system of
internal protectionism w hich "protected th e initial advantage of P itts
burgh p lan ts by elim inating any m arket advantage th a t decentralized
locations could realize from th eir proximity to d istan t m arkets"
(M arkusen 1985, p. 79). This system w as followed w ith some varia
bility by the rivals of the Steel Corporation. To many, adherence to
this pricing system offered profit advantages realized from th e collec
tion of "phantom freight" (Warren 1973, p. 199). On th e other hand,
w hen it looked as If Republic Steel and TCI would merge, G ates's
corporation, interested in underselling U.S. Steel, ignored th e price
agreem ent (Wendt and Kogan 1948, p. 279). In fact, after TCI w as
acquired by U.S.S. and th a t corporation was able to expand its position
in th e C alum et area, Pittsburgh Plus became less necessary. After
1907, steel corporations found "co-operation paid b etter th a n c u t
thro at competition" an d Pittsburgh Plus w as gradually replaced by
price leadership of United S tates Steel (Warren 1973, p. 197).
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in p u t costs w as dim inished by large gains in productivity, Pittsburgh's growth rate slowed. Pittsburgh's sh a re of o u tp u t peaked
in th e y ear 1900; th e la st m ajor new mill to be constructed In
Pittsburgh w ent u p in 1911.
To this m u st be added th e transition from the im portance of Bessem er
steel to the open-hearth process, w hich w as less dependent u p o n high
grade iron o re,10 could m ake use of scrap as p art of its input, m ade
larger o u tp u ts in shorter Intervals possible, and required less labor.
O pen-hearth steel was on the rise in th e developing steel centers of
th e country. While United S tates Steel accounted for 55 percent of
th e nation’s open h earth steel capacity, very little of th is w as located
in Pittsburgh, in fact, open-hearth capacity was n o t added to th e Edgar
Thom pson W orks until 1915 (Hogan 1971, pp. 463 an d 516).
In addition to the rise of w estern m arkets an d the declining
im portance of Pittsburgh, of equal im portance w as competition from
the South. A southern steel industry w as built d uring the Civil War
centered around Birmingham, A labama—"'the Pittsburgh of the
S outh'."11 Nearly destroyed during the Civil War, it w as rebuilt during
R econstruction w ith capital invested by northern industrialists an d
served "a spatially distinct market" (M arkusen 1985, p. 78). The
advantage of southern steel production rested In low cost which
obtained by virtue of th e fact th a t raw m aterial in th e Birmingham area
w as readily available w ithin a ten-mile radius of steel mills. This m ade
transportation costs practically negligible (Hogan 1971, p. 500).
The leader of the S outhern steel economy w as TCI, and th e
10 The B essem er steel process required ore with a low content of
phosphorus. In th is respect, the open-hearth process was more
"forgiving." (Cotter 1916, p. 72).
11 Cf. Beard an d Beard (1960, p. 286).
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im pending m erger between Republic Steel a n d th is firm th reaten ed to
create, as discussed above, a "southern steel empire" on a p a r w ith
United S tates Steel. This th re a t to U.S.S. w as all th e more im posing
since th e corporation w as heavily concentrated in Pittsburgh, again,
relatively d ista n t from its m o st im portant m arkets, an d increasingly
d istan t from raw m aterial sources (Cotter 1916, p. 71).
This so u th ern insurrection, led by G ates, w as p u t down by
United S tates Steel w hen TCI w as taken over by th e Steel Corporation
in 1907. TCI w as a valuable prize not only because th e Republic
merger would m ake it an equal competitor, b u t because of its exten
sive holdings in raw m aterials an d facilities an d its contract w ith
Union Pacific Railroad for 155,000 tons of steel rails a t prem ium price
(Hogan 1971, pp. 500 and 503, and Cotter 1916, p. 63). TCI p assed
into control of United S tates Steel in the m id st of a banking p anic in
1907.
At th a t time, TCI h ad recently been reorganized as a holding
company for a num ber of so u th ern steel concerns. It stock h ad passed
into th e control of several large banking firm s including the K nicker
bocker T ru st Company of New York, a leading financial concern of th a t
city, and th e T ru st Company of America (Cotter 1916, pp. 63-64).
These concerns used TCI stock as collateral o n loans, and, according
to Cotter (1916, p. 64):
Suffice it to say th a t th e panic followed a period of enorm ous
expansion an d of extension of credit eventually carried to a point
w here b u sin ess overreached itself and, in a country lacking a n
elastic currency system, su c h as the United S tates then w as,
financial stringency w as bound to follow. The first rum blings of
the com ing storm w ent unheeded an d it w as n o t until late in the
year th a t there was any realization of th e desperate state of
affairs. T hen one big tr u s t company closed its doors and w as
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followed by others. Banks stopped specie paym ents, stocks
tum bled headlong on the exchanges of the country, industry
halted, throwing th o u san d s o u t of employment, and th e financial
h urricane sw ept over the country, leaving ru in in its wake and
m aking its effects felt over th e whole world.
The value of TCI stock plum m eted and Knickerbocker T ru st
succum bed to a run. It appeared a s if the T ru st Company of America
would suffer the sam e fate.
Morgan took advantage of the opportunity and offered to
exchange more secure collateral on loans in exchange for control over
TCI stock. Morgan an d Gates so u g h t assu ran ces from Theodore
Roosevelt th a t the acquisition would not bring an ti-tru st repercussions
with it (Hogan 1971, p. 504). Roosevelt "gave satisfactory a s s u r
ance... th a t the Federal Government would p u t no obstacle in the way of
completion of the transaction" (Cotter 1916, p. 75).12 W ith the ac
quisition of TCI by U nited States Steel, n o t only w as th e Republic-TCI
merger headed off, b u t North and S outh ceased to exist a s spatially
distinct m arkets, and through U nited S tates Steel, an integrated
national m arket w as created.

12 Following the TCI takeover by United S tates Steel, Roosevelt m ain
tained th a t financial emergency facing th e nation m ade th e merger
necessary. However, public sentim ent tu rn ed against U.S.S. In
response to the TCI acquisition and other monopoly practices of the
corporation. Samuel Gompers led th e nation in d ie call to break u p
United S tates Steel. After inconclusive Senate hearings w hich ended
in 1909, th e House of Representatives initiated a n Investigation to
determ ine w hether or n o t su it should be brought against th e corpora
tion for violation of th e Sherm an A nti-Trust Act. This congressional
committee led by A ugustus O. Stanley determ ined in 1911 th a t the
U.S. Government should file suit, an d m ake th e case th a t United States
Steel should be dissolved. "The su b seq u en t trial continued p a st Mor
gan’s d eath in 1913. W itnesses num bered 402. In 1919 th e United
States Suprem e Court finally ruled against the government, 6 to 3."
U.S.S. rem ained in ta ct (Wendt and Kogan 1948, pp. 304-326).
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New Growth. Urbanization, and Factory Closures: From th e
W asteland. Gary. Indiana
For th e first tw enty years of its existence. United S tates Steel
acquired eleven competing steel corporations. Three of th ese were
com panies -which a t th e time h ad been m ajor actors in th e American
steel industry. Among these were Union Steel Company in 1902- and
Clairton Steel in 1904 (Schroeder 1953, p. 87, and Hogan 1971, pp.
485-488). Union Steel was a t th e tim e the second largest steel
com bination outside of U.S. Steel.13 But, given the th re a t of a m erger
w ith Republic, the takeover of TCI by the U nited States Steel Corpora
tion rep resen ts the m o st im portant instance of external growth—th e
m erger or acquisition of competing com panies—u n d ertak en by U.S.S.
before 1920 (Schroeder 1953, pp. 79-87). T his acquisition, as we
saw, w as a response to the changing locational pressu res of the
American steel industry, particularly the rise of the South. Equally
im portant to the development of th e United S tates Steel Corporation
w as the direction of internal growth, i.e., th e construction or p u rchase
of new facilities (Schroeder 1953, p. 79). T his developmental trend
w ithin the Steel Corporation w as also a response to locational
pressu res emerging w ithin the dom estic steel industry, in th is case
particularly th e expansion of the W estern m ark et and the rise of the
Calum et region of the G reat Lakes area as a steel producing center of
th e nation, an d the subsequent decline of Pittsburgh. The response of
13 This w as a sta tu s Union Steel did not enjoy for long, having achieved
it only one m onth prior to the takeover by itself acquiring Sharon
Steel Company, S haron Ore Company, Sharon Coke Company, Sharon
Sheet Steel Company, Donora M ining Company, Republic Coke Com
pany, River Coke Company, Sharon Tin Plate Company, an d Sharon
Ore and Limestone Company (Hogan 1971, p. 485).
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th e Corporation to these developments w as concentration of produc
tion westward from Pittsburgh, the highest expression of w hich w as
the establishm ent of the th e city of Gary, Indiana. Gary would succeed
Pittsburgh as th e new capital of United S tates Steel's "steel republic."
With respect to b oth the corporation’s external an d internal growth,
factoiy closures played a significant role in the process of capital
concentration geographically. By far th e m ost significant levels of
factory closures were found w ithin U.S.S. for th e first 30 years of the
tw entieth century. In two m ajor waves, the United S tates Steel
Corporation abandoned or dism antled between 1901 to 1905 and
1923 to 1929 a total of 66 plan ts.

This section covers these events

leading u p and subsequent to the building of Gary, Indiana.
U rbanization is both cause and effect of th e concentration of
capital. In this way, the organizational concentration of capital, w hich
takes place through su ch practices as corporate mergers, is accom 
panied by and necessitates th e spatial concentration of capital
expressed In th e process of u rb a n growth. For th e first 30 years of the
tw entieth century, th e process of urbanization acted as a stim ulus to
capital concentration. Agnew (1987, pp. 57-58) notes th a t nationally:
Over the y ears 1898-1905 more th a n 3,000 m ergers took place.
U rbanization provided a m ajor p art of the stim ulus. [Because a]
spectacular consequence of u rb an growth w as the increased
dem and for producer goods like steel, copper, power m achinery
and concrete—the stuff o u t of w hich cities are built.
Ready to supply th a t dem and was United States Steel Corporation,
which controlled th e majority of the nation's supply of stru ctu ra l steel,
tin plate, sh eet steel, plate steel, steel rods for reinforced concrete,
and cement, a product into w hich the corporation diversified—a by-
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product of the steel m aking process (Hogan 1971, p. 490, an d cf.
Schroeder 1953, p. 121). The Corporation produced an d m aintained
control over the raw m aterials necessary for Its own development and
expansion.
The growth of the steel industry, however, w as n o t merely a n
outcome of urbanization. Urbanization w as also an outcome of the
growth of the steel industry, a s it h ad been since the nineteenth
century. Walker (1950, p. 14) describes, for example, th e origin of
Ellwood City, Pennsylvania.
Ellwood City began as a n idea in the m ind of a nineteenthcentury steel m an, H.W. H artm an, a former p artn e r of Andrew
Carnegie. Mr. H artm an lived in Beaver Falls and is said to have
exclaimed to h is friends w hen he saw the p leasan t valley of the
Connoquenessing and perhaps w hen he realized its potential
industrial strength and wealth: "This is th e site for my city!" On
J u n e 1, 1889, as President of the Pittsburgh Company (a real
estate holding company), h e sen t his m anager to call on the
owners of the land in the valley and m ake arrangem ents for its
purchase. By May, 1890, ground for th e new town site was
broken. H artm an nam ed h is project Ellwood City for his friend
Isaac L. Ellwood, Chicago steel m an and inventor of the barbed
wire fence.
In a sim ilar way, Gary, Indiana, w as built upon a strip of sw am plands
and san d dunes ju s t east of Chicago by the United S tates Steel Corpo
ration (cf. Philips 1968, p. 309). And In th is process, closure, dis
m antling, and abandonm ent of factories played a vital role as m ore and
more capital w as concentrated In fewer and fewer locations. Steel
ind u stry development n o t only changed the shape of com m unities,
transform ing them into m anufacturing centers, b u t th e building of
cities like Gary, Indiana, from the ground up, were p a rt of a n overall
policy of corporate growth.
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The Gary project was p art of a general program of reorganiza
tion, relocation, an d expansion carried out by U .S. Steel from th e time
of its form ation. Between 1901 an d 1905, th ree im portant develop
m ental tren d s were unfolding w ithin th e corporation: organizational
restructuring, investm ent projects, an d with th e se th e first ro u n d of
p lan t closures w ithin th e corporation since its form ation.
Organizational restru ctu rin g . Besides the acquisitions m entioned
above, several im portant organizational changes w ere implem ented for
the purpose of consolidating the adm inistration o f the firm, reducing
its staff, simplifying accounts, and saving on m anagem ent cost. First,
corporate entities were placed u n d er the direction of single
presidents. For example, Carnegie Steel, National Steel, and American
Steel Hoop came u n d er th e direction of W.E. Corey. Bessemer a n d
Lake Erie Railroad an d Union Railroad were directed by Ja m es H.
Reed. All coal an d coke com panies lost identity a s independent
entities an d were consolidated w ith th e H.C. Frick Coke Com pany
u n d er th e direction of Thom as Lynch. In the sam e way, all tu b e
production w as brought together an d all mining concerns of th e
corporation came u n d er unified adm inistrations. Secondly, in 1903,
this development w as carried a step fu rth er in a wave of "intracor
porate mergers." Carnegie Steel, American Hoop Steel, and N ational
Steel were merged u n d e r the ch arter of the N ational Tube C om pany
and the nam e changed to Carnegie Steel Company. American Tin
Plate an d American Steel Sheet Com pany were m erged and called
American Sheet and Tin Plate. And, the facilities o f Union Steel
Company were distributed throughout th e corporation's subsidiaries.
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Thirdly, a single foreign selling agent representing all subsidiary
concerns of th e corporation w as established in th e U nited States Steel
Products Export Company, all the stock of which w as held by Federal
Steel (Hogan 1971, pp. 490-491).
Investm ent In Expansion and Factory C losures. The reorganization of
th e United S tates Steel Corporation w as accom panied by a wave of
investm ent expenditure on internal growth between 1901 and 1905
w hich totaled $106,938,891 for augm entation of existing facilities
producing basic, semi-flnished, and finished steel as well a s for raw
m aterial mining, processing, and transportation (Hogan 1971, p. 489).
T his spending by the corporation reflects the m ovem ent of corporate
investm ent west, especially into the Chicago area. E xcept for the
addition of a new plant a t Ambridge, Pennsylvania, w hich produced
bridge and stru ctu ra l equipm ent, and th e addition of b la st furnaces
and open hearth-steel m aking capacity a t various sites throughout the
corporation, th e spending on new facilities w as focused on three
projects. These included th e addition of fourteen 50-ton furnaces
each for the S outh Works a t Chicago and the Donora W orks of the
Union Steel Company; new construction a t the South Chicago plant of
the Illinois Steel Company; an d the construction of a large cement
p la n t located a t Buffington, Indiana (Hogan 1971, p. 490).
A nother asp ect of th e concentration of corporate development
in the Chicago area was th e partial and total dism antling of factories.
For example, th e corporation had recently acquired th e facilities of
the Troy Steel Company w ith plans to revive them —since they had
been idled a t th e time of the p u rch ase—u n d er the Am erican Steel and
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Wire Company. Instead, the p lan t w as dism antled In 1907 an d its
blooming mills transferred to the S outh Works of the Illinois Steel
Company (Hogan 1971, p. 487). The m ost intense wave of closures
came betw een th e years 1901-1905 w hen a total of 33 of th e corpora
tion's p lan ts, m ost of w hich were located in Pennsylvania, were dis
m antled. By subsidiary, these included: eight plants of the American
Steel a n d Wire Company; 12 of th e American Sheet an d Tin Plate
Company; four of American Steel Hoop; one of National Tube Company;
one of Shelby Steel Tube Company; four of Carnegie Steel Company;
and two of Illinois Steel Com pany (cf. Hogan 1971, p. 491-493).
In these developments th e p attern of corporate growth charac
teristic of the United S tates Steel Corporation until 1930 h ad been
established: shutdow n of p lan ts accompanied by geographically con
centrated investm ent. While p lan ts in Pennsylvania an d other places
were being dism antled as steel production concentrated in th e
Chicago area, several Chicago area plants of th e Illinois Steel Company
were also dism antled as their location w ithin th e city of Chicago itself
left them no room for expansion. Between 1901 and 1904, th e rail
mill a t North Chicago and Union Works were gradually dism antled and
finally abandoned (Warren 1973, p. 140). For a while, expansion did
take place a t U.S. Steel's South Works in Chicago, b u t by 1905, even
this operation which covered 330 acres becam e too sm all (Greer
1979, p. 55). So, following the 1901 to 1905 wave of closures,
construction on the Gary Steel W orks and the city of Gary w as begun in
1905 w ith th e p u rchase of 7,500 acres of land on the Indiana-Illinois
border, outside of the city of Chicago, on the swam p and san d dunes
facing Lake Michigan. United S tates Steel Corporation established two
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new subsidiary companies, the Indiana Steel Company and th e Gary
Land Company to carry o u t the project. In total, the project w as to
build a completely integrated steel mill with a capacity of over one
million tons of basic steel p er year a s well as a city to su p p o rt It. The
city w as incorporated in 1906, steel production began in 1909, and by
1911 the Gary Works w as capable of producing 2.16 million tons of
steel (Greer 1979, pp. 55-68; W arren 1973, p. 143; Hogan 1971, p.
505; Philips 1968, pp. 309-310; and Cotter 1916, p. 146).
Besides construction of the G ary Tlibe W orks, United S tates
Steel made som e other im portant investm ents u p to 1930. Some of
th ese include (Hogan 1971, pp. 509-524 and 891-892);
• In 1906, U.S.S. organized the Universal Portland Cement Company
and began construction of two new cem ent p lan ts n ear P ittsburgh and
Buffington, Indiana.
• Along the p a tte rn of the building of Gary, U nited States Steel, on a
m ore m oderate scale, began construction of a steel mill an d com m u
nity "from the ground up" a t D uluth, M innesota, in 1910. T his project
w as organized u n d er th e M innesota Steel Company, a wholly owned
subsidiary of U.S.S. To th is construction new ore docks an d a cement
p la n t were added between 1911 and 1915. And in 1920, $ 8 .5 million
were invested in the diversification of D uluth operations to w hich
w ere added wire and steel rod mills.
• Between 1911 and 1915, investm ents were m ade in existing
facilities, including the addition of a n open-hearth plant a t th e Edgar
Thom son Works, and a b a r mill at D uquesne, an d a plant for smelting
zinc and producing sulfuric acid at Donora.
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• Expanded dem and brought ab o u t by World War I resulted In several
additions: the building of electric steel p lan ts a t S outh Chicago;
addition of an arm or plate departm ents a t Homestead, Gary, S outh
Chicago, and Fairfield Alabama; development of facllties for shipbuild
ing in New Jersey a n d Alabama; and, addition of facilities for barbed
wire production a t plants of th e American Steel an d Wire Company.
• In 1920, United S tates Steel acquired rich m anganese and iro n ore
properties in Brazil in addition to the Central Railway of Brazil. These
supplem ented the corporation's other foreign sources of m anganese,
used in th e steel sm elting process, th a t it held in India and Russia.
This accom panied in th a t year the p u rchase of 17 cargo ships.
• Between 1924 a n d 1929, $28 million w as invested in the G eneral
Expansion Program of TCI.
• Between 1926 an d 1927, $31 million w as invested in the co n stru c
tion of a beam mill a t Homestead.
• Between 1928 an d 1931, $ 25 million w as invested in the m odern
ization of facilities of National Tube Company.
B u t for the m o st part, th e m ost in ten se growth of the corpora
tion w as taking place in the C alum et steel district, especially in South
Chicago a n d Gary, Indiana. Of the eight m ajor investm ent program s
initiated by United States Steel between 1922 and 1931, four—some
$145 m illion w orth—were given to expansion and m odernization of
production in the Chicago area including Gary (cf. Hogan 1971, pp.
*

891-892). These Investm ents were indicative of th e tren d tow ard
concentration of production a t fewer locations. Between 1909 an d
1915, subsidiaries of the United States Steel Corporation began locat
ing at Gary, for example. American Sheet an d Tin Plate, National Tube,
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and American Bridge, in addition to a works of Universal Portland
Cement Company (Warren 1973, p. 143). Gary becam e th e center of
growth for b oth basic steel and finished steel production. While no
new plan ts were bu ilt in the area after 1916, the rise of Gary steel
production brought w ith it over th e next 15 years th e dism antling of
facilities in other areas, the equipm ent of m any of w hich w as relocated
to Gary as well as abandonm ent of factories m ade superfluous by this
largest steel complex in th e world. W arren (1973, p. 143) comments:
In th e agglomeration of all these operations Gary w as the very
an tith esis of th e scatter of Steel Corporation operations in the
Pittsburgh area. Eventually other U.S. Steel Chicago plants,
except the S outh Works, ceased to operate in th e prim ary lines
of iron and steel-making. Bay View Works, Milwaukee, closed in
1928; Joliet, although it retained its mills and coke ovens, w as
abandoned as a n iron and steel-m aking plant in 1932.
In addition to these m entioned by W arren, between 1923 and 1930
United S tates Steel abandoned or dism antled more th a n 3 0 of its
plants. The highest concentration of p lan t loss w as from Pennsylvania,
accounting for about half. Most of th is loss w as from P ittsburgh itself,
which lost 11 plants during the period (cf. Hogan 1971, pp. 892-893).
The m ajority of p lan ts abandoned or dism antled were properties
of Carnegie Steel Company, which lost 14. American Steel and Wire
Com pany closed 11, an d the rest were fairly evenly distributed
between American Bridge Company, National Tube Company, and TCI.
In 1916, Illinois Steel Company absorbed completely th e Indiana Steel
Company and with it adm inistration of the Gary Steel W orks. In 1935,
Carnegie Steel Company lost its identity as an independent subsidiary
of United S tates Steel as it was merged w ith Illinois Steel an d its
nam e changed to Camegie-Illinois Steel Company (Hogan 1971, pp.
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528 an d 1203). This not only brought the steel mills of Chicago,
Pittsburgh, and Youngstown u n d er a single adm inistration, it also,
perhap s, symbolized th e decline in im portance to th e n atio n 's steel
industry of Pittsburgh.
Boomtown and Bust-town: Planned Decline. U nplanned
Growth. Com munity Development a t the T u rn of the C entury
As th is discussion of steel Industry development from 1901 to
1930 shows, th e concentration of capital in m anufacturing cities
involved a process sim ilar to th a t described in c u rre n t literature on
deindustrialization. Specifically, th is process involves a shift of capital
location from one spatial context to another, e.g., betw een regions or
between "outlying" areas and cities. This process of disinvestm ent and
reinvestm ent is empirically expressed in the event of the factory
closure in one place along w ith the concom itant rise of production
elsewhere. Such w as the case in the history of Youngstown an d
especially in the development of Gary, Indiana.
To B luestone and H arrison (1982) and to others, Feagin (1984)
for example, central to deindustrialization theory Is the antithesis
between boom towns and bust-tow ns—between th e destinations of
capital flight and the points from w hich capital departs. W hat unites
them is th e socially destructive aspects of each—of th e destruction of
local economic b ases and of u n restrained economic growth in th e local
context. B luestone and H arrison (1982, p. 86) s ta te their position:
Indeed the economic ju ices of th e nation seem to be flowing
swiftly to areas like Houston, an d millions of families are follow
ing th e flow. Youngstown's loss seems to be H ouston's gain, so
th a t on average the nation prospers. B ut does it? A closer look
a t America's new boomtowns suggest th a t all is not well there
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either. The movement of capital Imposes enorm ous social costs
on th e "winners" ju s t as it does on th e "losers."
While Bluestone and Harrison argue th a t th is dynamic is characteristic
of the cu rren t dism antling of the nation's basic capacity to produce, a
sim ilar dynam ic can be identified in th e period u n d er discussion in
this w ork—the period of m assive industrialization, of the creation of
the nation's basic capacity to produce, and the rise of the m anufactur
ing belt (later th e "Rust Belt") of th e United S tates. In other words,
from 1901 to 1930, the economic ju ices of th e nation were flowing to
places like Gary, Indiana, through basically th e sam e process by which
they apparently "dried up" some fifty years later. This dynam ic can be
illustrated in th e parallel development of com m unities experiencing
factory closures a t th e time of m assive capital concentration an d
urbanization of the area in and around Gary, Indiana.
The Rise and Fall of Greenville. Pennsylvania, and the Shelbv Seamless
Steel Tube Company: U.S. Steel and the S hutdow n of Factory C
The history of Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company following its
acquisition by United States Steel is a litany of closed plants. Shortly
after th e m erger betw een 1901 an d 1904, for example, U.S. Steel
closed Shelby's Factory M, the Hartford Works: Factory N, its Albany
Works; and Factory D, the Toledo Works (Boore 1951, pp. 81, 123,
and 137).
In 1903 experim ents carried o u t a t Shelby’s Greenville, Penn
sylvania, plant. Factory C, and a t Factory A in Shelby, Ohio, resulted in
the discovery of the autom atic rolling process—a new m ethod of
m aking seam less steel boiler tubes a t greatly reduced cost.14 U.S.
14 The technical aspects of this continuous mill process is described in
detail by Boore (1951, p. 79), basically, it m ean t th a t seam less steel
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Steel Corporation then undertook th e expansion of its seam less tube
production since the m ethod developed a t Greenville could replace
N ational T ube's old m ethod of producing lap welded, th a t is, seamed
boiler tube. T he expansion program w as carried o u t between 1906
a n d 1907 an d began with th e dism antling of one of the b ar mills at
Shelby Factory C. This sam e mill was rebuilt and p u t into operation a t
the plant of National Tube Company located at Ellwood City, Ohio
(Boore 1951, pp. 79-83).
Factory B a t Ellwood City, Pennsylvania, w as also involved in
experim ents to find a cheaper way to produce tubing. However, with
th e adoption of th e autom atic process, th e so-called "continuous mill"
developed th e re w as dism antled. Following the dism antling of th is
mill, Factory B h ad a new building added to it. This building w as itself
dism antled a t th e Toledo facility. Factory D and reconstructed a t the
new site (Boore 1951, p. 117).
When Shelby Steel T ube Company w as completely subsum ed
u n d e r the organization of National Tube Company, Factory B w as
operated by th e latter. Factory B, the old Ellwood Weldless Tube
Company, w as given the designation of "Ellwood City, Plant B" to
distinguish it from the old National concern in th e sam e city, which
received the designation of "Ellwood City, Plant A." In 1923, P lant B
w as abandoned by National Tube, the equipm ent an d buildings were
dism antled, a n d in 1924, th e property w as sold to th e Pittsburgh and
Lake Erie Railroad (Boore 1951, pp. 117-118). These developments

tu b e could be produced a t greater lengths and w ith fewer in te rru p 
tions th an previously possible.
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took place In conjunction with the developm ent of steel tu b e
production by National Tube at Gary, Indiana.15
The year 1908 w as im portant in Shelby's an d U.S. Steel's h is
tory, a t least in the area of seam less steel tube production. It was th en
th a t Shelby Steel Company lost all identity and w as absorbed finally
an d completely by the Steel Corporation, w ith all steel tu b e operations
a n d production placed u n d er control of National Tube. The final
im portant event of 1908, and the term inal event In the h lsto iy of th e
Shelby Company, was the shutdow n an d dism antling of Factory C four
years after th e autom atic process for producing steel tu b es w as devel
oped. It w as th is p lan t w hich In 1903 becam e th e first operation
commercially capable of producing tu b es in th is w ay (Boore 1951, p.
122).

Shelby Factory C h ad its origins as the Greenville Tube Company,
an interest of Lozier-Yost Company w hich eventually w as reorganized
as Shelby Seam less Steel Tube Company. The Greenville W orks w ent
into operation in 1897 after inducem ent funds were successfully
raised by the citizens of th e com m unity of Greenville, Pennsylvania. At
th e time, it w as common practice for firms to require g ran ts of money
or land as inducem ents for locating in particular com m unities.16 In

15 The closure of Ellwood City, Plant A would n o t be announced until
1947 (Walker 1950, p. 1). It is m entioned here because rep resen ta
tives of National Tube In announcing the closure stated th a t tube pro
duction w as to be shifted from Ellwood City to Gary, Indiana, a move
w hich they fu rth er described as one th a t "has b een deferred" (Walker
1950, pp. 2-3).
16 Concerning the Greenville Tube Project and th e system of induce
m ents in general, J.G . White in M ercer County History stated, "It w as
one of those schem es by w hich some person or persons o th er th a n
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this case, the final decision to locate the p la n t in Greenville had more
to do w ith the level of inducem ents the com pany received th a n any
other consideration su ch as th e "suitability or availability of the site"
(Boore 1951, p. 118).
The original price asked by the firm w as forty thousand dollars
and th e project cam e to be know n as th e "$40,000 whistle," referring
to the co st to the tow n for th e privilege of having th e com pany's
whistle so u n d in th e ir com m unity and expressing anim osity a t th e
unusually high am ount th at h ad to be raised by the com m unity.17
Anxious to attract industry to th e community, the Greenville Improve
m ent Association agreed to th e term s and sponsored a drive to raise
the funds. Boore (1951, p. 120) cites the account of J o h n L. Morrison,
Secretary of the Greenville Improvement Association:
The bonus inducem ent...set was $40,000 which w as raised by
su p erh u m an efforts of th e community. We com mitteemen m et
Lozier in Cleveland. Producing a m ap of Greenville he pointed to
a "blank spot" of 14 acres an d added th a t as additional bonus
requirem ent. T his upped our offer to $45,000. We accepted
th is hard deal an d the lan d owner reduced th e $5,000 price to
$2,500. Eventually we raised the $42,500. The p lan t came. It
covered m ost of the 14 acres b u t in th e buildings there were
wide open spaces. The n ig h t the contract w as signed we
ascended th e hotel stairw ay a s heroes and came down in
disgrace.

those intended by th e contributors profited b y the contribution"
(quoted in Boore 1951, p. 119).
17 As Boore (1951, p. 119) points out, com pare the $40,000 am ount to
the $15,000 inducem ent required by P.L. Kimberly & Co. to locate
their Greenville Rolling Mills In th e town shortly after th e Greenville
Tube Company deal w as finalized.
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Commenting on the fund-raising efforts of the com munity, Boore
(1951, pp. 119-120) cites th e account of th e Greenville Advance
Argus:
Probably no tow n in the country h a s worked m ore unitedly or
earnestly to secure a bonus th a n h a s Greenville. Nearly every
society raised or guaranteed a su m of money, th e W.C.T.U.
pledged a good am ount, and a n um ber of young ladies sold
flowers to swell the fund, the latter realizing $75 in one day.
The ladies of the town have been behind the m en in working to
secure this industry, and the young girls and boys have shown a
sp irit th a t is m ost commendable. The m instrel show and the
b an d concert m u st n o t be forgotten a s a m eans to the end. In
fact...everyone h a s done his utm ost to help Greenville along.
In a little more th a n te n years from the m instrel show and the band
concert, the plant w as s h u t down.
The history of seam less steel tube production in Greenville is
typical of Shelby history overall. As a u n it in the Shelby organization.
Factory C was characterized by its m odem facilities, and, as previously
m entioned, w as one of the locations a t w hich th e autom atic process
for producing seam less tu b e w as first developed. In 1898, one of the
piercing mills a t Greenville was dism antled and installed a t Factory A.
At the sam e time, the Greenville Works received 31 hydraulic tube
drawing benches w hich h ad been dism antled and removed from other
Shelby plants. In 1906, a b ar mill was dism antled an d rebuilt a t
Ellwood City, Plant B of National Tube Company. In 1907, production
ceased a t Greenville an d in 1908 the p lan t w as closed by U.S. Steel
and dism antled. The property and empty buildings were th e n used by
a com pany which built and repaired railroad cars (Boore, 1951, pp.
121-122). Boore (1951, p. 122) com m ents, "According to J o h n L.
Morrison, th e United S tates Steel Corporation, although u n d er no
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legal or m oral com pulsion to do so, reim bursed the Greenville citizens
to the ex ten t of $25,000."
Gary. Indiana: A Steel Boomtown a t th e T u rn of the C entury
T hat Gaiy, Indiana, w as created through a process nearly
identical to cu rren t discussions In literature on deindustrialization Is
exemplified in O'Connor's (1935, p. 322) observation th a t for th e first
thirty y ears of its existence. United S tates Steel Corporation,
closed entire p lan ts in smaller cities to concentrate a t Gary and
Youngstown. For instance, Scotdale, Pa. former city of mills,
becam e a "ghost town," kept alive th a n k s only to federal relief
doled to 80 percent of the inhabitants.
W hat will b e done here, though, is to determ ine to w h at extent the
internal dynam ics of the development of Gary, Indiana, resem bles the
socially disorganized development attrib u ted to the so-called boom
tow n described in contem porary discussions of th e im pact of the
deindustrialization process on national development.
In th e 1920s, Gaiy, Indiana, could literally be described as a
factory city. T h at is, it w as n o t merely a city w here factories were
located, b u t it exemplified a n u rb an plan w here the city itself w as a
factory b u ilt ’"in accordance with the dictates of economic necessity
an d advantage'" (Greer 1979, p. 57). The site on w hich th e city w as
b u ilt encom passed 9,000 acres covering te n miles of shore front on
Lake Michigan and was two miles wide. The site was chosen for its
suitability for th e location of ore docks, proximity to expanding steel
m arkets, a n d access to U.S. Steel's other operations w ithin the city
lim its of Chicago. The city w as laid out in su ch a way th a t three lines
of rails, 55 m iles in all extended from th e mill area an d connected

251

b la st furnaces, open-hearth furnaces, an d finishing m ills so that,
literally, iron ore could be unloaded at one end of th e city and finished
steel pro d u cts could leave th e other w ith a minimum of disruption in
th e processes (Greer 1979, pp. 56-61). On this point W arren (1973,
p. 143) states, "By this m ean s heat loss a n d internal haulage were b o th
reduced....The excellence of Gary's plan an d internal m aterial flow h a s
scarcely if ever been exceeded."
As a site for the profitable and large-scale production of steel,
the u rb an plan of Gary, Indiana, was em inently rational. However, a s a
site for h u m a n living indications are th a t th e social asp ects of the city
were subordinated to the needs of capital accum ulation w ith dire
results. While a great deal of planning w en t into the lay o u t and
arrangem ent of steel works, the city w as Itself treated a s "merely a
m eans to staff th e mills" (Greer 1979, p. 58, and O 'Connor 1935, p.
256). Upon th e 9,000 acres on which G aiy w as built, only 800 acres
were allocated for the city. The rest w as given over to industrial
development. The result w as that,
The city Itself was a n afterthought, throw n over to Gary Land
Company to be laid o u t in a dismal rectangular tow n plan. It
sprang from the m ind of the realtor rath er th a n o f the
professional city p lan n er (O'Connor 1935, p. 256).
The town w as laid o u t according to a typical u rb a n grid pattern,
b u t it w as essentially im posed upon the landscape w ith o u t regard to
hum anly created or n atu ral terrain features, made no provision for a
definitive downtown, and conspicuously omitted the construction of a
civic center w hich, "served th e interests of the board of directors who
...clearly preferred th a t Gary's working class not engage in too m uch
political activity" (Greer 1979, p. 67). In th is p attern of development.
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G aiy is rem iniscent of contem porary boomtown cities. Bluestone and
H arrison (1982, p. 86) describe this p attern .
W ith a deliberate policy of enacting no zoning law s and doing
practically n o planning, Houston a n d other boomtown cities have
been virtually overrun b y th e Influx of capital. Growth h a s
occurred so rapidly and haphazardly th a t boomtown m etropol
ises now paradoxically exhibit m any of the sam e urban w oes that
plague n o rth ern central cities. To m o st planners, "Houston's
sprawling growth rep resen ts how n o t to do it. In Houston,
developers c a n build w h a t they w ant, when th e y want, w here
they want. While su ch laissez-faire certainly engenders boom 
town vitality, it also creates boom-town problem s.
B ut w ith the subordination of city development to th e needs of co
ordinated in d u strial expansion, th e problem s of G aiy were associated
not w ith sprawling growth b u t w ith constrained development a s space
was jealously conserved for th e addition of steel mill capacity.
Among the problem s of Gaiy, the m o st socially disorganizing
were associated w ith housing. First, G aiy was overcrowded. T he
housing problem w as com pounded by the fact th at n o t only w as rela
tively little space given over to housing development, b u t expansion of
the residential section of the city was restricted by a rechanneling of
the G ran d Calumet River so th a t it was situated on one side by Lake
M ichigan and on th e other side by the river, and beyond the river, by
the m ills (Greer 1979, p. 60, a n d O’Connor 1935, p. 256). The result
of th is w as a housing shortage described b y Davis (1933, p. 72), who in
quoting a 1922 rep o rt of the U.S. Children's B ureau s ta te s of Gary,
H ousing shortage severe enough to ham per th e passage a n d
enforcem ent of regulations governing building a n d sanitation has
existed in G ary practically from the beginning.
In a related way, th e housing situation reflected the class composition
and th e composition of the workforce at Gary.

2 53
Typical of th e steel Industry at th e time, the labor force w as
composed of a m ajority of unskilled and a m inority of skilled laborers.
Also, th e wage situation in th e industry w as bleak. In a letter of the
National Committee of the American Federation of Labor se n t to Elbert
Gary on th e eve of th e nationwide Steel Strike of 1919, it w as stated:
The conditions of employment, th e home life, the m isery in the
hovels of the steel workers is beyond description. You m ay not
be aw are th a t the stan d ard of life of the average steel worker is
below the p au p er line, w hich m eans th a t charitable institutions
fu rn ish to th e p au p er a b etter home, more food, clothing, light
an d h eat th a n m any steel workers can bring into their lives upon
the com pensation received for p u ttin g forth th eir b est efforts in
the steel in d u stry (quoted in Foster 1920, pp. 83-84).
This assessm en t of living conditions w as borne o u t by an independent
stu d y u n d ertak en by th e Interchurch World Movement in 1920 to
determ ine the causes of the strike. On wages and stan d ard of living,
the inquiry determ ined the following for 1919 (Interchurch World
Movement 1920, p. 85, em phasis in the original):
• "The an n u al earnings of over one-third of all productive iron and
steel workers were an d had been for years, below th e level se t by
governm ent experts as the m inim um su b sisten ce stan d ard for families
of five."18
• "The an n u al earnings of 72% of all [steel] workers were, an d had
been for years below th e level se t by government experts as th e
m inim um of comfort level for families of five."
• "Skilled steel labor is paid wages disproportionate to th e earnings of
th e other two thirds, th u s binding the skilled class to the com panies
and creating divisions between it and th e rest of th e force."
18 At the time, a family of five w as considered to be of average size.
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This Industrywide condition w as reflected in th e h o u sin g
situation of Gary, Indiana. In general, skilled w orkers were often able
to afford hom es, financed by morgage money m ade available by Gary
Land Company. Rates were generally favorable, an d as G reer (1979, p.
67-69) argues, this situ atio n was politically expedient from th e point
of view of th e corporation. First, th e availability of home ownership for
skilled labor, who represented a scarcer form of labor power, tied
them "into a position of dependency through...privileges afforded to
th e la b o r aristocracy'." This dependency operated to prevent skilled
laborers lending any active political support to Gary's unskilled labor
force. Jux tap o sed to th e four- to six-room frame housing u n it were
w h at O'Connor (1935, p. 256-257) describes a s th e "flimsy shacks" on
w hich real estate speculators m ade a retu rn of fifty percent an d the
"double dry goods boxes" of "Hunkyville" which appeared in j u s t one
year from th e city's creation.19
In general, the socially disorganized development of G ary and
th e process w hich accounted for its growth—th e flight of cap ital and
its relocation—resem ble th e dynam ics of contem porary u rb a n develop
m ent described by w riters su ch as Bluestone an d H arrison in their
support of th e deindustrialization th esis and th eir analysis of th e rela
tionship betw een boomtown and bust-tow n development.
19 Greer (1979, p. 70), com ments: "The corporation made one small
effort at housing its unskilled workers, b u t its fifty four-room wood
fram e houses for this purpose were quickly to m down w hen th e
laborers doubled up in order to afford th e rents." Also, in com paring
the situation in Gary to those of other steel areas, O'Connor (1935, p.
256) states, "The Corporation could com plain th a t It inherited the
slum s along the Monongahela b u t Gary, Indiana, w as its own creation,
built on the uninhabited san d dim es.”
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Conclusions
Of th e factory closures th a t occurred between 1901 an d 1930,
Hogan (1971, p. 491) com m ents:
In su c h a large aggregate of plants, as was assem bled in the
United S tates Steel Corporation, one m ight well expect to find a
num ber of obsolete plants. One of the fortunate aspects of size is
the ability to abandon and write-off these p lan ts w ithout harm ing
the m ain structure. It resem bles a pruning operation on a tree
and gives the rem ainder great strength.
W hat Is notable here w ith respect to Hogan's statem en t an d develop
m ents w ithin th e United States Steel Corporation is, first, th e sim i
larity of th is tu m -of-the-centuiy process to corporate developments In
steel since th e 1970s w hich Mueller (1982, pp. 76-77), In explaining
th e contem porary wave of factory closures, described as "major s u r
gery on the substance of...companies" an d as "stream lining operations"
in order to elim inate "stru ctu ral deficiencies."20 The difference, how
ever, between the two is th a t the form er is taken to describe corpo
rate developments in the period of massive national industrialization,
and the latter is taken to describe a cu rren t wave of deindustrializa
tion.
Secondly, despite th e imagery of "creative destruction" th a t Is
characteristic of both, one is struck in Hogan's account with the age of
m any of the p lan ts th a t were sh u t down in this process of locational
change u n d ertak en by U.S. Steel, m any of them having been opened
only shortly before being dism antled. This is especially tru e of those
concerned prim arily w ith finished steel products. Several examples
stand out:

20 See chapter 2.

256

• The Ellwood City W orks a t Ellwood City, Pennsylvania, w hich
produced plates for tinning and steel sheets, w as In operation since
1893 an d dism antled in 1902.
•The Johnstow n W orks a t Johnstow n, Pennsylvania, which produced
tinning plates, was p u t Into operation In 1898 a n d dism antled in
1901.
• The D ennison W orks a t Dennison, Ohio, w hich produced tinning
sheets, w as p u t into operation in 1897 and dism antled in 1905.
• A nother producer of tinning sheets, th e A tlanta Works, of A tlanta,
Indiana, w as p u t into operation in 1895 and dism antled in 1902.
• The A tlanta Mill a t A tlanta, Georgia, producers of steel hoops and
cotton ties, w as built in 1900 an d dism antled in 1902.
• The Toledo Works a t Toledo, Ohio, w hich produced sem i-finished
steel for tube making, w as p u t into operation in 1896 and dism antled
in 1905.
If we look at instances of factory closure su c h as these in
com parison to cu rren t concern w ith factory clo su res in the steel
industry, w hat we notice is th a t th e issu e of deindustrialization h a s
been developed with reference to th e closure of factories m any of
w hich h ad been in operation prior to or since th e closure of th ese
plants. For example, Lynd's (1982) an d B uss an d R edbum 's (1983)
accounts rely on analysis of the 1977 closures of th e Campbell Works,
in operation since 1901; the Brier Hill Works, in operation since
1912; an d the McDonald Works, in operation since 1924. Also,
B ensm an an d Lynch's (1987) account of factory closures in th e Chicago
area during the early 1980s em phasizes analysis of th e shutdow ns of
W isconsin Steel, a subsidiary of International Harvester, in operation
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since 1902, an d the South W orks of N orth Chicago Rolling Mill, w hich
w as first p u t into operation in 1880. T his lends su p p o rt to the id ea
th a t factory closures can be historically located w ithin a general
process of investm ent and disinvestm ent w hich am ong other th in g s
w as as vital to th e building of th e nation's industrial heartland a t th e
tu rn of the century as to its dism antling in the contem porary period.
Also, with p articu lar reference to the case of Gary, Indiana, factory
closures were as im portant to urbanization and the rise of that city a s a
m anufacturing center as they are taken to be currently In the process
of the destruction of cities an d com m unities with essentially sim ilar
socially disorganizing Impacts.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS: THE HISTORICAL FACTORY CLOSURE
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALIST SOCIETY

Introduction
The overall concern of this dissertation h a s been w ith the issu e
of factory closures. In th is study, th e factory closure h a s been treated
historically In order to discover its relationship to the general process
of capitalist development and in so doing to re-evaluate th e tendency
to em phasize th e im portance of su c h events only with specific regard
to th e theoretically form ulated process of deindustrialization w hich
generally characterizes cu rren t literature.
At each point in th is study of th e American steel in d u stry s u b s e 
q u en t to 1865 and of factory closures In th is development, I have em 
phasized different aspects of capitalist development. In ch ap ter 3, the
destruction of th e iron industry an d the transition to steel production
w as related to th e destruction of the craft-based workforce and its
conversion to a n industrial one. T hus, the connection of capital de
stru ctio n to interclass processes, m ost notably, the conflict between
capital and wage-labor an d the subsum ption of labor to th e conditions
of capitalistic production, w as stressed. The central conflict of th is
time w as the extension of capitalist control over production in conflict
w ith direct producers. C hapter 4 covered th e role of th e factory
closure during th e corporate revolution—the period of tr u s t form ation
w hich, in the steel industry, culm inated in th e rise of th e "royal
dom ain" of th e United S tates Steel Corporation. Here, th e connection
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between the factory closure an d Intraclass processes, especially those
concerning capitalist com petition horizontally, vertically, an d spatially
over m ark et control were brought to th e forefront. In the passage
from in d u strial control of th e independently owned firm to th e
oligopolistic tru st, th e im portance of factory closures in th e extension
of capitalist control over production in conflict w ith each other can be
observed. C hapter 5 w as a discussion of the historical role of factory
closures in the spatial development of American capitalism , p articu 
larly w ith regard to the development of the American steel industry.
Here, b o th u rb an and regional development were stressed, an d the
im portance of factory closures to the rise of m anufacturing cities like
Youngstown, Ohio, an d Gary, Indiana, an d with them the rise of the
m anufacturing belt were discussed in relation to th e parallel issue of
u rb an a n d regional development which typifies c u rre n t deindustrial
ization literature. The historical im portance of factory closures to
creation of class and m arket conditions and to the organization of
geographical relations across international borders, within th e domes
tic context, in regions, and in localities, holds im plications for the
m anner in w hich deindustrialization theory is currently formulated.
The deindustrialization view is seen to contain several shortcom ings,
each of w hich is related to th e narrow historical focus which charac
terizes th is approach to economic development.
In general, the history of factory closures in th e steel industry of
the United States reveals th eir im portance within th e process through
which conditions of capital accum ulation are reproduced, especially as
this process relates to th e activities of capitalist firms. J u s t a s the
sta te more or less advances th e interests of capital generally consti-
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tuted, the firm advances those of capital constituted In particular.
R enner (1949. passim) asserts, for example, th a t th e organizational
form of the firm accounts for the reproduction of capital in particular
in a way analogous to the process by w hich the sta te provides for the
reproduction of capital in general (Brown 1986, pp. 95-96, a n d cf.
Poulantzas 1975; Miliband 1969; and Zald 1970, pp. 221-257). The
firm, like the state, secures th e interests of individual capitals which
seek the maximization of profit under com pulsion of com petition
(O’Connor 1984, p. 191). T hat is, the firm organizes the in terests of
individual capitals against each other an d m irrors th e way th e state
organizes the interests of a national capitalist class against o th e r
national capitalist classes. If, as Poulantzas (1975, p. 133) argues, the
capitalist state is the purely political expression of economic relations,
th e n the capitalist firm is the strictly economic expression of political
relations, i.e., between the interests of capital and labor forces and
between capitalists and each other. This idea is contained in Anthony
Sam pson's (1980) reference, in his corporate history of International
Telephone and Telegraph, to ITT as a "sovereign state," and is tacitly
recognized In E lbert Gary's reference to United S tate s Steel Corpora
tion a s a "steel republic" (Hogan 1971, p. 470). Factory closures, along
w ith other actions taken by capitalist firm s, reproduce the conditions
of capital accum ulation as capitalists engaged in competition p u rsu e
the discipline of labor forces, create the conditions for the sale of
labor power, attem p t to discipline each other, i.e., advance th e ir par
ticular interests over and against those of other capitalists, create and
extend m arkets for labor an d other commodities, a n d create in
organization of space the conditions conducive to th is accum ulation.
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Problems A ssociated w ith th e Ahlstorlcal
N ature of th e D eindustrialization Thesis
As stated a t the outset of th is work, Bluestone and H arrison's
formulation of the theory of deindustrialization h a s become m ost influ
ential in cu rren t sociological w ork on the issue. But, th eir focus is
upon American industrial development su b seq u en t to th e Second
World War. They assum e, especially with respect to the issu e of fac
tory closures, th a t the post-W orld War II period is m arkedly different
from th a t of the pre-World W ar II period. This is to say th a t the prob
lem is n o t factory closures in themselves, b u t th e scale an d velocity of
capital flight w hich by virtue of its intensity, especially since the
1970s, m akes contem porary development problem atic. T his aspect of
Bluestone an d H arrison's work is sum m arized by Zipp (1984, p. 225):
Although p lan t closings have occurred throughout th e history
of industrialized capitalism , w hat is new in the U.S. is the
frequency and scale of su c h closings in som e regions an d the
resulting public aw areness th a t they rep resen t a th re a t to the
economic and social well-being of those affected areas.
To Bluestone an d H arrison (1982, pp. 105-106), the problem Is one of
degree, of quantify, not of investm ent b u t of "hyper-investment" which
brings "hyper-disinvestment" an d unprecedented rates of factory clos
ures. Such developments are equated with th e organizational trend
among b u sin ess firms to conglomerate.
Capital mobility and the form it takes in th e plant shutdow n is
treated a s an outcome of U.S. corporate growth in the th ree decades
following the w ar (Zipp 1984, p . 230).

Factory closures in th is view

are associated only with th e tren d toward th e conglomerate diversifi
cation of capitalist firms. For example, as steel firms move o u t of steel
production to more profitable endeavors or m arkets, they leave closed
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steel mills In their wake. Therefore, factory closures In the era of
conglomeration are considered a "newly Im portant aspect" of capital
accum ulation, e.g., in th e conflict betw een capital a n d labor over con
trol of th e workplace an d wages, etc. (Zipp 1984, p. 226).

In th is way

factory closures are th e result of th e dism antling of th e nation's basic
capacity to produce.
The choice of th e p o st-1945 period as the m ajor concern of
deindustrialization theory rests u p o n the assertion th a t p atterns of
dom estic capitalist development su b seq u en t to 1945 are distinct from
those prior to 1945—distinct because growth In th e post-war period
w as unprecedented. This assertion led to a further assum ption ab o u t
factory closures in each period. While It Is often recognized th a t fac
tory shutdow ns are nothing new to capitalist development, it is gener
ally held th a t prior to 1945, p lan ts were closed m ore often as a re su lt
of b u sin e ss failure. T h at is, plant shutdow ns were m ore or less passive
outcom es of the norm al process of capitalist com petition. In th is way,
there h a s been a fundam ental change in the ch aracter of plant s h u t
downs (Bluestone an d Harrison 1982, p. 15, and Zipp 1984, p. 229).
Of th e post-w ar era, deindustrialization, and factory closures, Bluestone an d Harrison (1982, p. 15) 'write:
D eindustrialization does not ju s t happen. Conscious decisions
have to be m ade by corporate m anagers to move a factory from
one location to another, to b u y u p a going concern or to dispose
of one, or to s h u t down a facility altogether. These things never
happen autom atically nor are they simply a passive response to
m ysterious m ark et forces. The planning b ehind such decisions
is usually intricate, often costly, an d extensive.
In th e post-w ar period, shutdow ns are outcomes of active conscious
m anagem ent decisions characteristic of th e conglomeration process.
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In the pre-w ar period, they are passive resu lts of Im personal forces
characteristic of th e age of horizontal a n d vertical m erger (Bluestone
and H arrison 1982, p. 123). However, su c h corporate practices as
buying th e p lan ts of com petitors in order to sh u t th em down as firms
p u rsu ed th e construction of horizontally an d vertically Integrated
operations culm inating in th e formation of United S tate s Steel Corpo
ration dem onstrates th a t closures were n o t ju s t passive outcom es of
m arket forces.
It seem s th a t every stage of national capitalist developm ent is
accom panied by unprecedented rates of factory closure relative to
preceding stages, an d w hat Bluestone an d H arrison state above con
cerning post-World W ar II factory closures w as tru e also of th e period
of industrialization an d steel industry form ation from th e end of the
Civil War. If horizontal and vertical m erger/integration are th o u g h t of
along w ith conglomerate m erger/diversification as "particular accum 
ulation models" (Amin 1975, p. 357) developed a t th e level of th e firm
in th e historical development of capitalism, th en factory closures are
seen to be not a "newly im portant aspect of capital accum ulation," b u t
are central in the formation of each. As such, factory closures th en
contribute to the historical reproduction of the conditions of capital
accum ulation. The history of th e steel in d u stry dem onstrates th a t fac
tory closures are a s m uch a p a rt of vertical and horizontal integration
of steel firm s, i.e., of their entrenchm ent in steel production, th e
building of steel producing capacity and w ith it of th e creation an d ex
tension of the nation's basic capacity to produce, as they are of con
glomeration and th e dism antling of the n atio n 's basic capacity to
produce.
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The focus of contem porary sociological analyses of the deindus
trialization process principally upon th e era of conglomeration h a s led
to the advance of a theory w ith a narrow historical focus. It h a s
neglected to take in to account th e way in which th e very cities and
regions currently undergoing deindustrialization were them selves
created through a similarly conscious process in w hich closure of
factories and movement of capital was essential. If. as Bluestone and
H arrison (1982, p. 106) claim, "Growth in the S unbelt...is surely
happening at the expense of th e Frostbelt," then it w as also tru e th a t
growth of the C alum et steel region happened a t th e expense of Penn
sylvania, and the rise of Gary a n d Youngstown took place a t th e ex
pense of Pittsburgh, as well a s involving th e movement of capital out of
the city of Chicago itself. In h is criticism of the "spatial reification"
implied in the term s "Frostbelt" and "Sunbelt," R ichard Peet (1984,
45) sta tes,
The change in employment location during the 1970s an d early
1980s can therefore be explained a s a move from "Frost Belt" to
"Sun Belt" only as long as "frost" an d "sun" refer to the social
conditions for profit-making.
Taking th is one step further, th e history of the steel in d u stry implies
as well th a t "frost" an d "sun" refer to th e h isto riral conditions of
profit-making an d th a t the tendency to reify the p resen t m u st be
resisted.
Historically, th e possibility of disinvestm ent exists once m ulti
plant operations of capitalist firm s come into being. It is th en th a t the
conditions exist for taking profits from one endeavor or location and
shifting them to another. It is also then th a t factory shutdow ns, d is
m antling, and abandonm ent e n te r into the: (1) cycle of labor control
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exemplified in th e tran sitio n from iron to steel production; (2) cycle
of capitalist com petition exemplified in th e deliberate policy of buying
the plan ts of com petitors in order to close them and shifting useable
p a rts to other facilities as corporations extend horizontal and vertical
control over production; and (3) geographic shift of capital to other
locations exemplified by the shift of steel production from B ritain to
the United States an d w ithin th e latter from ea st to w est. The impli
cations of factory closures w ithin the areas of labor control and capi
talist com petition are fundam entally the sam e betw een th e periods of
domestic in d u strial formation an d domestic industrial disformation.
Also, besides class and capitalist competition, factoiy closures
historically play a fundam ental role in the creation of the spaceeconomy of capitalism or the organization of geographic space w hich
assum es th e form of "business climate" or w h at Jaffee (1986, p. 300)
calls th e "social stru ctu re of accumulation" w hich includes "elements
of the external environm ent th a t impinge on th e process of capital
accum ulation." The historical effect of the movement of capital into
and ou t of nations, regions, and localities is th e form ation of the "built
environment" of changing landscapes w hich Harvey (1982, p. 233)
describes in these term s:
The b u ilt environm ent com prises a whole ho st of diverse ele
m ents: factories, dam s, offices, shops, w arehouses, roads, rail
ways, docks, power stations, w ater supply and sewage disposal
system s, schools, hospitals, parks, cinem as, re sta u ra n ts—th e list
is endless....At any one m om ent the b u ilt environm ent appears as
a palim psest of landscapes fashioned according to th e dictates of
different modes of production at different stages in th eir h isto r
ical development. Under th e social relations of capitalism ,
however, all elem ents assum e a commodity fonn....The built
environm ent h a s to be regarded, then, as a geographically
ordered, complex com posite commodity.
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I suggest, th e n , the Importance of stressin g historical continuity be
tw een stages of capitalist development rath er th a n assum ing historical
disjuncture, for example, between pre- and post-W orld W ar II periods.
B luestone a n d Harrison (1982, p. 121) are essentially correct when
th ey equate concentration of capital within corporations w ith capital
mobility an d therefore w ith factory closures. However, they are incor
re c t to imply th e fundam ental im portance of th e conglom erate form of
corporate control only. T his socio-hlstorical analysis dem onstrates as
well the im portance of factory closures in the process of capital be
coming concentrated in horizontal an d vertical m ergers. In each era,
factory closures share essentially th e sam e relationship to th e general
process of capitalist development w hether or n o t th e th ru s t of th a t
development is growth o r decline of industry in th e dom estic context.
To this extent, the post-Civil War history of the steel in d u stry is not, as
E.H. Carr (1961, pp. 23-24) would say, "a dead p ast, b u t a p a s t which
in some sense is still living in the present."
Capital Accumulation and the Progress of Social Disorganization
Swartz a n d Bonello (1986, p. 17) sum m arize the positions of
McKenzie an d Bluestone an d H arrison on the issu e of deindustrializa
tion in the d eb ate over w hether or n o t corporations exploit w orkers
a n d com m unities. McKenzie's basic argum ent is th a t disinvestm ent
from one p lan t to another or one p a rt of an enterprise to a n o th er p art
of th e same enterprise is totally consistent with th e profit maximiza
tion rule advanced by neoclassical economists. The closure of plants is
a n aspect of a healthy economy w hich is continually restru ctu red
according to th e criteria of economic efficiency, th e benefits of which
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eventually reach all segm ents of society. Bluestone and H arrison's
basic argum ent is th a t disinvestm ent and factory closure "violate the
internal logic of [neoclassical economics" since consideration of
profitability does n o t necessarily enter into decisions to d o se plants.
In the process, im m ense h ard sh ip s are im posed "on w orkers and
com m unities where they are located." But, th e em phasis u p o n post1945 developm ents w ithin the dom estic economy carries w ith it the
implication th a t the destructive aspects of capitalist development are
confined to the p resen t historical period an d com prise a deviation
from w h at is otherwise a healthy accum ulation process.
A ddressing th e argum ents of both the McKenzie school an d the
Bluestone an d H arrison school, m y position on the Issue of deindustri
alization as it is currently form ulated can be sum m arized as follows. By
looking a t th e history of the steel industry an d placing factory closures
in historical perspective, McKenzie's observation th a t disinvestm ent Is
consistent w ith th e logic of profit maximization, characteristic of
capitalist development, is correct to the extent th a t events su c h as
factory closures can be located w ithin the process whereby th e condi
tions for accum ulating capital are reproduced. It Is incorrect for Bluestone and Harrison to conclude th a t such events are aberrations of the
accum ulation process on the b asis of their scale an d intensity in the
post-Wold W ar II period. B ut Bluestone and H arrison are correct
insofar a s th e operation of the accum ulation process involves th e
imposition of hardships upon w orkers and com m unities. Again, this is
characteristic of capitalist industrial history in general and n o t unique
to the p resen t or to the domestic situation. Social disorganization is
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a n aspect of th e logic of capitalist development, i.e., accum ulation is
social disorganization.
In their criticism of the view th a t factory closures are p a rt of the
creative destru ctio n process th ro u g h which capitalist society
advances, the m o st significant contribution of deindustrialization
th eo rists has b een th e docum entation of th e destructive asp ects of
capitalist social development u p o n workers a n d com m unities, not only
th o se com m unities experiencing factory closures, b u t so-called reindustrializing cities su ch as H ouston. The physical, emotional, and
m ental health co sts of deindustrialization are well docum ented (cf.
B luestone 1984, pp . 39-51; Nelson and Lorence 1985, pp. 71-86;
Lam phere 1985, pp. 259-268; H opper 1985, pp. 183-236; a n d Perrucci 1986, pp. 215-228). In each case they tell a story of th e greater
incidence of loss of Income, illnesses, stress, divorce, suicide, feelings
of inadequacy an d the inability of com munity welfare agencies to con
front su ch problem s as revenues are progressively dried up. Rayman
an d Bluestone (1982, p. 262), for example, also find that.
Families were n o t the only prim ary group caught u p In th e rip
pling effect of Job loss events....The m ost common reported
effect of job lo ss was increased distancing from friends an d coworkers, feeling less and less in touch w ith others.
At Youngstown, following the closures of Brier Hill, Campbell Works,
an d McDonald W orks, Buss an d R edbum (1983, pp. 73-78) report
higher rates of crime, mortality, an d liquor sales. Bluestone a n d Har
rison (1982, p. 64) also say of Youngstown th a t,
Headaches, u p se t stom achs and feelings of depression were the
m ost widely-reported h ea lth problems. Aggressive feelings,
anxiety, and alcohol abuse were the observed psychological con
sequences of th e Youngstown steel closings.

It is on th e b asis of s u c h findings th a t proponents of th e deindustrial
ization th e sis claim to be describing the destructive side of creative
destruction.
The limited historical scope of the deindustrialization argum ent
h a s brought with it a model not only of the com m unity destroyed by
factory closures b u t a model of the com m unity prior to su ch events. It
is an idealized com m unity founded upon a stability w hich is tho u g h t to
accom pany employment. In the conclusion to their stu d y of the im 
pacts of steel mill closings in S outh Chicago in the early 1980s. Bensm an and Lynch (1987, p. 208) state:
Economic dislocation, social traum a, an d dwindling resources
are combined to underm ine a basic u n it of American society--our
com munities. Ever since the P uritans founded th e M assachu
setts B ay Colony, the ideal of com m unity h as been central to
American culture, a counterweight to th is country's restless
individualism....Economic stability is critical for sustained com
m unity life: th u s it is th a t m any of our m ost enduring com m uni
ties have been linked to a m ajor workplace. This is tru e n o t Ju st
of renowned in d u strial areas like S outheast Chicago or Youngs
town. Even the m o st bucolic of small tow ns can often be found
to sh elter a granary, a m eat-packing plant, or an au to parts
factory.
In the development of th e steel industry, th is stable com m unity or
G em elnschaft. as consistent with a n ideal of com m unity, did not exist
in th e period of in d u strial formation. The tow ns which are currently
being destroyed by decisions to close factories m ade according to the
criteria of capital accum ulation were originally built through the very
sam e force. The history of Gary, Indiana, is b u t one example of this.
Steel com m unities were creations of capital in th e first place so th a t
com m unities are historically not so m uch a basic u n it of American
society as th ey are a vital organization of space in the process of capital
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accum ulation. F or example, a conclusion of th e Interchurch World
Movement (1920, pp. 184-185, and cf. Davis 1933, p. 140) w as that.
The [United States Steel] Corporation owns towns. In m any
localities institutions, su ch a s churches, schools and news
papers, are dependent on it for existence.
This control of firm s over local institutions, and over su ch things as
housing, recreation, even th e m anner in w hich th e town is to be built
and developed, led Foster (1920, pp. 1-8 and 25) and Davis (1933, pp.
139-140) to describe steel tow ns as organized u n d e r a system of
"industrial feudalism .”
T his is n o t to say th a t life in the steel tow ns and other industrial
centers w as completely devoid of com munality. For example, the
church, union hall, household, club, an d especially the working class
and eth n ic neighborhood, e t cetera, arose w ithin th e towns and
formed th e bases of working class com m unity an d culture. These
G em einschafts grew—although often in unw itting collusion w ith the
interests of capital—despite a n d often in resistance to attem p ts to
control labor an d to organize social life and living space according to
the dictates of capital accum ulation.
Not ironically, the im pacts on life conditions of w orkers and
families living in steel towns were n o t dissim ilar to im pacts experi
enced b y workers currently undergoing factory closures. V arious
accounts point to feelings of despair, disruption of family life as a
consequence of long hours of mill work, m ental an d physical exhaus
tion, low income, susceptibility to various diseases, industrial acci
dents, e t cetera. Davis (1933, p. 72), for example, states:
T he steel tow n is not a healthy place to live in. One of the best
w ays to ju d g e the healthfulness of a town is to look a t its Infant
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m ortality rate. The steel towns having an infant m ortality rate
above th e average outnum ber th e steel tow ns below average by
two to one. Especially pestilential are Steubenville, Ohio, with a
rate of 110.8 d eath s under one year of age p er 1,000 live births.
Ashland, Ky., w ith a rate of 109.6, and Steelton (near H arris
burg), Pa., with a ra te of 103.6, compared w ith a general average
for all cities of 65.5.
Also, M argaret Byington (1910, p. 184) concludes in her survey of
hom e life in Hom estead th a t,
...the wives of m any of its workers may find life merely a round of
wearisome task s In th e attem pt to make b o th ends m eet; its
m en m ay be too w orn by the stre ss of twelve h o u r sh ifts to care
for th eir own individual development or too shorn of selfdependence to exert themselves to m aintain a borough govern
m ent th a t shall give them b etter living conditions. "Life, work,
and hap p in ess,—th ese three are bound together." The mill
offers the one, subject to no effective dem and by society nor
commercial necessity th a t th e w ork shall b e done u n d e r con
ditions w hich m ake the other two possible.
The problem atic im pacts currently associated w ith factory closures
an d th e destruction of steel cities are historically concom itant to the
problem s associated w ith capitalist industrialization and th e Impacts of
the creation of those sam e cities. The unilateral power of steel corpo
ratio n s within these com m unities d uring the early 1900s h a s a s its
m irror image th e unilateral power to close plants, b oth of w hich have
socially destructive im plications for peoples’ lives.
Historically, w orkers and com m unities suffer consequences of
factory location a s well a s factory dislocation. The problem is n o t one
of employment v ersus unemployment, b u t of the historically created
conditions of w ork life in general and its relation to other asp ects of
life. Factory closures are n o t currently undoing social solidarity
created in a p a s t age of industrialization, because capitalist industriali
zation w as never conducive to solidarity. The image of the com m unity
advanced in cu rren t studies of factory closures is sim ilar in one sense
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to th e problem atic ethnographic Image of nonlndustrlal or p ea san t
societies w hich m any anthropologists are currently criticizing. It is an
image of the purely traditional and untouched society w ithout history
u n til confronted by modernity. "History is often treated as som ething
th a t arrives, like a ship, from outside the society in question" (O rtner
1984, p. 143). In the deindustrialization literature, a com m unity's
tradition leaves w ith the factory.
Friedrich Engels (1845/1987, p. 40) noted a s well the d e stru c 
tive character of capitalist industrialization and th e form of urb an iza
tion It entailed in his description of M anchester an d th e emergence of
E ngland as th e "workshop of the world." Quite contrary from th e
image of G em einschaft. Engels (1845/1987, p. 69) says of the m a n u 
facturing towns:
...the social war, the w ar of each against all. Is here openly
declared. J u s t as In S tim er's recent book, people regard each
other as useful objects: each exploits the other, and the end of it
all is, th a t th e stronger treads th e weaker u n d e r foot, and th a t
the powerful few, the capitalists, seize everything for them 
selves, while to the weak many, th e poor, scarcely a bare
existence rem ains.
David Harvey (1973, pp. 121-147) gives credit to Engels for first
discovering th e relationship between th e creation of th e city as a
context for capital accum ulation and social misery. Factory dislocation
and factory location to th e extent th a t b oth enter Into the process of
creating conditions conducive to accum ulation carry w ith them
socially destructive costs. W hat Bluestone and H arrison and others
describe as the social im pacts of factory closures are n o t the outcom e
of deindustrialization so m uch as they are of the capital accum ulation
process in general. The cu rren t situation In places like Youngstown
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and w ith it the socially disorganized growth of H ouston w ith its "’73square-m ile slum"' an d large perm anent underclass (Bluestone and
H arrison 1982, pp. 87-88) contain th e contem porary an d domestic
consequences of th a t alienating process (cf. Oilman 1976, p. 137). B ut
such consequences are n o t unique to th e cu rren t period wherein th e
nation's basic capacity to produce is being dism antled. The history of
factory closures in th e steel industry indicates that, ultimately, they
are no t p a rt of the process of creative destruction. Nor Is their
Im portance limited m erely to illustrating the destructive side of
creative destruction. Rather, they exist w ithin a universe of events
w hich dem onstrate th a t th e very process of capital accum ulation is
one of destructive creation.
Sum m ary
In th is dissertation, the historical case of the development of the
United S tates steel in d u stry from the end of the Civil W ar to 1929 w as
used in a socio-historical analysis in order to address the theory of
deindustrialization by examining the role of factory closures in the
formation of the nation's basic capacity to produce. Two basic conclu
sions are reached w hen the period of industrial form ation is compared
to th a t currently held to be the period of industrial disformation.
First, factory closures were seen to play a s im portant a role in the
formation of industry an d the centralization of capital culm inating in
the establishm ent of th e United S tates Steel Corporation a s they do
contem porarily in th e dism antling of th e domestic steel industry. For
example, factory closures and capital flight, advanced b y su ch theorists
as Bluestone and H arrison as the central m echanism of deindustrial
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ization, were crucial in th e formation of the cities an d regions which
are curren tly the objects of concern w ithin the deindustrialization
literature and w ithin th e process through w hich th e United States
rose to pre-em inence a s a capitalist Industrial natio n as well as within
the process w herein th a t position declined In th e post-w ar period.
Secondly, it is suggested th a t factory closures are historically impor
tan t In th e reproduction and expansion of the social conditions of
capital accum ulation, i.e., the social relations of class an d m arket. This
is to say th a t factory closures are events w herein th e following are
created, extended, an d intensifed: (1) social conditions u n d er which
labor-power is bought and sold, for example, in the increasing su b 
sum ption of labor "as a factor of production whose guiding force is
capital" w hich forms "the 'logic' of capital's self-expansion" an d pro
gressively resolves labor power, for example In its form a s craft, into
increasingly simplified forms (Aronowitz 1978, p. 126, an d Marx
1859/1970, p. 31); (2) social conditions of capitalist com petition
where individual capitals compete w ith each other over rights to
control su rp lu s and opportunities for profit an d w here concentration
of capital reproduces com petition on a "higher scale and in m ore acute
form" (Mandel 1968, p. 434); an d (3) the organization of space in a
way conducive to capital accum ulation including the ordering of space
at the local and regional levels in the process of urbanization an d in
the process where:
In p u rsu it of profit, all capitalists m u st be willing to go wherever
th e highest rate of profit can be obtained. In a very real sense,
im perialism is sim ply the extra-state expression of th is dynamic
in h eren t in all forms of capital accum ulation. Capital as such
recognizes no su c h thing as foreign raw m aterials, foreign labor
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supplies, and foreign m arkets, b u t only sees opportunltes (Smith
1981, p. 229, an d cf. Perlman 1977, p. 64).
In general factory closures are understood not to be th e outcom es of
a n aberration of an otherwise healthy accum ulation process specific to
th e current era and resulting in th e dism antling of th e natio n 's basic
capacity to produce. They are, rath er, in th e history of capitalist
developm ent, located w ithin the process tho u g h w hich corporations
seek to overcome the real barriers to capitalist production imposed by
capital itself (Marx 1894/1967, p. 250).
The problem s of th e deindustrialization th esis as currently
form ulated are understood to be a function of its limited historical
scope. These can be added to a range of problem s identified by other
com m entators relevant to lim itations of scope in other areas. For
example, di Leonardo (1985, pp. 238-243) argues th a t th e deindustri
alization concept em erged as a new discourse on th e economy which
focuses its attention on th e "American economy alone an d on its bluecollar white m ale workers." The outcome is th a t "the deindustrializa
tion model th u s signals a new economic nationalism " w hich falsely
dichotomizes th e U nited S tates and the rest of the world w hich really
exists w ithin a n interconnected capitalist world-economy. H ouston
(1984, p. 259) also describes the deindustrialization th esis as limited
by virtue of its nationalistic bent. Also, H arrington (1984, p. 40) states
th a t factory closures are currently of su c h concern because of their
effect upon America's "labor aristocracy." While I have n o t addressed
su c h issues specifically in this work, it is hoped th a t the historical
orientation of th is stu d y will contribute to shifting attention back to
th e process of capital accum ulation, th e reproduction of capitalist
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society, its implications for social life; an d In so doing, subm erge th e
issue of development of any particular nation or social category of
persons, n o t only with respect to the issu e of factory closures, b u t
regarding other substantive Issues a s well.
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